Canonical and non canonical questions[*]

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Abstract

The general aim of this paper is to make progress in understanding what is common and what is not across canonical and non-canonical questions. After laying out the theoretical assumptions, I argue that the commonly assumed felicity conditions on canonical questions follow from the semantics and the basic conventional discourse effects of unmarked interrogatives. I further argue that special interrogative forms can be used to signal special conventional discourse effects that bring about the weakening or overriding of these default assumptions. As a case study, the properties of interrogatives in Romanian marked by the morpheme *oare* are investigated and accounted for in detail. I argue that *oare*-marked interrogatives exemplify a novel kind of non-canonical question that I dub *non-intrusive*.

1 Introduction

Many languages, including English, have two types of interrogative sentences: (i) formally simple interrogative sentences that can be used to ask 'canonical questions', i.e., questions asked by an ignorant Speaker requesting information from an Addressee presumed to be knowledgeable, and (ii) formally more complex forms that can only be used to asked special, non-canonical questions. The former are exemplified in (1), and the latter in (2):

(1)   a.   Are you hungry?
       b.   Who has Maria invited?

(2)   Maria is joining us, isn't she?

The tag interrogative in (2), assumed to be pronounced with a rising intonation on the tag, can only be used to asked a 'biased' question, i.e., a question that, besides requesting information, signals Speaker bias for the truth of the declarative sentence that precedes the tag.

This formal and functional contrast has been noted before, of course – see, for instance, Dayal [2016], Chapter 9, for a brief discussion. The theoretical goal of this paper is to explain it. Why are canonical questions understood as requests for information, and why is it that simple interrogative forms can be used to ask canonical questions? In what way can non-canonical questions differ from canonical ones, and what connection is there between non-canonical questions and marked forms? Sections 3 and 4 address these questions, against the theoretical background laid out in Section 2.

Section 5 pursues a narrower goal, namely that of introducing on the scene a new type of non-canonical question, dubbed 'non-intrusive', by providing an account of interrogatives in Romanian

marked by the morpheme *oare*, exemplified in (3).[1]

(3)   *Oare* Rodica e aici?
        oare Rodica is here
        Is Rodica here, I wonder.

Besides placing this type of interrogative within the larger family of non-canonical questions, the proposal developed here captures the constraints on the sentence forms that can be marked by *oare*, as well as the contrasts between unmarked interrogatives and *oare*-marked ones.

2   Theoretical assumptions

This section specifies the relevant assumptions concerning the theoretical components that play a role in what follows, namely *compositional semantics*, *discourse structures* and *conventional discourse effects* (CDE).

2.1   Compositional semantics

In line with both Hamblin and Inquisitive Semantics, I assume that declarative and interrogative sentences denote the same type of entity, differentiated only by its inner structure. The discussion below is framed within the framework of Inquisitive Semantics.

The basic terminology and assumptions I adopt are the following. A *proposition* (or state) is a set of worlds. The denotation of both declarative and interrogative sentences is a downward closed set of propositions P, called an *issue*.[2] If P is the denotation of a sentence S, the maximal propositions (sets of worlds) in P will be referred to as the *alternatives* in P. The *informative content* of a sentence denoting an issue P, written as info(P), is $\cup$P, the union of the propositions in P.

I adopt here the view of declarative and interrogative sentences in Roelofsen and Farkas [2015]. Declarative sentences are taken to involve the sentential operator DEC, whose effect is to ensure that info(P) $\in$ P. As a result, the denotation of a declarative sentence contains a unique alternative. Interrogative sentences are taken to involve a sentential operator INT, whose effect is to ensure that info(P) $\notin$ P. The informative content of a typical declarative sentence does not cover the whole logical space provided by the context, while that of an interrogative does. The denotation of declaratives is said to be *non-inquisitive*, and that of interrogatives is said to be *non-informative*.

Finally, I follow Roelofsen and Farkas [2015] and references therein in assuming that sentences highlight the n-place property denoted by their overt element. Declaratives and polar interrogatives highlight a state (a 0-place property), namely the alternative denoted by their sentence radical; constituent interrogatives highlight an n-place property, where n $\geqslant$ 1. Highlighted states are marked in bold faced in what follows.

The denotations of simple declaratives, polar interrogatives and constituent interrogatives are exemplified in (4) - (6).

(4)   a.   Mona arrived.
        b. $\{\{$**w: Mona arrived in w**$\}\}^{\downarrow}$

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[1]An account of this type of question is sketched in Farkas and Bruce [2010]. See Giurgea [2018] for a different proposal, and for references to previous descriptive work suggesting that *oare* in interrogatives marks uncertainty.

[2]A set of propositions P is downward closed iff for every p $\in$ P, if p' $\subset$ p, p' $\in$ P. The symbol $^{\downarrow}$ is used to denote this property.

(5)   a.   Did Mona arrive?
       b.   {{**w: Mona arrived in w**}, {w: Mona did not arrive in w}}$^\downarrow$

(6)   a.   Who arrived?
       b.   {{w: only Mona arrived in w}, {w: only Gail arrived in w}, {w: Mona and Gail arrived in w}}$^{\downarrow 3}$

In the case of (6), the highlighted property is $\lambda x.\ x\ arrived$.

As noted in Theiler [2019], under these assumptions, the three types of sentences exemplified above are grouped into the two natural classes given in (7) and summarized in Figure 1.

(7)   Semantic typology of sentences
       a.   informative (declaratives) vs. purely inquisitive (polar and constituent interrogatives)
       b.   involving a unique highlighted alternative (declaratives, polar interrogatives) vs. not (constituent interrogatives)[4]

	non-inquisitive	non-informative	highlighted state
declaratives	✓	⋆	✓
polar interrogatives	⋆	✓	✓
constituent interrogatives	⋆	✓	⋆

Fig. 1: A semantic typology of sentence types

We turn next to the other two analytical components the discussion rests on, namely context structure, and the effects different sentence types have on the input context structure relative to which they are uttered.

2.2   Context structures

I focus here on those context structure components that are relevant to differentiating between canonical and non-canonical assertions and questions. Considerations concerning the introduction and the tracking of discourse referents are not relevant to these issues and therefore will be ignored below. To simplify, I will assume that the conversation is a dialogue between two participants.

   Building on Farkas and Bruce [2010] and the long tradition that work is rooted in, I assume that a context structure K has at least the following components:

1. a set of discourse participants *Part*

2. for every discourse participant X $\in$ *Part*, DC_X is a set of states, called the *discourse commitments of X*

3. a stack of issues, called the Table

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[3]I assume that the relevant contextual alternatives are reduced to {Mona, Gail}. Whether an exhaustive or non-exhaustive interpretation is intended is immaterial for present purposes, as is the issue of whether constituent interrogatives involve an existential presupposition.

[4]We are ignoring here disjunctive interrogatives that involve multiple highlighted alternatives.

4. a set of future discourse commitments, DC_X, called the projected set (ps)

Below I briefly present each of these components.

Discourse commitments For each discourse participant X, DC_X is the set of propositions X has publicly committed to in the course of the current conversation. The use of discourse commitments in modeling discourse goes back at least to Hamblin [1971]; Gunlogson [2001] and Gunlogson [2008] treat discourse commitments as the essential components of discourse structure.

If $p \in DC_X$, X is publicly committed to $w_a \in p$ for the purposes of the conversation, where w_a is the world in which the conversation takes place. For every DC_X, X will be referred to as the *commitment anchor* of the propositions in DC_X. Given these assumptions, for every $X \in Part$, the set of propositions in DC_X has to be consistent, i.e., $\cap DC_X \neq \emptyset$. For the purposes of the conversation, each $w \in \cap DC_X$ is a candidate for w_a as far as X is concerned.

I follow Gunlogson [2008] in assuming that a participant's commitment set is, by default, supposed to persist throughout the conversation: 'a discourse commitment, once made by an agent, becomes a fixture of that agent's state – it persists, and subsequent commitments (barring revision) to not affect its status.' (p. 109).

If X is sincere, she is actually committed to her public commitments, in which case DC_X is a subset of X's doxastic background. This default case can be publicly overridden when the pragmatics of the situation make it clear that participants are not sincere. A context in which adults talk about Santa Claus in the presence of a child, or situations in which discourse participants wish to mislead an eavesdropper are examples of circumstances in which this assumption is publicly overridden at least for some participants. A different type of non-default situation obtains in cases of story telling or recounting dreams, when there is a 'willing suspension of disbelief for the moment', in Samuel Coleridge's words. These assumptions substitute for that part of Grice's Quality maxim that requires one not to say what one believes to be false.

Discourse commitments are firm, or categorical, precisely because they are projected to stay constant. Languages also provide means of signaling weakened commitments, i.e., commitments that are less than categorical. The main difference between weakened commitments and categorical ones is that the assumption of persistence is weakened in the case of the former. When a participant makes a weakened commitment to a proposition p she signals less certainty relative to w_a being an element of p, and therefore raises the possibility of her withdrawing the commitment altogether in the future of the conversation. To model non-categorical commitments one can assume that discourse commitment lists are subdivided into categorical and non-categorical commitments, with the latter being the special case.

As noted in Farkas and Bruce [2010], the Stalnakerean common ground (cg) and context set (cs) can be derived from the participants' discourse commitments. The former is the set of propositions that are members of each discourse commitment set, and the latter is their intersection.[5]

The Table The Table consists of a stack of active issues awaiting resolution. An issue P on the Table is resolved relative to a context state K iff there is an alternative $p \in P$ such that for every $X \in Part$, $p \in DC_X$. If this condition is met, p is in the cg of the conversation, and P is removed from the Table. Following Farkas and Bruce [2010], I assume that a conversation is in a stable state iff the Table is empty, i.e., there are no open issues awaiting resolution. The canonical way

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[5]The cg includes, in addition to mutually agreed upon commitments, general background knowledge participants assume is shared. Differentiating various types of assumed shared knowledge is an important issue but one that is not relevant to present purposes.

to remove an issue from the Table is to reach a resolution. Non-canonical ways are to agree to disagree or to agree not to pursue the issue further.

