

A plea against monsters*

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Abstract Inspired by Schlenker’s (2003) seminal *Plea for Monsters*, linguists have been analyzing every occurrence of a shifted indexical by postulating a monstrous operator. My aim in this paper is to show that Kaplan’s (1989) original strategy of explaining apparent shifting in terms of a quotational use/mention distinction offers a much more intuitive, parsimonious and empirically superior analysis of many of these phenomena, including direct–indirect switches in Ancient Greek, role shift in signed languages, free indirect discourse in literary narratives, and mixed quotation.

Keywords: Kaplan; indexicals; monsters; quotation; role shift; free indirect discourse

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1 Introduction

In English there are two distinct ways to report what someone said, direct and indirect discourse. The semantic difference between the two can be brought out clearly with indexicals. In the direct report in (1a) *I* refers to Otto, while in the indirect variant in (1b) it refers to me.

- (1) a. Otto said, “I am a fool”.
b. Otto said that I am a fool.

The traditional explanation of this contrast is based on the assumption that in direct speech we report the original words, while in indirect speech we report the content expressed by those words. The formal semantic implementation of this idea involves analyzing direct discourse as a metalinguistic operator, i.e., a form of mentioning or pure quotation, and indirect discourse as an intensional operator, i.e., on a par with constructions like *John believes that φ* or *it is necessary that φ* .

In his *Plea for Monsters*, Schlenker argues that some reports with shifted indexicals (e.g., an embedded *I* referring to the subject of the reporting clause, not to the actual speaker) indicate the presence of a Kaplanian monster, i.e., a context shifting operator. Semanticists subsequently embraced the notion of monsters in natural language – prohibited by Kaplanian orthodoxy – to explain all kinds of phenomena that involve the apparent shifting of some context-dependent expression.

In this paper I first review Kaplan's original case against monsters, and Schlenker's challenge based on cross-linguistic data from Zazaki, Amharic, and Slave. I then present some other cases of alleged monsters from the recent literature, ranging from Ancient Greek reports, to sign language role shift, and the literary style of free indirect discourse. I argue for an alternative analysis of these phenomena in terms of mixed quotation. But then, of course, mixed quotation cannot itself be a monster. I show how existing, monstrous analyses of mixed quotation fail to deal with a phenomenon I call language shift. Then I propose an alternative, non-monstrous analysis of mixed quotation and its dual, unquotation. Finally, I show how to use mixed quotation and unquotation to provide a more conservative, monster-free, and empirically superior analysis of the allegedly monstrous phenomena listed above.

The lesson is that even if monsters exist, not every case of indexical shift is *ipso facto* a monster. As Kaplan himself already anticipated, many alleged examples of indexical shift are merely harmless forms of (mixed) quotation and as such pose no threat to the prohibition of monsters.

2 Kaplan on indexicals and monsters

In this section I will introduce Kaplan's semantics of indexicals and the motivation for his ban on monsters. The main point will be that mere indexical shift does not prove the existence of monsters.

2.1 The Logic of Demonstratives

Kaplan's (1989) *Logic of Demonstratives* provides a semantics for indexicals, i.e., context-dependent expressions like *today*, *here*, *this*, *that*, *I*, and *you*. The main desiderata that this theory aimed to satisfy are summarized in two principles on indexicality:

(2) **Principle 1:** indexicals are context-dependent

This is taken to be self-evident. When you say *I'm hungry* you express something different from what I would express with it. It seems that *I* is systematically context-dependent in that it always picks out the speaker of its utterance. This may lead one to postulate that *I* is simply synonymous with *the speaker (of this utterance)*. But that is in conflict with the second principle:

(3) **Principle 2:** indexicals are directly referential

Following Kripke's (1980) argumentation that proper names are rigid designators, Kaplan argues that indexicals are not synonymous with any description. Whatever descriptive meaning indexicals have, it is not part of the content expressed. A key argument for principle 2 is based on the observation that an indexical's reference is never affected by a linguistic embedding.

- (4) Three years ago in Spain, you doubted that it was possible that I'd be here today.

Despite the embedding under temporal, locative, and modal operators, *I*, *you*, *here* and *today* in (4) refer to the actual speaker, addressee, location, and time of the utterance of (4). Kaplan sometimes refers to this property as indexicals taking "primary scope"; Schlenker (2003) calls it the "Fixity Thesis". This property marks an essential, linguistically observable difference between indexicals and definite descriptions, which *can* be affected by operators. Concretely, we can show that *I* is not synonymous with a description like *the current speaker* by constructing minimal pairs where the referent of the description shifts but that of the indexical remains fixed, leading to truth-conditionally distinct interpretations:

- (5) If you had been {me/the current speaker}, everybody would have listened attentively.

In fact, we don't even need embeddings to bring out these contrasts. A simple sentence like (6a) can only express a contingent truth (for I might have kept my mouth shut) while its descriptive counterpart (6b) has a tautological interpretation (for there are no possible worlds in which a uniquely salient current speaker is not speaking).

- (6) a. I am speaking.
b. The current speaker is speaking.

To reconcile the conflicting intuitions behind his two principles (i.e., contextual variation and rigidity), Kaplan develops a two-dimensional semantics. In addition to a modal parameter or index, *i*, we have an independent context parameter *c* in the semantics. Notation: $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_i^c$ denotes the semantic value of α as uttered in *c* and evaluated with respect to index *i*. Formally, indices are tuples containing those parameters that are shiftable by operators, say a possible world and a time: $i = \langle w_i, t_i \rangle$. Contexts are likewise tuples, containing those parameters necessary to fix the reference of indexicals, say a possible world, a time and a speaker: $c = \langle w_c, t_c, s_c \rangle$. In the lexicon indexicals get their interpretation solely on the basis of *c*, while (non-indexical) predicates get

their interpretation from i :

- (7) a. $\llbracket I \rrbracket_i^c = \text{the speaker of } c$
b. $\llbracket \text{speak} \rrbracket_i^c = \text{set of speakers in } i$

This allows us to capture the contrast between I and *the current speaker*: I picks out the speaker of c , while *the current speaker* picks out some speaker in i . Now define the proposition expressed by a sentence uttered in c as the set of indices i in which that sentence would be evaluated as true (relative to c and i):

$$(8) \quad \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^c = \{i \mid \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1\}$$

From (7) and (8) we can derive, correctly, that the proposition expressed by (6a), uttered by me, is the set of indices in which I, Emar, have the property of speaking, while the proposition expressed by (6b) is the set of indices in which the speaker is speaking.

It looks like Principle 2 is taken care of, but, to ensure compliance with the Fixity Thesis we need to say something about operators. (9) shows a typical example of a modal operator manipulating the index parameter:

$$(9) \quad \llbracket \diamond \varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1 \text{ iff there exists an index } i' \text{ with } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{i'}^c = 1.$$

Such an operator indeed will not affect the interpretation of indexicals in its scope. The logic however allows the definition of operators that do shift the context parameter and thereby potentially shift the reference of indexicals:

$$(10) \quad \llbracket M\varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1 \text{ iff there exists a context } c' \text{ with } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\langle w_c, t_c \rangle}^{c'} = 1.$$

To do justice to the Fixity Thesis, Kaplan claims that such so-called monstrous operators do not exist in natural language. In the remainder of this section I reconstruct in some detail Kaplan's arguments for this so-called Prohibition of Monsters, before turning to Schlenker's challenge.

2.2 The case against monsters

Kaplan introduces his Prohibition of Monsters as follows:

no operator can control the character of the indexicals within its scope, because they will simply leap out of its scope to the front of the operator. I am not saying we could not construct a language with such operators, just that English is not one. (Kaplan, 1989)

Indeed, we can easily construct a formal language with monsters – we just defined a monster M in Kaplan’s own logic. But Kaplan makes an empirical claim here: English does not have monsters. To substantiate this claim, his strategy is to refute some potential counterexamples. In the remainder of this section I’ll go through four types of potential monsters and reconstruct Kaplan’s reasons for dismissing them.

2.2.1 Quantifying over contexts

Kaplan starts off with the English construction *in some contexts it is true that*. At first sight this looks like it could be the natural language counterpart of the monster M defined in (10). If indeed it were a context shifter, like M is, (11) would express the trivially true claim that there are contexts c whose speaker (s_c) is not tired.

(11) In some contexts it is true that I am not tired

But it doesn’t – (11) is clearly a statement about me, the actual speaker, so no context shift has taken place.

2.2.2 Pure quotation

Quotation comes closer to being a monster in that it actually manages to affect the interpretation of indexicals.

There is a way to control an indexical, to keep it from taking primary scope, and even to refer it to another context [. . .]. Use quotation marks. If we mention the indexical rather than use it, we can, of course, operate directly on it. [. . .] If they stay in the metalanguage and confine their attention to sentences as in *In some contexts “I am not tired now” is true* they are rendered harmless and can even do socially useful work. (Kaplan, 1989)

Quotation poses a prima facie counterexample to the Fixity Thesis in that none of the following statements containing first person pronouns are about me:

- (12)
- a. In some contexts ‘I am not tired now’ is true.
 - b. ‘I exist’ is valid in the *Logic of Demonstratives*.
 - c. ‘I’ is a one-letter word.
 - d. ‘I Mary love’ is not grammatical.

So why doesn't quotation qualify as a monster in English? Kaplan's answer: the word *I* is not used in any of the examples in (12)– it is only mentioned. The *I*'s in (12) don't refer to anything, they are just referred to. In other words, according to Kaplan, quotation is not a linguistic operator at all. The statements in (12) are part of the metalanguage, not the object language that we're trying to give a semantics for. Quotation only does “socially useful work” by allowing the metalanguage to talk about the object language.