I assume that the unresolved issues on the Table are questions under discussion. As such, more structure has to be added to the items on the Table to model the various ways in which a question under discussion can be structured, but these matters are not relevant to present concerns.

The projected set (ps)   The ps is a forward looking conversational space that records canonical immediate future conversational states triggered by discourse moves that raise issues. In Farkas and Bruce [2010], the ps was assumed to be the set of context sets one arrives at once the issues on the Table are resolved. Under this assumption, if the Table has a single issue P, containing a single alternative p, the ps will be the singleton set cs $\cap$ p, where cs is the current cs. If the Table contains a single issue P, containing multiple alternatives $p_1, ..p_n$, the projected set will be the set $\{\text{cs} \cap p_1, \, ... \, , \text{cs} \cap p_n\}$.

Meriçli [2016] argues that this view is not fine-grained enough when it comes to capturing properties of evidential constructions. He suggests that instead of projecting directly those context sets that would be reached if each alternative in the issue on the Table were to be accepted by all participants, one should project the first step that leads to such a context state, namely Addressee reactions. The ps then is that set of Addressee commitment lists in which the Addressee commits to each alternative in the issue on the Table. Thus, in Meriçli's proposal, the ps is a set of projected DC_{Ad}. For each alternative $p \in$ P, the ps contains an element $DC_{Ad} \cup \{p\}$, where DC_{Ad} is the input Addressee discourse commitment list. This is a first step in the process of accepting p as the resolution of P, i.e., having p in the cg and therefore intersecting the input cs with p. I follow here Meriçli [2016] with a slight change, namely, I assume that the anchor of the discourse commitment lists in ps is a free variable whose value is contextually determined, and set to the Addressee by default.

Figure 2 gives a visual representation of the basic context structure components discussed above.

DC_{Sp}	Table	DC_{Ad}
	ps	

Fig. 2: Basic context structure

DC_{Sp} and DC_{Ad} contain sets of propositions, the Table, if not empty, contains a set of issues, and the ps, if not empty, contains a set of discourse commitments, which, by default, are anchored to the Addressee.

2.3   Conventional discourse effects

Conventional discourse effects (CDE) characterize the way a particular sentence affects the input context structure relative to which it is uttered – see Gunlogson [2001], Gunlogson [2008], Condoravdi and Lauer [2012a], Condoravdi and Lauer [2012b], Farkas and Roelofsen [2017]. They are conventional in as much as they are given by linguistic convention; they cannot be inferred

from pragmatic considerations alone. They are called 'discourse effects' because their contribution pertains to the context changes triggered by the utterance of a sentence.

Formally, I assume that CDE are functions from $< \text{S}, \text{P}, \text{K}_i >$ to K_o, where S is the representation of the structure of a sentence, P is the issue expressed by S, K_i is the input context structure, and K_o is the output context structure. Below, CDE are characterized by enumerating the changes they trigger to the relevant components of K_i.

Following Farkas and Roelofsen [2017], I distinguish between basic and special CDE. Basic CDE are determined solely by the semantic content of the sentence they are associated with. I assume here that special CDE are contributed by special forms called d(iscourse)-markers. D-markers can contribute presuppositions, override default settings or trigger additional discourse effects in a monotonic fashion. These discourse effects are context change functions that apply to the output of basic CDE. According to this set up, special CDE can add to the basic effect but cannot override them. Note that special CDE can be recursive, a property needed to account for languages that have stacked d-markers, as found, for instance, in Japanese (see Hirayama [2018] and references therein).

In the next two subsections we turn to the basic conventional discourse effects of declaratives and interrogatives. The discussion that follows adapts the relevant proposals in Farkas and Roelofsen [2017] to the more fine-grained view of discourse structure assumed here.

2.4 The basic conventional discourse effects of declaratives and interrogatives

The basic CDE of a sentence As mentioned above, I follow Farkas and Roelofsen [2017] in assuming that the basic CDE of a sentence are determined by its semantic content alone. These basic CDE are specified in (8), where a subscripted i stands for 'input' and a subscripted o stands for 'output', and where P stands for the issue expressed by a declarative or an interrogative sentence S.

(8)   Basic CDE: $\text{K}_i + \text{S}$

   1.$\text{DC}_{Sp,o} = $ add info(P) to $\text{DC}_{Sp,i}$, denoted by $\text{DC}_{Sp,i}$&info(P)

   2.$\text{Table}_o = \text{Table}_i \circ \text{P}$

   3.$\text{ps}_o = \text{ps}_i \oplus \text{P}$

The first effect in (8) adds the informative content of the sentence expressed to DC_{Sp}. This change publicly commits the Speaker to w_a being an element of some alternative in P. By default, this commitment is categorical, which means that the Speaker presents herself as expecting to hold on to this commitment for the rest of the conversation. If A is a set, A&a is the set obtained by adding a as an element of A, i.e., A&$a = \text{A} \cup \{a\}$.

The second effect adds P, the semantic content of the sentence, on the top of the stack on the Table. As a consequence, the move steers the conversation towards a future state in which this issue is resolved, i.e., a conversational state in which there is a $p \in \text{P}$ such that there is agreement across participants that $w_a \in p$.

The third effect spells out all the possible first steps a participant X can take towards reaching a discourse state in which P is resolved: for each $p \in P$ the ps contains a future $\text{DC}_{X,o} = \text{DC}_{X,i}$&$p$. I assume that by default, the value of X is fixed to the Addressee, an assumption to which we will come back below. Above, $\text{ps}_i \oplus \text{P}$ stands for the operation that adds each $p \in \text{P}$ to each element of ps_i. If the Table is empty, the ps is assumed to be empty as well. Recall that by default, the affected commitments are the categorical ones.

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The effects in (8) are connected. Putting an issue on the Table amounts to a proposal to direct the conversation towards a state in which the issue is solved because a conversational state is stable iff its Table is empty, and the canonical way of removing an issue from the Table is to reach a conversational state in which the issue is resolved. It is therefore natural to assume that the author of such a move, the Speaker, is committed to the possibility of reaching such a state. This means that she is committed to w_a being an element of some alternative in P, which in turn amounts to being committed to info(P). The change to the ps follows from the assumption that the ps encodes the first possible conversational steps towards reaching one of the possible resolutions of the issue placed on the Table.

The basic CDE in (8) apply to both interrogatives and declaratives. We turn now to showing how the semantics of declarative and interrogative sentences combined with the effects in (8) allow us to derive the differences between their discourse effects from their semantic content alone, thus rendering separate *Assertion* and *Question* speech act operators superfluous.

The basic CDE of a declarative sentence If S is a declarative sentence, the issue P that it expresses contains a unique alternative p. According to (8), its CDE commit the Speaker to p. In order to arrive at a context state in which P is resolved, the Addressee has to commit to p as well, which is what is encoded in the ps, under the default value for the commitment anchor in the ps. Note that choosing the Addressee as default value for the commitment anchor in the ps in the case of declaratives is the only possible choice since the first discourse effect already commits the Speaker to p, and therefore choosing the Speaker as the value for the commitment anchor in the ps would be redundant. Another possible choice as value for the commitment anchor could be the conversational community, the group made up of the Speaker and the Addressee. Choosing this value, however, amounts to choosing the default value since the Speaker is already committed to p.

If the Addressee does in fact commit to p in a future move, p becomes a member of the cg and P is resolved, and taken off the Table.

To exemplify, let us consider the effects of a speaker uttering the declarative sentence in (9-a), which expresses the singleton issue in (9-b):

(9)   a.   Amalia is home.
        b.   P = {{**w: Amalia is home**}}$^\downarrow$

Under the assumption that the Table of the input context is empty, and the participant discourse commitments are empty as well, uttering (9-a) has the effects in (10), given visually in Figure 3, where $p = \{$w: Amalia is home$\}$

(10)   CDE of uttering *Amalia is home*

        1.$\mathrm{DC}_{Sp,o} = \mathrm{DC}_{Sp,i} \& \mathrm{info(P)}$

        2.$\mathrm{Table}_o = \mathrm{Table}_i \circ \mathrm{P}$

        3.$\mathrm{ps}_o = \{\mathrm{DC}_{Ad,i} \& p\}$

In this view, then, the effects of uttering a declarative sentence, i.e., performing an assertion, are to raise the issue the sentence expresses, to commit the Speaker to the unique alternative in this issue, and to project a future state in which the Addressee shares this commitment and therefore the issue is resolved.

As discussed in Farkas and Bruce [2010], the projected state is a canonical future which is not always reached. In the aftermath of an assertion, the least marked Addressee reaction is the projected one. The most marked reaction is for the Addressee to contradict the Speaker and commit

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DC_{Sp}	Table	DC_{Ad}
p	$\{\boldsymbol{p}\}$	
	ps: $\{DC_{Ad}\&p\}$	

Fig 3: Context state after Sp has uttered (9-a)

to $\neg p$ thereby triggering what Farkas and Bruce call a 'conversational crisis'. Reactions that fall in between these extremes are requests for further information or evidence that the Addressee may need in order to decide whether to accept p or not. The only canonical way of removing P from the Table, however, once the Speaker has made her assertion, is for the Addressee to end up committing to p as well. This canonical reaction may remain unexpressed.