The claim that quotation is a marker of pure mention rather than a linguistic operator manages to deflect the counterexample, but it does so at the cost of severely limiting the scope of natural language semantics. The sentences in (12) are evidently well-formed English language sentences, so a proper syntax and semantics of English should contain rules dealing with quotation as a bona fide linguistic construction. There are various theories about the syntax and semantics of quotation on the market (recent overviews include Cappelen & Lepore 2012; Saka 2013). The so-called disquotational theory, for instance, analyzes pure quotation as an operator that turns a string of letters (or phonemes, or signs, or expressions, depending on the specific version of the theory, cf. Maier 2014c) into a referential term referring to that string.¹

(13) if σ is a sequence of letters, ' σ ' is a referential term and $\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket = \sigma$.

This disquotational semantics allows us to derive the right truth conditions for the examples in (12). For instance, (12d) is true iff the denotation of '*I Mary love*', i.e., the string of letters *I Mary love*, is not in the denotation of the predicate *is grammatical*, i.e., the set of grammatical things. So, although Kaplan didn't think this was a job for semantics, we *can* give a decent formal syntax and semantics for the pure quotation constructions exemplified in (12).

Since on the disquotational analysis quotation is now a genuine operator (be it a somewhat peculiar one), the question arises again: is it a monster? Again the answer is no. On the current version the English first person pronoun *I* still is not a syntactic constituent of the sentence – at best, the letter *I* is. And even in a version of the disquotational theory where the quotation does contain actual expressions rather than letters, these expressions are not semantically evaluated in the computation of the truth conditions. This is precisely why the disquotational theory is said to be non-compositional: the meaning of the complex term consisting of quotation marks and enclosed

¹ By ' σ ' I mean an opening quotation mark, followed by the letters in σ , followed by a closing quotation mark.

expression, does not depend on the meaning of the enclosed expression, only on the enclosed expression itself (cf. Pagin & Westerståhl 2011; Maier 2014c for details). In other words, even if quotation is analyzed as an operator, and the quoted expression as having genuine syntactic structure, we can still maintain, with Kaplan, that indexicals inside a quotation do not refer, and hence that no monstrous shifting takes place.

2.2.3 Direct discourse

The story above applies to pure quotation, but Kaplan discusses two other types of quotation, broadly construed: direct and indirect discourse. Kaplan mentions direct discourse right alongside (12a), in the elided part of the previous quotation:

If we mention the indexical rather than use it, we can of course operate directly on it. Carnap once pointed out to me how important the difference between direct and indirect quotation is in

- (14) a. Otto said, "I am a fool"
b. Otto said that I am a fool

(Kaplan, 1989)

This suggests that, for Kaplan, direct discourse is just a species of pure quotation, i.e. the quotation marks mark the use/mention distinction and the *I* inside the quote does not refer at all, so, a fortiori, it's reference is not shifted by a monstrous operator.

In the case of direct discourse, more so than with pure quotation examples involving metalogical predicates like *is valid*, Kaplan's position that this is all metalanguage and thus falls beyond the scope of semantics, is unsatisfactory. Direct discourse is surely a grammatical construction of English that we want to analyze semantically. We can do so by applying the disquotational semantics above. This means analyzing direct-discourse-saying as a relation between an individual and a string of letters. Truth conditions: $\llbracket (14a) \rrbracket = 1$ iff Otto uttered (the sounds corresponding to) the mentioned string of letters, *I am a fool*. On such an analysis, again, the pronoun *I*, insofar as it is even a syntactic constituent of (14a) at all, is never semantically evaluated in the course of deriving the truth conditions of the report. Hence, direct discourse is still no monster.

2.2.4 Indirect discourse

Finally, let's consider indirect discourse. Although examples like (14) are meant to contrast the apparent indexical shift in direct discourse with the primary scope, non-shifting behavior of indexicals in indirect discourse, there is a close connection between direct and indirect discourse that warrants further attention. In fact, the traditional account of indirect discourse seems to presuppose an account of direct discourse. The intuition formulated in 1 was that indirect discourse conveys the content of the original speaker's words. In other words, (14b) is true iff Otto uttered (i.e., direct-discourse-says) some sentence (or sequence of letters/signs) that expressed that I am a fool.

$$(15) \quad \llbracket \alpha \text{ says that } \varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1 \text{ iff } \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_i^c \text{ uttered a sentence in } i \text{ that expressed } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^c.$$

There are different ways to make the notion of *uttering a sentence that expresses a proposition (modeled as a set of indices)* more precise. With our disquotational semantics of direct and pure quotation we can do the following:²

$$(16) \quad \llbracket \alpha \text{ says that } \varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1 \text{ iff there is a sentence } \sigma \text{ such that:}$$

- a. $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_i^c$ uttered σ in i , and
- b. $\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket^{c_0} = \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^c$, with $c_0 = \langle \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_i^c, w_i, t_i \rangle$.