The basic CDE of an interrogative sentence If S is an interrogative sentence, P, the issue it expresses, is non-singleton, and info(P) covers the (contextually restricted) logical space. Therefore, the basic CDE applied to the denotation of an interrogative yield results that differ from those we get for declaratives.

To illustrate, (11) gives the basic CDE of uttering the polar interrogative in (11-a) determined by (8), where the commitment anchor in the ps is set to its default value.

(11)   a.   Is Amalia home?
       b.   CDE of uttering *Is Amalia home?*
            1. $DC_{Sp,o} = DC_{Sp,i}\&\text{info(P)}$
            2. $\text{Table}_o = \text{Table}_i \circ \{\boldsymbol{p}, \bar{p}\}$
            3. $\text{ps}_o = \{DC_{Ad,i}\&p, DC_{Ad,i}\&\bar{p}\}$

These effects are summarized in Figure 4 below. Note that since P is inquisitive and non-informative, info(P) = W, and therefore the commitment added to DC_{Sp} is trivial. Since adding a trivial discourse commitment does not result in a significant change, it is not marked below.

DC_{Sp}	Table	DC_{Ad}
	$\{\boldsymbol{p}, \bar{p}\}$	
	ps: $\{DC_{Ad}\&p, DC_{Ad}\&\bar{p}\}$	

Fig 4: Context structure after Sp has uttered (11-a)

Recall that the difference between polar and constituent interrogatives concerns the fact that the former highlight a state while the latter highlight an n-place property where n where $n \geqslant 1$. The CDE in (8) are insensitive to this difference, and therefore constituent interrogatives, just like polar interrogatives, will register a trivial Speaker commitment, and will steer the conversation towards a non-singleton set of future conversational states in which the issue they raise is resolved. Thus, when

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the Speaker utters an interrogative, she makes a trivial commitment and she steers the conversation towards a set of future Addressee commitments, one for each alternative in P.

In the case of interrogatives, just like in the case of declaratives, the default anchor for the elements of ps is the Addressee. Note, however, that fixing this anchor to the Speaker or the conversational community would not be redundant in this case. This is so because uttering an interrogative does not commit the Speaker to any of the alternatives in the issue she places on the Table.

In the aftermath of a speaker having uttered an interrogative, the Addressee may react by resolving the issue in one of the projected ways, and once the Speaker accepts the resolution the Addressee proposes, the issue is resolved and removed from the Table in a canonical way. Thus, the canonical way of resolving the issue the Speaker places on the Table involves the Addressee providing the relevant information. Asking a question, therefore, puts the Addressee in a position in which she has to resolve the issue if the discourse is to proceed in a canonical way.[6] Note that the CDE of interrogatives do not commit the Speaker to any of the alternatives in the issue she places on the Table, and therefore in their case, unlike with declaratives, there is no 'default agreement' move.

There are a variety of other felicitous ways of reacting to an interrogative, besides the projected ones, such as confessing one's inability to resolve the issue, requesting further information or even refusing to engage with the issue altogether. In the set up proposed here, the elements of the projected set do not define felicitous responses; they define those responses that lead to the removal of the issue that the Speaker has placed on the Table in a canonical way; thus, the basic CDE of both declaratives and interrogatives project future discourse states where the issue placed on the Table is removed by being resolved.

Parenthesis on interrogative flip Below I give a simplified version of the account of 'interrogative flip' in Meriçli [2016]. 'Interrogative flip' has been discussed relative to evidentials and predicates of personal taste. Evidentials involve an implicit evidential anchor, called *origo* in Murray [2010]; predicates of personal taste involve an implicit 'judge'. I will use here the term *origo* to cover both, disregarding the differences between them. 'Interrogative flip' refers to the fact that in declaratives, the default value for *origo* is the Speaker, while in interrogatives, it is the Addressee. Taking predicates of personal taste as an example, in (12-a) the default choice of value for *origo*, i.e, the individual who judges the soup to be sour, is the Speaker, namely Amanda. Her statement is understood as a commitment to the fact that she finds the soup sour. In (12-b), on the other hand, the default choice of value for *origo* is the Addressee, namely Barney. Amanda is understood as asking whether Barney finds the soup sour.

(12)   a.   Amanda to Barney: This soup is sour.
        b.   Amanda to Barney: Is this soup sour?

Theiler [2019] connects this phenomenon to the fact that in declaratives the source of information is the Speaker, while in interrogatives, it is the Addressee. The referent of *origo* is set by default to the participant who is the source of information, or, 'the seat of knowledge' in the terminology of Speas and Tenny [2003].

In the current set up, this can be made more precise by connecting commitment anchors to

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[6]See Truckenbrodt [2004] for a view in which this is captured by assuming that interrogatives generally involve an order for the Addressee to contribute the answer to the question. Sauerland and Yatsushiro [2017] implement this by assuming that interrogatives involve a syntactically present imperative operator whose effect is to place the Addressee under the obligation to answer the question.

discourse moves as in (13).

(13)   If the effect of a conversational move m is to add a proposition p to DC_X, X is the commitment anchor (CA) of p relative to m.

Given the set-up above, we can distinguish two subtypes of commitment anchors in a discourse move, current (CCA) and projected (PCA). They are defined in (14)

(14)   a.   If in the course of a conversational move m, p is added to the current DC_X, X is the CCA of p.
        b.   If in the course of a conversational move m, p is added to the projected DC_X, X is the PCA of p.

In the case of declaratives, given (8), the Speaker is the CCA of the unique proposition in the denotation of the issue the declarative expresses, and the Addressee is its PCA. In the case of interrogatives, there is no CCA for any of the alternatives in the issue expressed, while the Addressee is the PCA for each of these alternatives in default cases.

We can now define the notion of *anchor* of an alternative p relative to a move m as follows:

(15)   Given a discourse move m that places an issue P on the Table, the *anchor* of $p \in P$ relative to m is the CCA of p if there is one, and the PCA otherwise.

Under this view, the anchor of an alternative p in a move m is the participant who commits to p as a result of m before any other participant commits to p as a result of m.[7]

As suggested in Theiler [2019], and in the spirit of Meriçli [2016], 'interrogative flip' is captured by assuming that by default, the referent of *origo* is fixed to the anchor participant in the move that places the relevant issue on the Table. In the case of (12-a), that participant is Amanda, while in the case of (12-b), it is Barney.[8]

(16)   a.   The value of *origo* is the CCA if this role is defined; otherwise
        b.   The value of *origo* is PCA.

Going back to (12), the value of *origo* is predicted to be Amanda in (12-a) because she is the CCA of the unique alternative in the denotation of the sentence she expresses. In (12-b), the value of *origo* is predicted to be Barney because there is no CCA for any of the alternatives in the denotation of the sentence expressed, and Barney is the PCA for each.

3   Canonical assertions and questions

Having laid out the theoretical assumptions we work with, we turn in this section to characterizing canonical assertions and canonical questions, thus setting the stage for introducing non-canonical questions in Section 4.

A fundamental assumption in what follows is that assertions and questions are speech acts canonically used to give and request information about the issue they place on the Table, and therefore such speech acts are canonical in conversations whose immediate aim is to increase the information mutually available to participants relative to that issue.

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[7]This notion of anchor is a close relative of the notion of commitment source in Gunlogson [2008] but not identical to it. For Gunlogson, a discourse participant is a commitment source for p if her commitment to p is not dependent on another participant's commitment to p, i.e., if her commitment is based on her own independent evidence.

[8]For a different account of interrogative flip, see Lim [2011].

Under the assumptions laid out above, a discourse participant makes a canonical assertion if she utters a d-unmarked declarative in a context in which the recognized aim of the conversation is to increase the mutually available information of participants relative to the issue expressed by the declarative. A discourse participant asks a canonical question if she utters a d-unmarked interrogative in a context in which the recognized aim of the conversation is to increase information relative to the issue expressed by the interrogative.[9]

Canonical assertions/questions are discourse moves that trigger the basic CDE given in (8) above, determined by the semantic content of the uttered sentence. Below we characterize some basic default pragmatic assumptions accompanying canonical assertions and canonical questions that follow from these assumptions.

3.1 Some default pragmatic assumptions accompanying canonical assertions

Recall that the basic CDE of uttering a declarative sentence with falling intonation is to place an informative issue P on the Table, add the unique alternative $p \in$ P to the DC_{Sp}, and project an immediate canonical future of the conversation in which p is added to the input DC_X as well, as a first step in the process of adding p to the cg. By default, the affected discourse commitments are the firm commitments of participants, and the commitment anchor in the ps is the Addressee.

Under the assumption that the immediate aim of the conversation is to increase the information available to the conversational community relative to P, some of the default pragmatic assumptions accompanying an assertion include those listed in (17):

(17)   Default pragmatic assumptions accompanying canonical assertions

1. *Open issue*: the Speaker assumes that the issue she places on the Table is not resolved in the input context, i.e., that there is no alternative $p \in$ P, such that $p \in cg_i$.

2. *Speaker competence*: the Speaker presents herself as believing that $w_a \in p$

3. *Addressee ignorance*: the Speaker presents herself as assuming that the Addressee does not already believe $w_a \in p$

4. *Addressee compliance*: the Speaker presents herself as assuming that the Addressee will in fact commit to p, and therefore that p will be added to the current cg.

Open issue follows from the assumption that the conversational engine behind the Speaker's move is information increase relative to P, as far as the conversational community is concerned. Had the Speaker assumed that the issue is already resolved in the conversation, no information increase would result from solving the issue raised. *Speaker competence* follows from the basic assumption that one's public and private commitments align. *Speaker ignorance* follows from the assumption that the engine driving the conversation is the wish to increase information that is mutually available to participants. If the Speaker assumed that the Addressee already had the information that $w_a \in p$, her speech act would be redundant because it would not lead to information gain. *Addressee compliance* follows if the Speaker is taken to assume that one of the conversational states her move projects will in fact be reached.