Note that (16) involves interpretation with respect to a shifted context: $\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket^{c_0}$ denotes the proposition expressed by the utterance of σ in its original utterance context. Nonetheless we can see that this definition as a whole is not monstrous because neither α nor φ , the two variable constituents of the linguistic report, are evaluated with respect to any context other than c , the actual utterance context. Hence any indexicals occurring in the report will get their interpretation fixed by the actual context. So: no indexical shift, no monster.³

Schlenker proposes a convenient simplification to bring out the non-monstrous nature of Kaplanian indirect discourse even more clearly. Using the auxiliary notion of an index compatible with what x uttered in i , the

² Note that σ here is used both as an object and as an expression that can be semantically interpreted. This means that, for this purpose, we need a version of the disquotational theory that allows expressions rather than, or in addition to, strings of letters/phonemes to be quoted (cf. Maier 2014c).

³ Kaplan himself proposes to define direct-discourse-saying as a relation between an individual and a character, which allows him to formulate (16) without metalinguistic quantification over linguistic objects.

semantics of indirect discourse takes on the form of a traditional universal modal operator:

- (17) $\llbracket \alpha \text{ says that } \varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1$ iff for all i' compatible with what $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_i^c$ uttered in i : $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{i'}^c = 1$

The connection between Schlenker's modal definition and my disquotation-based reconstruction of Kaplan's original can be brought out by defining the compatibility notion as follows:⁴

- (18) An index i' is compatible with what a utters in i iff there is a sentence σ s.t. a uttered σ in i and $\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{i'}^{\langle a, w_i, t_i \rangle} = 1$.

3 Schlenker's plea for monsters

In the previous section we've seen how Kaplan enforces Principle 2 (indexicals are directly referential) with a strict no-monsters policy. We saw how potential counterexamples involving quotation and reported speech constructions are either explained away as involving mention (direct discourse, pure quotation) or analyzed as intensional operators (indirect discourse). The latter move in particular has been challenged by linguists.

Looking for a convincing counterexample to the Fixity Thesis, Schlenker (1999; 2003) turns to languages other than English. He presents the following Amharic speech report as an example of a monstrous indexical shift:⁵

- (19) ጎን ጎና ነፃ-ኸኸ ያለ-ለ
John hero I.am he.says
 'John says he's a hero'

The first person marker in the embedded clause ጎና ነፃ-ኸኸ ('I am a hero') is not interpreted as referring to me, the reporter, but to John. But we already encountered similar cases of shifting, viz. in direct discourse, and that didn't commit us to the existence of monsters. The next step is therefore to rule out a direct discourse analysis of reports like (19). Schlenker provides two arguments for this – mixed indexicality and wh-movement.

⁴ Schlenker's definition is weaker than Kaplan's or the disquotational variant above, because no character/sentence needs to be uttered at all for the universal quantification in (17) to be satisfied.

⁵ Amharic is a Semitic language spoken by 22 million native speakers in Ethiopia.

3.1 Excluding direct discourse

The first argument against direct discourse involves cases of mixed indexicality, i.e., reports where not all indexicals are shifted simultaneously. Schlenker's Amharic data have been contested, so here's an example from subsequent work on Slave:⁶

- (20) Simon rásereyineht'u hadi
Simon you.hit.me said
'Simon said that you hit him.' [Slave, Anand & Nevins 2004]

There are two indexicals in the embedded clause, literally glossed as 'you hit me'. The *you* is interpreted as referring to the actual addressee, i.e. in line with the Fixity Thesis, but the *I* is shifted, picking out the speaker of the reported utterance. This shows that Slave reports with shifted indexicals cannot simply be analyzed as direct discourse – at least not if direct discourse is understood 'à la Kaplan as a special case of pure quotation.

The second argument against direct discourse revolves around the grammatical opacity that is characteristic of direct discourse. One salient instance of this argument involves *wh*-movement. In English we can turn an indirect report into a question by replacing one of the embedded arguments with a *wh*-word and moving it to the front. Direct discourse doesn't allow such *wh*-movement operations:

- (21) Margaret's original utterance: "Make this for me!"
a. What did Margaret tell you to make for her?
b. *What did Margaret tell you, "Make for me"?

This blocking effect follows directly from the disquotational analysis of direct discourse that we are currently considering. If we're just literally mentioning a sequence of words, we cannot adjust anything in the quotation without making the report false, and in this case also ungrammatical (*make for me* in (21b) is ungrammatical because it lacks a direct object argument, while *tell* seems to have one argument too many). Hence, *wh*-movement constitutes a nice linguistic test for distinguishing direct and indirect speech cross-linguistically. The following example shows an application of the *wh*-movement test in Slave, indicating a case of shifted indexicality in a non-direct report:

⁶ Slave is a language spoken by 2,350 native speakers of the Slave(y) First Nations of Canada.

- (22) Yeri Margaret segha wɔshi néhdi
What Margaret [for-me you-will-make] told-you
 ‘What did Margaret tell you [to make for her]?’ (Slave, Rice 1986)

Other linguistic tests that have been used to exclude direct discourse analyses for reports containing shifted indexicals include the licensing of NPI’s (negative polarity items, like *any*, that require a downward entailing environment), (23a), and *de re* readings, (23b) (cf. Anand 2006; Schlenker 2011 for an overview).

- (23) a. NPI licensing test:
 (i) John never said that it was any good.
 (ii) #John never said, “It was any good.”
 b. *De re* test:
 (i) And then my daughter told me that she wanted to marry that stupid idiot!
 (ii) #And then my daughter told me, “I want to marry that stupid idiot.”!

By applying these tests Schlenker and others have convincingly argued that indexical shifting in reported speech cannot always be explained away as mere instances of direct discourse.

3.2 Excluding mixed quotation

The tests above exclude an analysis of the alleged monsters in terms of direct-discourse-analyzed-as-pure-quotation. But there are other, more flexible forms of quotation, like mixed quotation, which are more difficult to rule out.

Mixed quotation, also referred to as partial or subclausal quotation, is a mix of direct and indirect discourse, usually introduced by way of Davidson’s (1979) example:

- (24) Quine said that quotation “has a certain anomalous feature.”

The first thing to note about mixed quotation is that it does indeed induce an indexical shift.

- (25) Levi Foster, in fact, is the great-great-grandfather of Gov. Mike Foster of Louisiana, who said recently on a radio program that it would be “news to me” if anyone in his family had owned slaves. [Recanatani 2001]

None of the tests considered above exclude an analysis in terms of a (ty-

pographically unmarked) mixed quotation that covers only the part of the report complement that contains the shifted indexical. However, the question whether mixed quotation itself is monstrous is a matter of some debate, to which I return in section 4.4.

Whatever the outcome of that debate, Anand (2006) already offers an explicit argument against a mixed quotation approach, based on the existence of syntactic constraints on shifting in Amharic, Slave, and Zazaki. Anand & Nevins (2004) describe and name two such constraints, which they hypothesize to be universal.

The Shift Together constraint says that shiftable indexicals in a clause either shift all together or none at all. This rules out certain mixed readings schematically illustrated in (26).

(26) *John says that I_{John} am smarter than I_{Emar}

What complicates matters is that not all indexicals have to be shiftable in a given language. For instance, in Zazaki all indexicals are shiftable, so we should never find any mixed indexicality, while in Slave only first person indexicals are shiftable, leaving room for mixed indexicality cases like (20) above.

The still more subtle No Intervening Binder constraint says that, once an indexical is shifted by a report operator, more deeply embedded indexicals do not have access to the unshifted, global referent.

(27) *Mary says that someone told me $_{Mary}$ that I_{Emar} am an idiot.

The important point for us is that these constraints appear to be syntactic in nature, i.e., the readings sketched in (26) and (27) are blocked on purely structural grounds, regardless of the plausibility of the potential interpretations. By contrast, mixed quotation is usually thought of as driven entirely by pragmatic considerations. We mixed quote in order to highlight some phrasing that seems particularly apt or interesting, or to distance ourselves from a particular phrasing.⁷ So we can't expect a mixed quotation analysis of shifted indexicality in Zazaki or Slave to categorically rule out mixed indexicality configurations like those in (26) and (27).

I conclude, tentatively, that for languages like Slave and Zazaki that obey syntactic shifting constraints, a monstrous analysis seems preferable to a (mixed) quotational analysis. In the remainder of the paper I argue that this

⁷ The only syntactic constraint on mixed quotation seems to be that the quoted material is of the appropriate category to fill the slot it occupies in the surrounding report structure (Maier, 2014b).

conclusion does not extend to many other phenomena that have been claimed to involve monsters.

4 More monsters?

Schlenker's plea had a great impact on linguistic semantics. Over the last 15 years, linguists have been re-analyzing each occurrence of potential indexical shifting, especially in the vicinity of reported speech, as involving some kind of monstrous operator. In this section I'll present some examples of this trend.

4.1 Ancient Greek

As a first example, consider reported speech in Ancient Greek.⁸ Bary & Maier (2003) observed shifted indexicals in report constructions that are traditionally analyzed as indirect discourse.