Canonical assertions, then, are speech acts whereby a competent Speaker informs an Addressee assumed to be ignorant of the truth of a proposition p. They are performed by asserting a declarative sentence that contains no special d-markers, and which expresses an issue P containing a unique alternative p.

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[9]I assume that the intonation of rising declaratives interpreted as requests for information is a d-marker, and therefore they cannot be used to perform either a canonical assertion or a canonical question.

Note that in the current approach, the assumptions in (17) are not felicity conditions associated to assertive speech acts, as proposed, for instance, in Searle [1969]. Rather, they are default assumptions accompanying such acts, which derive from the CDE associated with the Speaker's utterance. There are contexts in which these default assumptions are overridden and yet the assertive speech act is felicitous. Information gain is not necessarily the engine behind every speech act. Thus, a knowledgeable Speaker may assert something in order to remind rather than inform a knowledgeable Addressee, of the truth of the unique alternative in the proposition she expresses, and this fact may be evident to both Speaker and Addressee. Such contexts override *Addressee ignorance* and *Open issue. Speaker competence* is overridden in situations such as those mentioned above, when it is public knowledge among the participants in the conversation that the Speaker does not believe the truth of her own assertions. Finally, *Addressee compliance* may be overridden as well: it may be public knowledge that the Speaker's assertion will be rejected. In such cases, the Speaker's aim is not to inform the Addressee concerning w_a being in p but to start an argument, or reiterate a conversational claim. The CDE of asserting a sentence will, however, be constant across these contexts, and the assertions in question will be non-canonical.

Declarative sentences may involve special discourse markers that trigger additional CDE which override default pragmatic assumptions. When asserting such a sentence, the Speaker performs a non-canonical assertion. In the case of declaratives, a common default assumption to be weakened is that of *Speaker competence*: speakers often wish to express a commitment that is weaker than categorical. In the framework sketched here, such weakened commitments can be modeled at two levels, the discourse structure level or the level of compositional semantics. At the level of discourse structure, one can assume that discourse commitment sets are divided into subsets differing with respect to the nature and strength of the anchor's commitment. The strongest such commitments are categorical, while weaker ones are non-categorical. One could thus model the effect of *perhaps* in (18) as signaling that the proposition in its scope, expressed by *Amy is home by now*, is to be added to the speaker's non-categorical commitment list.

(18)   Perhaps Amy is home by now.

The standard treatment of doxastic modality on the other hand captures weakened epistemic commitment at the level of compositional semantics. The standard semantics of epistemic possibility, denoted by $\Diamond_E$, for instance, entails that the speaker of (19), while categorically committing to a proposition of the form $\Diamond_E(p)$, where p is the proposition expressed by the sentence in the scope of the modal, is weakly committed to p. The speaker's categorical commitment only rules out worlds in which $\neg p$ is necessary.

(19)   Amy may be home by now.

Incurvati and Schlöder [2019] propose to differentiate *perhaps* from epistemic possibility along precisely these lines. They note that under the assumption that what we call here d-markers do not embed freely, an account along these lines explains the contrast in (20):

(20)   a.   *Paul doesn't know that perhaps Amy is at home.
        b.   Paul doesn't know that Amy may be at home.

We leave open the many issues canonical and non-canonical assertions raise and turn to questions, which are the focus of this paper.

3.2 Some default assumptions accompanying canonical questions

Recall that canonical questions place an inquisitive issue P on the Table, add a trivial Speaker commitment, and steer the conversation towards a set of states, one for each alternative in P, such that for each such alternative $p \in$ P, there is a projected state in which the commitment anchor in ps commits to p. By default, this projected commitment is assumed to be a firm one and the commitment anchor is the Addressee. Under the default assumption that the immediate goal of the conversation is information increase relative to P, some of the default pragmatic assumptions accompanying such a speech act are listed in (21):

(21)   *Some default pragmatic assumptions accompanying canonical questions*

1. *Open issue*: the Speaker assumes that the issue she places on the Table is not resolved in the input context, i.e., that there is no alternative $p \in$ P, such that $p \in \mathrm{cg}_i$.

2. *Speaker ignorance*: the Speaker presents herself as being an epistemic state that does not support commitment to any of the alternatives in P.

3. *Addressee competence*: the Speaker presents herself as assuming that the Addressee's epistemic state supports her commitment to the 'true' alternative in P, i.e., that alternative that has w_a as its element.

4. *Addressee compliance*: the Speaker presents herself as assuming that the Addressee will resolve the issue by publicly committing to the true alternative in P.

Open issue follows, as in the case of assertions, from the default assumption that the conversational engine behind the Speaker's move is information increase relative to P. This assumption is incompatible with taking P to be already resolved in the input context. *Speaker ignorance* follows from the fact that were the Speaker to think she knows which alternative in P is the true one, a more efficient way of increasing information would be to simply assert a declarative sentence that publicly commits her to that alternative. *Addressee competence* follows from the fact that the Addressee is the default anchor for the projected commitments and from the fact that the Speaker performs a conversational move that steers the conversation towards a state where the Addressee resolves the issue. It is therefore natural to take the Speaker to assume that such a state can in fact be reached. *Addressee compliance* also follows from the fact that the Speaker steers the conversation towards states where the Addressee provides the relevant information. In the absence of this assumption, the Speaker's speech act would be futile as far as information increase is concerned.

Note that a canonical question puts the Addressee on the spot: the Speaker assumes that the Addressee will commit to one of the alternatives in the issue the Speaker has just placed on the Table, thus taking the first step towards reaching a mutually accepted resolution of that issue. In doing so, the Addressee has to provide novel information. When asking a canonical question, the Speaker assumes that the Addressee is more informed than the Speaker is with respect to P, a risky assumption given our limited insight into other people's minds.

Canonical questions, then, are speech acts whereby an ignorant Speaker requests information from an Addressee whom she assumes to be knowledgeable and who, she assumes, will propose the true resolution of the issue in the immediate future of the conversation.

Just as with assertions, in the current set up, these are not felicity conditions for the performance of a question but rather, properties that follow from default assumptions. And just as with assertions, there may be situations where default assumptions are overridden, leading to non-canonical questions. We discuss a few illustrative cases of non-canonical questions in the next section.

4   Non-canonical questions

In this section we briefly discuss ways in which questioning speech acts may diverge from default assumptions associated with canonical questions restricting our attention to English, and then stop to take stock of where the current approach has led us. In the next section we turn to a detailed discussion of a special, d-marked interrogative in Romanian.

4.1   Some non-canonical questions in English

Non-canonical questions are questions whose properties differ from those of canonical questions. They can be asked by uttering an unmarked interrogative in a non-default context or by uttering a d-marked interrogative that triggers additional discourse effects leading to the default assumptions of canonical questions being weakened or overridden. Some examples of non-canonical questions of both types are briefly discussed below.

'Quiz' questions   'Quiz' questions, exemplified in (22),

(22)   *Teacher to Joey*: Joey, what is the capital of France?

involve the suspension of both *Speaker ignorance* and *Addressee competence*. Such questions are asked in contexts in which it is publicly assumed that the aim of the Speaker is not to increase information concerning the issue she places on the Table but rather, to check how informed the Addressee is relative to that issue. In typical 'quiz' contexts, then, the Speaker is assumed to be competent, while the competence of the Addressee is left open. Under current assumptions, the semantics of such interrogatives, as well as their CDE, are the same as that of unmarked interrogatives. What is special in their case are the contextual assumptions concerning the aim of the Speaker. The semantics and CDE of (22) are the same independently of whether it functions as a 'quiz' question or as an 'information seeking' question. Assumptions about the particular situation in which the question is asked decide which way it will be interpreted.

Thus, 'quiz' questions are non-canonical because they are used in contexts in which gaining information about the issue placed on the Table is not the recognized aim of the conversational exchange; rather, the aim of the exchange involves checking the Addressee's competence.

Self-addressed questions   We have assumed above that the default commitment anchor in the ps is the Addressee. This is a natural assumption for questions since the commitment anchor proposes a resolution to the issue the Speaker has placed on the Table, and the Speaker is assumed, by default, to be ignorant. There are, however, situations where this default commitment anchoring is overridden, and the anchor is either just the Speaker or the conversational community, i.e., the group made up of the Speaker and the Addressee. We will call the first type exclusively self-addressed and the second, inclusively self-addressed and will use the term 'self-addressed' as a cover term for both. Recall that anchoring to the Speaker rather than the Addressee is possible in the case of questions but not in the case of assertions. This is so because questions to not commit the Speaker to any of the alternatives in the issue she places on the Table, while assertions commit the Speaker to the unique alternative in that issue, and therefore a self-addressed assertion would be redundant.

Examples of exclusively self-addressed questions are found in situations in which it is assumed that the Addressee will not actively participate in the conversation. Interrogatives are felicitous in such contexts though non-canonical because the context overrides the default Addressee setting for

the discourse commitment anchor in the ps, and fixes the anchor to the Speaker. To exemplify, in (23),

(23)   *A politician gives a speech on television*:
        Why should you place your trust in me? Because I have been in public service all my life.

the Addressee of the politician's speech act is the television audience. That this is so is shown by the fact that the second person pronoun *you* is interpreted as referring to them. In this context, the Addressee is assumed not to actively participate in the conversation, and therefore the commitment anchor in the ps is set to the Speaker. The non-canonical nature of this type of question, sometimes called 'rhetorical', is due to the non-default value of the commitment anchor in the ps, which in turn is the result of the special nature of the situation in which the speech act is performed. In situations like (23), the *Speaker ignorance* assumption is suspended.

    Note that unlike in the case of 'quiz' questions, the aim of the Speaker here is to increase public information relative to the issue she places on the Table, but special considerations lead her not to take the most efficient route for doing so.

    Inclusively self-addressed questions, sometimes called 'engaging' or 'conjectural' questions, are asked in contexts where it is mutually assumed that the answer will be reached after a series of collaborative moves involving both the Speaker and her Addressee. In such questions the anchoring in the ps is not the default value, the Addressee, but rather, the group made up of the Speaker and the Addressee. Additionally, the issue raised by an inclusively self-addressed question cannot be assumed to be resolved in the immediately next move and *Addressee competence* is suspended. An example of such a question is given in (24):

(24)   *Alex and Bea are collaborating on a paper. At the beginning of their work session Alex says:*
        So, the question now is: Why are these facts the way they are?

In this context, Alex is setting the agenda for their work rather than signaling that he assumes Bea will provide the answer. Questions are interpreted this way in contexts in which it is assumed that neither the Addressee nor the Speaker know the answer but that they will endeavor to find it out together. For a recent discussion of conjectural questions see Eckardt and Beltrama [2019].

    One way of distinguishing self-addressed questions from those that are not is to check possible ways in which the speech act can be reported. Note that questioning acts, whether self-addressed or not, can be reported by using the verb *ask* intransitively; if this verb is used with a direct object, however, the commitment anchor in the ps must be the referent of the direct object. Unless the referent of the direct object is the Speaker, such questions cannot be self-addressed.

    Note now that reporting the teacher's speech act in (25) as in (26-a) is not felicitous while reporting the teacher's speech act in (26-b) is:

(25)   *Teacher to the whole class*:
        Why do you have to show your work? Because I have to see your reasoning, not just its result.

(26)   a.   The teacher asked the students why they have to show their work.
        b.   The teacher asked the student what the capital of France was.

In both cases, however, one can report the teacher's speech act as in (27).

(27)   The teacher asked why the students had to show their work/what the capital of France was.

Similarly, Alex's speech act in (24) can be reported as in (28-a) but not as in (28-b):

(28) a. Alex asked why the facts were the way they were.
      b. Alex asked Bea why the facts were the way they were.

Because of this constraint on the interpretation of the direct object of *ask*, it is not appropriate for the Addressee to react to (23) or (24) by saying (29):

(29) Why are you asking me/us?

In the case of self-addressed questions, the immediate aim of the Speaker when performing her speech act is the default one, namely resolving the issue in the context of the conversation. What is non-default, is the way that resolution is assumed to be reached.

Rhetorical questions   There is a further type of question commonly known as rhetorical, asked in situations in which the *Open issue* assumption is overridden. Such questions presuppose that the issue is closed in the context, and that its resolution is obvious to all involved. The point of the speech act is not to gain information about the issue placed on the Table but rather, to point to the obviousness of the answer. If (30) is interpreted rhetorically,

(30) Who would do such a thing?

the Speaker's aim is to point out to her Addressee the answer to her question, an answer that she assumes is obvious to her. This type of rhetorical question typically remains unanswered, and in some cases such rhetorical questions can be used to answer a previous non-rhetorical question, as in (31):

(31) *Mother to son*: Have you packed your lunch today?
      Son: Do I look stupid?

The son's question, by pointing to the obviousness of the answer, leads, via pragmatic reasoning, to the answer to the mother's question, as well as to the inference that her question was superfluous. Given that the whole point of this type of rhetorical question rests on the obviousness of its answer, providing it is not necessary.

   Example (32) is a self-addressed question asked in a context in which the Speaker also assumes that the issue she raises is resolved in the context.

(32) Does our keynote speaker need an introduction? Obviously not.

Here, however, the answer is assumed to be less obvious than in (31), which is why the Speaker does, in fact, provide it.

Tentative questions   *Addressee competence* is a special default assumption of canonical questions. Guessing what other people know, however, is a risky business. Overestimating it in the case of questions may cause your Addressee to lose face and your question to remain unanswered. Underestimating it, on the other hand, would hinder getting information one wants to have. In addition, there are situations in which a Speaker may well want to place an inquisitive issue on the Table even though it is not assumed that the Addressee is able to resolve it, or even in case it is assumed that she cannot do so. I call here *tentative questions* question acts that override the *Addressee competence* assumption. A common means of marking a tentative question is by using a modal interrogative, as in (33):

(33)   *The Speaker and the Addressee are in a used car lot, looking at a car whose price is not visible.*
         How much could this car cost?

Here, one can interpret the Speaker as being interested in the actual price of the car. But since she cannot assume that her Addressee knows it, she puts the real issue within the scope of the modal thus projecting a conversational future in which the Addressee is supposed to make a modal statement concerning the price rather than a firm commitment. The account I suggest is one where the interrogative in (33) is given a regular compositional semantics and a basic CDE. The tentative nature of the question is a pragmatic consequence of the fact that both Speaker and Addressee recognize that the issue to be resolved is what the price of the car is, and furthermore, both recognize that neither knows the answer to this question. Eckardt [2018] treats interrogatives involving *wohl* in German as modal tentative questions along the lines just sketched. Note that a tentative question is not felicitous in a context in which the Addressee is presupposed to know the answer to the question. Example (33) would be infelicitous if the Addressee were to be the salesman and were supposed to know the price of the car. Tentative questions are commonly, though not always, interpreted as inclusively self-addressed: the Speaker is seen as proposing resolving the issue as a common goal of the future conversation. Inclusively self-addressed questions are always tentative, since in their case the Speaker assumes that the answer will be reached only after a collaborative effort between the participants.

Tentative questions can also be asked in situations where Addressee ignorance is not presupposed but the Speaker signals that she does not assume Addressee competence. A common strategy used in such cases in English, as well as in other languages, is to ask an 'indirect question' as exemplified in (34):

(34)   *At a bus stop, asking a stranger:*
         Do you know when the next bus is supposed to come?

The context here makes it clear that the Speaker is interested in the issue expressed by the embedded interrogative rather than the one she places on the Table. The issue she raises, however, inquires as to whether *Addressee competence* is met relative to the issue of interest. A cooperative Addressee will figure this out and will answer the embedded interrogative if her answer to the main interrogative is positive.

'Remind-me' questions   Sauerland and Yatsushiro [2017] treat the use of *again* in (35),

(35)   Excuse me, what's your name again?

as contributing the presupposition that the answer to the question was already part of the common ground at some past time. Particles contributing this presupposition, which exist in German and Japanese as well, weaken the *Open issue* assumption associated with canonical questions. The existence of such particles is expected under the current proposal. Under the current set up formal markers can contribute special CDE that weaken default assumptions. Alternatively, they may contribute presuppositions that require particular default assumptions to be met.

Biased questions   Perhaps the most well-studied class of non-canonical questions are those that signal the Speaker's bias for one of the alternatives in the issue she expresses, thereby weakening the *Speaker ignorance* assumption. In many languages there are special d-markers that signal such bias. The literature on biased questions, even just for English let alone cross-linguistically, is way too

vast to survey here. Tag interrogatives pronounced with rising intonation on the tag, exemplified in (2) and repeated in (36), have been argued, most recently in Farkas and Roelofsen [2017], to indicate Speaker bias for the truth of the declarative part of the sentence:

(36)　　Maria is joining us, isn't she?

In current terms, the d-marker that signals bias in an interrogative in (36) triggers an additional conventional discourse effect that registers bias for the highlighted alternative in the issue denoted by the interrogative. These special forms, then, weaken the default *Speaker ignorance* assumption present in canonical questions. In case the bias involved has to be present in the input context, as argued, for instance, in Sudo [2013], for certain marked questions in Japanese, such forms weaken the *Open issue* default assumption as well.

　　The current set up predicts that biased questions can only be expressed by polar interrogatives, because to register bias, there must be a unique highlighted state that is favored, and constituent questions do not involve such a state. It also predicts that there will be no language that uses a simple polar interrogative to express a biased question and a complex form to express a neutral one.

　　To close this brief excursion into ways of overriding default assumptions associated with questions, note that framing the discussion of canonical questions in terms of default assumptions has several advantages over an approach in terms of felicity conditions. The current approach captures the unmarked nature of questions asked by a Speaker assumed to be ignorant, of an Addressee assumed to be knowledgeable, about an issue the Speaker presents herself as assuming to be open and expecting the Addressee to resolve in the future without having to treat questions that do not meet these conditions as in some way not felicitous. Moreover, in the current set up, the properties of canonical questions are connected to the basic CDE associated with interrogative sentences, determined by their semantic content. The class of non-canonical questions can then be defined as interrogatives asked in contexts that do not meet the properties associated with canonical questions.

4.2　Interim summary

Under the assumptions given above, the CDE of declaratives and interrogatives that do not involve a d-marker will be the basic ones, given in (8) above, and in default contexts, they will be associated with at least the the default pragmatic assumptions in (17) and (21). The approach outlined above predicts that declaratives and interrogatives that do not contain a discourse marker will be usable cross-linguistically, to make canonical assertions or raise canonical questions. Declaratives and interrogatives that involve d-markers that add CDE, on the other hand, are predicted to signal departures from default assumptions and therefore to be used to make non-canonical assertions and raise non-canonical questions.