- (28) ἄλλος ἀνέστη, ἐπιδεικνὺς μὲν τὴν εὐήθειαν τοῦ τὰ πλοῖα αἰτεῖν κελεύοντος, ὥσπερ πάλιν τὸν στόλον Κύρου ποιουμένου, ἐπιδεικνὺς δὲ ὡς εὐήθεις εἶη ἡγεμόνα αἰτεῖν παρὰ τούτου ᾧ λυμαινόμεθα τὴν πρᾶξιν.
'another man arose to point out the foolishness of the speaker who had urged them to ask for vessels, just as if Cyrus were going home again, and to point out also how foolish it was to ask for a guide from this man whose enterprise they were ruining.' (literally: λυμαινόμεθα = we are ruining.)

The first person plural inflection is clearly meant to refer to the reported speaker and his fellow soldiers, not to a group including the writer/narrator – i.e. it's a shifted indexical. To argue that this is not direct speech, we relied on various morphosyntactic cues, including the oblique mood on *how foolish it was*. On the basis of such examples we concluded that Ancient Greek, like Amharic, has a monstrous indirect discourse construction.

Unfortunately, a dead language like Ancient Greek is not very suitable for performing tests like *wh*-movement, let alone the more subtle tests for No Intervening Binder or Shift Together that would be required to rule out a mixed quotation approach. I conclude that the case for monsters in Ancient Greek is inconclusive at best.

⁸ The argument for monsters in Ancient Greek was never worked out in any detail and remains unpublished. I choose to lead with it here as it illustrates quite clearly both the post-Schlenkerian trend of equating indexical shift with the presence of a monster, and the fact that a quotational analysis is in fact conceptually and empirically superior (cf. section 6.2).

4.2 Role shift

Role shift is a form of reporting found in many sign languages. It involves the reporter shifting her body and gaze away from the current addressee, while reproducing (or “constructing”) the reported utterance. Inside a role shift the signed analogue of the first person pronoun, IX-1, i.e., typically the index finger pointing at the signer’s own chest, is interpreted as a self-reference of the reported speaker, i.e. as a shifted indexical. Note on notation: signs are glossed in all capitals, role shift and some other non-manual markings are indicated with an overline.

- (29) MOM $\overline{\text{IX-1 BUSY}}$ ^{RS}
‘Mom’s like, “I’m busy!”’ [American Sign Language (ASL), Lillo-Martin 1995]

Role shift is traditionally described as a form of direct speech, as witness the gloss in (29), but Zucchi (2004) and Quer (2005) argue against this approach, and, following Schlenker, propose alternative analyses in terms of indexical shifting operators.

In support of a monstrous analysis, Quer (2005) describes cases of mixed indexicality in Catalan Sign Language (LSC), where one indexical gets an indirect, unshifted interpretation, while another, typically the first person, gets shifted. Thus, the locative indexical *HERE* in (30), uttered in Barcelona, refers to Barcelona, despite the role shift that shifts the first person indexical IX-1.

- (30) $\overline{\text{IX}_a \text{ MADRID MOMENT}^f \text{ JOAN THINK IX-1 STUDY FINISH HERE}}$ ^{RS}
‘When he was in Madrid, Joan thought he would finish his study here.’ [LSC, Quer 2005]

Schlenker (2014a) applies the wh-movement test to establish that, in ASL, role shift is not direct discourse.

- (31) BEFORE IX-a JOHN IN LA WHO IX-a SAY $\overline{\text{IX-1 WILL LIVE WITH HERE}}$ ^{RS}
WHO?
‘While John was in LA, who did he say he would live with there?’
[ASL, Schlenker 2014a]

The evidence is certainly more convincing than in the case of Ancient Greek, but is it enough to show we’re dealing with a monster?

Concerning the wh-movement data, Davidson (2015) points out there is considerable variation here. For instance, although Schlenker’s main ASL informant consistently allowed extractions like (31), his French informant

rejected similar reports in French Sign Language. Moreover, related dependency tests like NPI-licensing show ASL role shift pattern with direct instead indirect discourse.

More fundamentally, though, as pointed out above, a mixed quotation approach to indexical shifting is in principle compatible with both *wh*-movement and mixed indexicality. To rule out such an analysis for Slave and Zazaki, we saw how Anand pointed to syntactic constraints like Shift Together and No Intervening Binder. But these have not been investigated in detail for signed languages. In fact, what evidence we have goes against Shift Together: since both *HERE* and *IX-1* are in principle shiftable under role shift in LSC, they should shift together, but in (30) they don't (Quer, 2011). Preliminary findings from a small survey⁹ of signers of Sign Language of the Netherlands (NGT) show that some signers judge (32b) to be an adequate report of (32a), some even preferring it over the verbatim alternative in (32c).

- (32) a. Martine's original utterance: *IX-1 BETTER SIGN THAN MACHA*
 b. Macha's report: *MARTINE IX-1 BETTER SIGN THAN IX-1*^{RS}
 c. Macha's report: *MARTINE IX-1 BETTER SIGN THAN MACHA*^{RS}

I conclude that the case for monsters in signed languages is still inconclusive. At this point a mixed quotation analysis may well be a viable alternative – assuming of course that mixed quotation is not itself a monster.