　　With respect to d-markers, the approach predicts that there will be no such marker that signals that the discourse effects of the sentence it occurs in are the ones in (8) and nothing more. We thus predict that there will be no d-marker that simply signals that the Speaker of a declarative sentence commits to the unique possibility in that sentence. Similarly, we predict that there will be no d-marker occurring in an interrogative or declarative sentence signaling that the Speaker steers the conversation toward future states in which the issue is resolved. In the same vein, we predict that there will be no d-marker in an interrogative signaling that the Speaker does not commit to any of the alternatives in the denotation of the interrogative. The d-markers just mentioned are predicted not to exist because their effects would be redundant.

　　Conversely, the approach taken here predicts the possibility of d-markers that signal additional discourse effects. Such effects lead to departures from default pragmatic assumptions accompanying

canonical assertions and questions. Thus, questions may be marked for the Speaker being biased in favor of a particular resolution, and declaratives may be marked to signal less than categorical commitment to their informative content. D-markers that emphasize one or another default characteristic of canonical questions by contributing presuppositions that enforce them, may exist as well, such as markers that emphasize how utterly ignorant the Speaker is relative to the issue she raises, or how eager she is to have it resolved in the immediate future. As an example, note that the former effect is achieved by adding *in the world* in (37):

(37)   Where in the world did I put my pen?

In the next section we turn to discussing a d-marker that occurs in Romanian interrogatives, whose special effect leads to the weakening of the *Addressee compliance* assumption.

5   Non-intrusive questions: *oare*-interrogatives in Romanian

The approach outlined above predicts that d-marked interrogatives may trigger complex CDE. This section introduces such a d-marked interrogative in Romanian whose effect, it will be argued, weakens the *Addressee compliance* assumption of canonical questions. Questions having this effect will be dubbed non-intrusive. The existence of such non-canonical questions is not surprising in the current set-up given that the effect involved weakens one of the default assumptions accompanying canonical questions.

Below, we first give the data relevant to *oare* interrogatives, and then propose an account which treats *oare* marked interrogatives as non-intrusive questions, after which we examine its consequences and predictions.

5.1   The particle *oare*

Recall that declaratives and interrogatives are assumed to involve a sentence type operator, DEC and INT respectively, ensuring a non-inquisitive denotation in the former case and a non-informative denotation in the latter. In Romanian, the presence of DEC is marked by falling intonation. The presence of INT in unembedded polar interrogatives is marked primarily by rising intonation, while constituent interrogatives involve a fronted interrogative pronoun. This is exemplified in (38), where declarative sentences are marked by a final period, and interrogative sentences are marked by a final question mark.

(38)   a.   Amalia e acasă.
              Amalia is home
              Amalia is home.
        b.   Amalia e acasă?
              Amalia is home
              Is Amalia home?
        c.   Cine e acasă?
              who is home
              Who is home?

We are interested here in the particle *oare*, which may occur in polar and constituent interrogatives, but not in declaratives, as exemplified below:

(39)   a.   *_Oare_ Amalia e acasă.
              oare Amalia is home

b. *Oare* Amalia e acasă?
   oare Amalia is home
   Is Amalia home, I wonder.

c. *Oare* ce   a   spus Amalia?
   oare what has said Amalia
   What did Amalia say, I wonder.

As exemplified in (40), *oare* cannot occur in imperatives either. In Romanian, imperatives involve a special verb form, glossed below as 'Imp':

(40) a. Închide   geamul!
      close.Imp window-Def
      Close the window!

   b. *Oare închide   geamul!
      oare close.Imp window-Def
      Close the window!

According to Giurgea [2018], the most commonly assumed historical origin of this morpheme is Latin *uolet 'wants'.

   Interrogatives with *oare* do not have a perfect English counterpart. A slifted interrogative with a postposed *I wonder* is a close translation in many instances, while in others a modalized interrogative is a better fit. The difference between *oare* marked interrogatives and slifted interrogatives with *I wonder* is discussed in the next section (see (64) below).

   The syntactic position of *oare* is not fixed, as shown in (41).[10]

(41) a. *Oare* cine îl   va ajuta pe   Petru?
      oare who him will help Acc. Peter
      Who will help Peter, I wonder.

   b. Cine îl   va ajuta pe   Petru *oare*?
      who him will help Acc. Peter **oare**
      Who will help Peter, I wonder.

   c. Cine îl   va ajuta *oare* pe   Petru?
      who him will help **oare** Acc. Petru
      Who will help Peter, I wonder.

Whether there are subtle interpretive differences triggered by the syntactic position of *oare* is an issue I leave open for the time being.

   Giurgea [2018] notes a further use of *oare* as a 'bare' particle pronounced with non-interrogative intonation: a fall on the first syllable and a low boundary tone, exemplified in (42) (Girugea's (43)):

(42) A: E prea devreme.
      is too   early
      It is too early.

   B: Oare.
      oare
      Is it?

In this case B's utterance signals that she does not accept the truth of the sentence A asserted but does not contradict it either. Hill [2002] notes that free standing *oare* used as a reaction

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[10]See Hill [2002] for the claim that *oare* is a complementizer.

to an assertion may also be pronounced with an interrogative intonation (low nuclear tone on the first syllable and a high boundary tone). According to Giurgea and Hill, the interrogative contour is associated with uncertainty relative to the veracity of the previous assertion, while the non-interrogative one is associated with doubt. This distinction will be ignored here.

A different use of the morpheme *oare*, sometimes in the abbreviated form *or*, is as a bound morpheme in free choice pronouns:

(43)   a.   *oare-care*
              oare - what
              'any' in pejorative use (any old)
    b.   *oricine/orice/oriunde/oricum*
              or-who/or-what/or-where/or-how
              'anybody/anything/anywhere/anyway'

Below we give an account of *oare* in interrogatives that extends to its use as a bare particle, and connects it to the 'free choice' bound morpheme use exemplified in (43).

5.2   *Oare* as a non-intrusive question marker

The basic intuition to be captured below is that *oare*-interrogatives are like their unmarked interrogative sisters in that the Speaker raises an issue and thereby signals that she wishes to have it resolved. They are, however, unlike unmarked interrogatives in that the presence of *oare* signals that the Speaker does to put the Addressee on the spot for providing the answer. I dub such questions *non-intrusive*.[11] This intuition is captured in the current set up by assuming that *oare* is a d-marker and as such, it applies to the output of the basic CDE triggered by the sentence to which it attaches. The special effect contributed by *oare* is to add $DC_{X,i}$&info(P) to the ps. This addition is the weakest commitment one can make relative to the issue on the Table. If this issue is non-informative, info(P) = W, and therefore adding it to $DC_{X,i}$ leaves those commitments unchanged. The projected Addressee commitment in this case is the same as that of the Speaker.

By using *oare* in an interrogative, the Speaker signals that non-canonical future conversational states include not only states in which the commitment anchor resolves the issue the Speaker just placed on the Table, but also a state where she does not. As a consequence, the commitment anchor, which, by default, is the Addressee, may comply with such a question without resolving the issue raised, and therefore *oare* weakens the *Addressee Compliance* assumption present in canonical questions. Since the Addressee is no longer projected to resolve the issue, the *Addressee Competence* assumption is weakened as well: *oare* questions are compatible with situations in which the Speaker does not assume that the Addressee's doxastic state allows him to resolve the issue. If the conversation reaches the projected state contributed by *oare*, the issue the speaker raised will not be resolved.

The proposal, then, is to treat *oare* as a d-marker whose role is to contribute a special effect in addition to the effects triggered by the semantics of the sentence in which it occurs. The presence of *oare* widens ps_o to include $DC_{X,i}$&info(P) in addition to the elements contributed by the basic CDE. Under the assumption that the input discourse structure for d-marked sentences is the output of the basic CDE, the contribution of *oare* is summarized in (44), where P is the issue expressed by the sentence *oare* attaches to.

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[11]Farkas and Bruce [2010] mention *oare* interrogatives and suggest an account that is similar, though not identical to the one developed below. Common to the two accounts is that in both, the presence of *oare* in an interrogative signals that the Addressee is not necessarily expected to settle the issue the Speaker places on the Table.

(44)   Contribution of *oare*
       $ps_o = ps_i \& (DC_{X,i} \& info(P))$

The CDE of a *oare* marked sentence are computed as follows: first, one applies the basic CDE of the sentence to its input context structure, and then one applies the CDE triggered by *oare* to the result. This order follows from *oare* being a d-marker.

Note that in this account, *oare* marked interrogatives have the same compositional semantics as unmarked interrogatives. Their CDE overlap in that the basic CDE apply in both cases. The only difference is that *oare* interrogatives have an additional element in the ps, namely $DC_{X,i} \& info(P)$. The semantics and CDE of (39-b) are illustrated below, under the assumption that p is the proposition expressed by *Amalia e acasă* 'Amalia is home', P is the semantic content of the interrogative, and the commitment anchor in the ps is set to its default value.

(45)   Semantics and CDEs of (39-b)
       a.   Semantics: $P = \{\boldsymbol{p}, \bar{p}\}$
       b.   CDE: basic CDE augmented by the contribution of *oare*.
            1. $DC_{Sp,o} = DC_{Sp,i} \& info(P)$
            2. $Table_o = Table_i \circ P$
            3. $ps_o = \{DC_{Ad,i} \& p, DC_{Ad,i} \& \bar{p}, DC_{Ad,i} \& info(P)\}$

These effects are summarized in Figure 5, where the addition of info(P) to the discourse commitments of the Speaker is not marked, as before.