4.3 Free indirect discourse

A third example of a reporting construction that has been all too hastily analyzed as a monster comes from the domain of literature. Literary scholars have extensively studied free indirect discourse, a form of reporting a character's speech or thought that also exhibits characteristics of both direct and indirect discourse (Banfield, 1982; Fludernik, 1995). Consider the following passage.

- (33) Dee knew she was in trouble. Tomorrow was her 40th birthday. What the hell was she supposed to do now?

Note that, for instance, the last sentence is not the narrator asking the reader what she is supposed to do. Rather, this question, and the otherwise temporally paradoxical *tomorrow was* statement before it, is to be interpreted as a kind of report of what the protagonist, Dee, is thinking.

⁹ Martine Zwets and I ran a pilot experiment in 2012 where we presented videos of signed utterances, followed by role shift reports, to (near-)native signers of NGT, and asked them to judge the appropriateness of a given role shift report of a previous original utterance.

The next thing to note then is that the indexicals *now* and *tomorrow* are shifted, i.e., they refer to the protagonist's present within the story, i.e. the day in which Dee is thinking these thoughts, not the day in which the narrator (let alone the writer) is telling the story. Now, thoughts can be presented in direct discourse in literary narratives, and this does not always require overt quotation marks, as in stream-of-consciousness passages, or interior monologues. But (33) is not direct discourse, because if it was we would have seen the original thought's present tense and first person, as in *Tomorrow is my 40th birthday. What the hell am I supposed to do now?*

Based on the shifty behavior of temporal and locative indexicals, Schlenker (1999) already concluded that free indirect discourse involves a monstrous context shift. This general idea has been pursued in different directions.

Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt (2014) develop theories whereby semantic interpretation is relativized to two Kaplanian context parameters, a protagonist context *c* and a narrator context *C*. We then have two kinds of indexicals: person and tense are narrator-oriented, i.e., they are lexically specified to get their reference from *C*, while temporal and locative indexicals are protagonist-oriented, getting their reference from *c*. Typically, $C = c =$ the Kaplanian utterance context, but in free indirect discourse *c* and *C* come apart. In the Schlenker and Eckardt analyses this divergence is handled in pragmatics.

Sharvit (2008), by contrast, introduces a bona fide (but phonologically unrealized) monstrous operator into the syntax of free indirect reports to handle the shift of *c* to the protagonist's thought context.¹⁰ I will argue below that the monstrous operator account is too weak to deal with a phenomenon known as language shift, which calls for a quotation-based analysis.

4.4 Mixed quotation

I have suggested a number of times above that instead of postulating a monster we can analyze the data in this section in terms of quotation. But we'd need a rather flexible form of quotation. The mixed indexicality in role shift or free indirect discourse shows that we cannot reduce these phenomena to direct speech or pure quotation. The natural candidate then is mixed quotation, which I already introduced with some examples in section 3.2:

¹⁰ In fact, Sharvit does not really assume a split between context parameters. All indexicals are shifted; the appearance of unshifted third person and past morphemes is a matter of uninterpretable surface features transmitted from the silent operator.

- (34) a. Quine said that quotation “has a certain anomalous feature.”
[=(24)]
- b. Levi Foster, in fact, is the great-great-grandfather of Gov. Mike Foster of Louisiana, who said recently on a radio program that it would be “news to me” if anyone in his family had owned slaves.
[=(25)]

However, ironically, some philosophers have argued – in line with the linguists’ reactions exemplified in the previous subsections – that, since it induces an indexical shift, as illustrated in (34b), mixed quotation is itself a monstrous operator.

Recanati for instance writes:

On this view the quotation marks function as a context-shifting operator d . That operator combines with an expression σ (the expression within the quotation marks) to yield an expression of the same type, and shifts the context for the interpretation of σ from the current context c to the source context c' . (Recanati, 2008)

Zimmermann (2007) makes this idea even more explicit. In his terminology, mixed quotations “allude” to past utterances, i.e., with (34a) Davidson alludes to the utterance event of Quine writing the phrase ‘has a certain anomalous feature’. Zimmermann introduces the following useful bit of notation:

- (35) $c + “\alpha”$ = the utterance context that a_c ’s utterance of “ α ” in c alludes to.

With the help of (35) we can define the context shifting operation that explains the observed indexical shift in examples like (34b):

- (36) $\llbracket “\text{news to me}” \rrbracket^c = \llbracket \text{news to me} \rrbracket^{c+“\text{news to me}”}$

However, this Zimmermann/Recanati analysis ignores the fact that, as Davidson already pointed out, there is a sense in which (34a) is about Quine’s actual words, not just about the content of what he said in some context or other. It may be hoped that an account that takes the mention component more seriously might be able to do without the monster – after all, we accounted for apparent indexical shift in direct speech by relying on mention rather than monsters.