DC_{Sp}	Table	DC_{Ad}
	$\{\boldsymbol{p}, \bar{p}\}$	
	ps:$\{DC_{Ad} \& p,\ DC_{Ad} \& \bar{p},\ DC_{Ad} \& W\}$	

Fig. 5: Context structure after Sp has uttered (39-b)

The only difference between Figure 5, summarizing the context state that obtains after an *oare* polar interrogative has been uttered, and Figure 4, summarizing the context state that obtains after the utterance of the corresponding unmarked polar interrogative, is that the ps of the former, but not that of the latter has $DC_{Ad} \cup W$ as an element.

More generally, then, non-intrusive questions can be defined as in (46):

(46)   A question is non-intrusive iff $DC_{X,i} \& W$ is an element of ps_o.

Non-intrusive questions do not put the Addressee on the spot because to comply with such a question, the Addressee does not have to propose a resolution to the issue the Speaker has just placed on the Table. Under the approach suggested here such an outcome can only be the result of a complex CDE triggered by an interrogative marked for being non-intrusive.

5.3   Consequences and predictions

The account given above predicts that if a language has an interrogative form that has to be interpreted as non-intrusive, that form will have to be d-marked. The Hungarian particle *vajon*

closely parallels Romanian *oare*; the distribution and interpretation of Turkish *acaba*, Greek *araye*, and Japanese *kana* also appear close to *oare* though more research is needed to determine how close these parallelisms are.

Focusing on *oare*, the present account correctly predicts that it can felicitously occur in both polar and constituent interrogatives. This is so because the special contextual effect it triggers does not manipulate a particular alternative in the issue the sentence expresses, and therefore it does not rely on the existence of a unique highlighted alternative.

Furthermore, the proposal captures the fact that this d-marker can only occur with interrogatives. Marking a declarative as non-intrusive would always be redundant. This is so because declaratives are non-inquisitive, and therefore in the case of a declarative whose semantic content is P, info(P) = p, where p is the unique alternative in P. This means that the non-intrusive marker attached to a declarative will add p to $DC_{X,i}$. But this effect is already part of the basic CDE of a declarative: part of the basic CDE of a declarative denoting an issue P containing the unique alternative p is to project $DC_X \& p$. The account of the rogative nature of *oare* rests on the basic difference between the structure of the issues expressed by declaratives and interrogatives. Under the assumption that the semantic content of imperatives is non-inquisitive, the account also predicts that *oare* will not occur with imperatives either.

In this connection, note that the account of *oare* sketched in Farkas and Bruce [2010] differs from the present proposal in that its effect in the earlier proposal was to add $DC_{Ad,i}$ to the projected set. The two accounts capture the same intuition, namely that the presence of *oare* weakens the expectation that the Addressee will resolve the issue. They yield the same result in the case of interrogatives, but the earlier account has to stipulate the incompatibility of *oare* with declaratives, while the current proposal captures this connection.

Note also that the account of interrogatives along the lines of Sauerland and Yatsushiro [2017], which posits an imperative operator that places the Addressee under the obligation to answer the question, would have difficulty explaining why *oare* cannot occur in imperatives in Romanian. Note that in Romanian, just like in English, it is possible to give the Addressee the option not to comply with an imperative, as exemplified in (47):

(47)   Dacă vrei,   deschide geamul.
       if   want.II open.Imp window.the
        Open the window if you want.

A further immediate welcome consequence of the account presented above is that it captures the connection between non-intrusive questions and free choice: non-intrusive questions widen the set of projected canonical futures by presenting the choice of not resolving the issue as canonical. This connection has a morphological echo in Romanian.

We turn now to examining in more detail the situations in which *oare* interrogatives, and, more generally interrogatives marked for being non-intrusive, are predicted to be felicitous and those in which they are not.

To start with, note that *oare*-interrogatives are predicted to be infelicitous in situations in which the Speaker expects the Addressee to resolve the issue the Speaker raises. The examples in (48) - (49) confirm this prediction.

(48)   *Context: Policeman to driver he stopped*
           #*Oare* cu   ce   viteză ai   mers?
           oare with what speed have.II gone
           What was your speed, I wonder.

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(49)   *Context: Teacher to student*

        #*Oare* ce   ai   avut pentru azi?
        oare what have.IIsg had for   today
        What is your lesson for today, I wonder.

The presence of *oare* renders these examples infelicitous because both the policeman and the teacher present themselves as assuming that the Addressee will resolve the issue they raise.

    Next, note that non-intrusive questions are predicted to be felicitously used as tentative questions. A non-intrusive question signals that the speaker does not expect her addressee to settle the issue she raises. This is consistent with situations in which she does not expect her addressee to necessarily be able to settle the issue, which is what characterizes tentative questions. That this prediction is correct is shown by the fact that *oare* interrogatives are often used in tentative questions. A natural interpretation of (50) is one in which Maria is asking a non-intrusive question, signaled by the presence of *oare* precisely because she does not assume that Paul knows more about the soup than she does.

(50)   *Maria and Paul are cooking together. Maria says to Paul*:

        Oare e gata   supa?
        oare is ready soup.the
        Could the soup be ready?

If Paul, in fact, is more informed, he can resolve the issue. If he isn't, natural responses to (50) would be along the lines of *Let't taste it* or *I wonder too*. Had Maria asked her question without *oare*, she would have naturally been taken as assuming that Paul is in a position to decide the matter.

    There are situations in which one asks a question even though the context makes clear that the Addressee does not know the answer or is very unlikely to do so. In such cases a simple, unmarked question is normally inappropriate, given the *Addressee competence* assumption of canonical questions, and the CDE of unmarked interrogatives. Using *oare* in such circumstances renders the question appropriate:

(51)   *There is a knock on the door in the middle of the night. Maria says to Paul*:

    a. #Cine e?
       who is
       Who is it?

    b.   *Oare* cine e?
       oare who is
       Who could it be?

If addressed to Paul, Maria's question in (51-a) is odd because Paul is in no position to know the answer; *oare* makes it appropriate because now a future conversational state in which Paul does not resolve the issue is rendered canonical.

    A common way of marking a question as tentative in Romanian is to use the so-called 'presumptive future', glossed as PF below. The PF and *oare* may co-occur:

(52)   *There is a knock on the door in the middle of the night. Maria says to Paul*:

        (*Oare*) cine o   fi?
        oare   who PF be
        Who could it be, (I wonder).

The non-temporal use of the future here results in a modal interpretation according to which the speaker is asking her addressee to give her best guess as to who might be at the door.[12] Because of the presence of PF, the *Addressee competence* assumption with respect to the issue of who is at the door is suspended, and therefore the question is appropriate with or without *oare*.

Romanian can also mark tentative questions using an epistemic possibility modal followed by the subjunctive form of the main verb. Again, as expected, *oare* may optionally also be used in these cases.

(53)   *There is a knock on the door. Maria says to Paul*:
        (*Oare*) cine poate să   fie?
        oare   who can   Subj be
        Who could it be?

These examples show that asking a canonical question concerning an issue about which your Addressee is unlikely to be informed is generally avoided, as predicted by the current account. One way to ask the question nonetheless is to resort to a modal expression. A non-intrusive question marker is correctly predicted to be compatible with interrogatives asked in such circumstances even in the absence of a modal.

Note that according to the account given above, *oare* is predicted to be felicitous in tentative questions but is not treated as marking a question as tentative. This is the essential difference between the current account and the suggestion made in Giurgea [2018], according to which *oare* contributes the presupposition that the Speaker does not assume that the Addressee is able to resolve the issue.

The special effect triggered by *oare* in the current proposal is compatible with a situation in which the Speaker assumes the Addressee knows the answer to her question. The use of *oare* in such situations signals that the Speaker nonetheless treats as canonical a conversational future in which the Addressee chooses not to settle the issue. In such situations, the Speaker signals that she assumes there are reasons why the Addressee may choose not to provide the relevant information. Some examples of *oare* in situations where the Addressee is assumed to know the answer to the question raised are given in (54).[13]

(54)   a.   Paul, *oare* te   mai gândeşti la mine?
              Paul, **oare** you still think.II at me
              Paul, are you still thinking of me, I wonder.
    b.   *Oare* unde eşti?
              oare were are.II
              Where are you, I wonder.

Using *oare*, the Speaker expresses her desire to know the answer while at the same time avoiding putting her Addressee on the spot for providing it. Note that, as predicted, using a tentative question marker in these examples, such as an epistemic modal, is not felicitous:

(55)   a. #Paul, poate te   mai gândeşti la mine?
            Paul, can   you still think.II at me
            Paul, could you still be thinking of me, I wonder.

---

[12]For work on this non-temporal use of the future tense in Romanian, as well as in other Romance languages, see Fălăuş [2014], Fălăuş and Laca [2014], Frana and Menéndez-Benito [2019], Giannakidou and Mari [2018], Ippolito and Farkas [2019], Irimia [2010], Mihoc et al. [2019], Eckardt and Beltrama [2019] among others.

[13]Example (55-b) was overheard in Bucharest, Romania; the speaker was talking on the phone.

b. #Poate unde eşti?
   can   where are.II
   Where could you be, I wonder.

Note next that using an *oare*-marked question is correctly predicted not to be felicitous in a situation in which the Addressee is presumed to know the answer and in which there is no reason to assume that he would not be happy to provide it. Thus, (56) is strange as asked by a mother of her child right before sitting down to eat:

(56) #*Oare* ţi-e   foame?
      oare you.Dat-is hunger
      Are you hungry, I wonder.

Finally, note that *oare* can be used in self-addressed interrogatives in which the Speaker answers her own question, as exemplified in (57):

(57)   *Oare* invitatul nostru trebuie prezentat publicului?   Bineînţeles că   nu.
       oare guest.the our   must   prezented public.the.Dat? of-course   that not
       Does our guest need to be presented to the public? Of course not.

I the present account, the occurrence of *oare* in such questions can be explained under the assumption that the Speaker here wishes to raise the issue in order to make her Addressee ponder it, and then she provides the answer she assumes the Addressee has reached as well. The interrogative in (57) cannot be interpreted as tentative given that the question is self-addressed. As expected, a PF or epistemic modal variant cannot be used in such questions. Note also that the type of question exemplified in (57) shows that *oare* cannot be treated as signaling Speaker ignorance. Giurgea [2018] provides a similar example, given in (58):

(58)   Nici   nu-şi   spuse numele,   dar mai era *oare* nevoie?
       not-even not-Refl.Dat. told   name.the.Dat but still was **oare** need?
       She didn't even say her name, but was that still necessary? (from Gib Mihăescu, *Donna Alba*, Giurgea's (5), p. 4)

Here the Speaker raises the question and assumes that the Addressee will ponder it and reach the conclusion that, indeed, there was no need for the person to say her name.

   Note also that *oare* is correctly predicted not to be felicitous in rhetorical questions whose purpose is to point to the obviousness of the contextually provided answer. An example is given in (59), a rhetorical question interpreted as having an obvious negative answer.

(59)   A: Ai   vorbit cu Maria?
          have.II spoken with Maria
          Have you spoken to Maria?
       B: #*Oare* am   căzut în cap?
          oare have.I fallen in head
          Have I fallen on my head?

In (59), the use of *oare* is redundant since the Speaker presupposes that adding the obvious answer to her question to $DC_{Ad,i}$ produces no change, and that the Addressee will not answer the question.

   In sum, the account presented here predicts, correctly, that *oare* can be used in tentative questions but cannot be treated as marking a question as being tentative. Treating *oare* as a tentative question marker cannot explain its occurrence in questions such as (57) and (58) or in

interrogatives that assume Addressee competence, such as (54).

We show next that the facts are parallel with respect to self-addressed questions: *oare* is compatible with such questions but cannot be treated as marking an interrogative as being self-addressed.

The fact that *oare* interrogatives can be used as exclusively self-addressed questions has already been exemplified in (57). In (60), we have an example of an interrogative marked by *oare* used in an inclusively self-addressed, or 'engaging' question:

(60)   *Alex and Bea are collaborating on a paper. At the beginning of their work day Alex says:*
        Oare de ce   sunt datele   aşa cum sunt?
        oare of why are data.def as way are
        Why are the data the way they are?

In fact, the presence of *oare* is so natural in self-addressed questions as to raise the issue of whether *oare* questions are ever Addressee addressed, as the present account predicts. The test discussed in Section 3 above shows that *oare* is indeed felicitous in Addressee-addressed questions. Going back to Maria, Paul and their soup, Maria can ask:

(61)   Paul, ce   crezi,   *oare* e gata supa?
        Paul, what believe.II **oare** is ready soup.the
        Paul, what do you think, is the soup ready?

To such a question, Paul may well respond as in (62):

(62)   De ce   mă întrebi pe   mine?
        of why me ask.II Acc me
        Why are you asking me?

And as expected, Ion, overhearing Maria's utterance in (61), can report what he heard as in (63):

(63)   Maria l-a   întrebat pe Paul dacă   e gata supa.
        Maria him-has asked   Acc Paul whether is ready soup.the
        Maria asked Paul whether the soup was ready.

Note that postposed *I wonder* contrasts with *oare* in that it is not appropriate in explicitly Addressee-addressed questions, as shown in (64):

(64)   #Paul, what do you think, is the soup ready, I wonder.

The pattern in (65) shows that post-posed *I wonder* interrogatives, unlike their *oare* counterparts, must be interpreted as self-addressed:

(65)   a. Alex to Bea: Is the soup ready, I wonder.
          Bea: #Why are you asking me?
      b. Alex to Bea: Is your mother coming to dinner today, I wonder.
          Carol, reporting Alex's speech act: #Alex asked Bea whether her mother was coming to dinner that day.

In conclusion, while non-intrusive questions marked by *oare* are compatible with being self-addressed, and indeed are often interpreted as such, the presence of *oare* does not force such an interpretation. I also tentatively suggest that postposed *I wonder* does mark the slifted interrogative as being self-addressed.

We turn now briefly to bare *oare* responses mentioned in (42), repeated below as (66).

(66) A: E prea devreme.
　　　 is too　early
　　　 It is too early.
　　 B: Oare.
　　　 oare
　　　 Is it?

Bare *oare* is an anaphoric response particle that can be used only in response to a declarative. In such a response the Speaker indicates that she calls into question the truth of the declarative, and therefore does not commit to the unique proposition it expresses. Under the current proposal, bare *oare* is treated as involving the ellipsis of a polar interrogative formed on the basis of the antecedent.[14] Under this proposal, the CDE of a bare *oare* response are the same as that of a full *oare* polar interrogative. B's discourse move is interpreted as raising a question, most naturally interpreted as self-addressed, that projects three possible future commitments, one in which B accepts that it is too early, one in which she accepts that it isn't, and a third in which her commitments remain unchanged. This accounts for the fact that such responses signal unwillingness to commit to the unique proposition in the issue on the Table, but do not contradict the commitment the interlocutor just made. This is consistent with expressing uncertainty or doubt relative to the truth of the proposition the interlocutor has just committed to.

To sum up, the present account of *oare* as a non-intrusive question marker correctly predicts that it can be used in both tentative and self-addressed questions but that it is not an exclusive marker of either.

The last issue to be discussed is whether one should treat *oare* as contributing to the CDE of the sentence in which it occurs, as proposed above, or whether one should treat it as contributing to its compositional semantic content. Note first that mirroring the effect of *oare* in the compositional semantics by assuming that it adds info(P) to the semantic content of the sentence in which it occurs is not an available alternative. Because of downward closure, such a move would render any *oare* interrogative tautological: any response whatsoever would settle the issue such an interrogative raises.

Finding other ways of achieving the same effect is not, however, impossible. While I cannot argue that the present account is superior to any such attempt, I will note here two advantages of the present proposal has over a potential compositional semantic analysis. First, treating *oare* as a d-marker immediately accounts for the fact that its contribution is not at issue. Second, the account presented here predicts that *oare* interrogatives will embed less freely than their *oare*-less counterparts, under the assumption that items that modify the CDE of a sentence occur high in its structure and resist embedding. That this prediction is correct is shown in (67):

(67) Paul nu ştie　　 dacă (*oare)　Rodica e aici.
　　 Paul not knows if　　 (***oare**) Rodica is here.
　　 Paul doesn't know whether Rodica is here.'

The ban against embedding *oare* interrogatives is not total, however. Verbs that report an interrogative speech act, whether public or private, such as *a (se) întreba* 'to ask (oneself)', *a se gândi* 'to think', allow *oare* complements:

(68)　a.　Paul s-a　　　 întrebat dacă　 (*oare*)　Rodica l-a　　 căutat.
　　　　　Paul himself-has asked　 whether (**oare**) Rodica him-has searched

---

[14]An account in which bare *oare* is treated as a polar interrogative pro-form is also possible. I leave the choice between these two possibilities open.

Paul asked himself whether Rodica looked for him.

b. Te   gândeşti dacă *oare*   mai ai   sentimente pentru Paul.
    you think   if   (**oare**) still have.II feelings   for   Paul
    You are wondering whether you still have feelings for Paul.

What the implications of this restricted embedding pattern are for the issue of d-marking vs. semantic content depends on how one accounts for the semantics of the verbs that allow such embedding. This, in turn, connects to the large issue of what Dayal and Grimshaw [2009] call quasi-subordination, exemplified in (69):

(69)   Ben asked himself would he ever find out what happened?

In these cases too, we find a root clause structure that can, however, embed but only under certain predicates (for discussion, see, for instance, McCloskey [2006], among many others):

(70)   *Ben didn't know would he ever find out what happened.

For the time being we simply note that the limited embedding potential of *oare* interrogatives is at least consistent with the account proposed here. Accounting for it remains, however, an open problem.

6   Conclusion

We started out with two general questions: (i) how to draw the distinction between canonical and non-canonical questions, and (ii) how this difference affects sentence forms. The answer to the first question provided here relies on default pragmatic assumptions associated with the basic CDE triggered by declaratives and interrogatives. A canonical question is one whose discourse effects are the basic ones, with contextually set parameters fixed to default values. Default pragmatic assumptions associated with such questions involve an ignorant Speaker raising an issue that is open in the current context, and steering the conversation towards a state in which the Addressee, assumed to be knowledgeable, settles the issue. These are default assumptions connected to the discourse effects triggered by the Speaker's speech act rather than conditions that must be met in order for a question to be felicitous. Indeed, we have discussed a variety of situations in which simple, unmarked interrogative forms are felicitous in contexts that do not meet these conditions. In such contexts, these unmarked forms are used to ask non-canonical questions.

With respect to the second question, the approach developed here predicts that interrogative forms that do not involve any special marking can be used to ask canonical questions. We have also proposed that languages may make use of special formal markings whose role is to add special discourse effects. Interrogatives thus marked can only be used to ask non-canonical questions because they trigger special conventional discourse effects that weaken or override default pragmatic assumptions.

Our narrow aim was to understand the distribution and interpretation of the morpheme *oare* in Romanian interrogatives. In the account we proposed, this morpheme functions as a d-marker whose effect is to project a canonical future in which the commitment anchor adds only a trivial commitment concerning the issue raised by the interrogative. We called such questions *non-intrusive*. In the course of the discussion, we distinguished non-intrusive questions from tentative ones, as well as from self-addressed questions. Hopefully, the discussion above will help in further understanding various types of non-canonical question markers across languages.

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