Potts (2007) first formalized the hybrid use/mention nature of mixed quotation in a compositional semantic framework. He posits a two-dimensional

logical form: the first dimension captures the use-component, i.e., the regular semantic contribution of the quoted phrase, while the second dimension captures the mention-component, i.e., the proposition that someone uttered these words:

$$(37) \quad \llbracket (34a) \rrbracket \approx \left\langle \begin{array}{l} \llbracket \text{Quine that quotation has a certain anomalous feature} \rrbracket \\ \llbracket \text{Quine uttered 'has a certain anomalous feature'} \rrbracket \end{array} \right\rangle$$

To derive such two-dimensional logical forms compositionally, the crucial step is shown in (38). Note: for simplicity I'm leaving out index parameters and assignment functions, and *utter* denotes the utterance relation between an individual and a sentence or phrase.

$$(38) \quad \llbracket \text{"has a certain anomalous feature"} \rrbracket^c = \left\langle \begin{array}{l} \llbracket \text{has a certain anomalous feature} \rrbracket^c \\ \text{utter}(x, \text{'has a certain anomalous feature'}) \end{array} \right\rangle$$

In the first dimension, note that we're essentially just ignoring the quotation marks. In the second dimension, note the free variable *x* representing the anaphoric nature of the source of the quoted words, and the fact that the mixed quoted phrase here occurs in pure quotation. Semantic composition proceeds only in the first dimension, i.e. only the top component is affected by the embedding under a regular, Kaplanian indirect discourse operator.

Potts' analysis seems to capture the basic observation from Davidson, viz. that mixed quotation involves simultaneous use and mention, and it does so in a more or less¹¹ compositional framework. But it doesn't adequately handle indexical shifting. If we apply the account sketched above to (34b) we get the wrong results. The problem lies in the first dimension, where the quoted expression receives its regular semantic interpretation, i.e., as if there were no quotation marks at all. For (34b) this means that Levi said that it was news to me, the reporter, while Levi uttered the words 'news to me', thereby presumably referring to himself.

The solution is to introduce a semantic indexical shifter, i.e., a monster, in the logical form. If we just insert something like the Zimmermann/Recanati monster in the use-dimension of (38) we will get the truth conditions right:

$$(39) \quad \llbracket \text{"news to me"} \rrbracket^c = \left\langle \begin{array}{l} \llbracket \text{news to me} \rrbracket^{c+\text{"news to me"}} \\ \text{utter}(x, \text{'news to me'}) \end{array} \right\rangle$$

11 Pagin & Westerståhl (2011) argue that the pure quotation component that Potts' account builds makes the account non-compositional, but this subtlety need not concern us here.

So even Potts's account, which tries to take seriously the mention component of mixed quotation, ends up postulating a monster.

In sum, mixed quotation is not direct discourse or pure quotation, but it does involve indexical shift. Hence, as with role shift and free indirect discourse, philosophers and linguists have been trying to deal with it in terms of a monstrous operator. This effectively undermines my case against monsters in the previous subsections, where I suggested that mixed quotation may offer an alternative to the monstrous analyses. Hence, in the remainder of the paper I will first argue that monstrous approaches to mixed quotation are fundamentally unsatisfactory (section 5), and then proceed to provide an alternative monster-free analysis of mixed quotation (section 6.1), which I then extend to cover the rest of the phenomena discussed in this section (section 6.2).

5 Beyond monstrous

In this section I argue that the monstrous proposal for mixed quotation in 4.4 is fundamentally too weak. Monstrous approaches cannot account for what Recanati has called language shifts. Language shift is really the hallmark of a use/mention shift.

5.1 Language shifts

A characteristic feature of direct speech is that we may quote someone in their own language, dialect, or idiolect.

- (40) a. Wolfgang asked "Hast du Hunger?" and I answered "Ja." [Clark & Gerrig 1990]
b. "Nothingth changed!" he yelled. "By God, Thally, you're the meaneth, thtubborneth, bitchieth, mule-headedeth, vengefulleth cold-blooded therpent in the Thtate of Vermont." [idem]

Note that such language shifts between a report and the surrounding text are usually unacceptable in indirect discourse (Banfield, 1973).

- (41) a. *Wolfgang asked if ich Hunger hatte.
b. ??He yelled that nothingth changed and he added that Thally was the meaneth, thtubborneth, bitchieth, . . .

The contrast between (40) and (41) is readily explained on the traditional analysis in which direct speech is just a relation between an individual and a linguistic entity, while indirect speech involves the reporter rephrasing the

content of the reported speech act from her own perspective. Essentially then, the examples in (40) are similar to cases of pure quotations of non-English expressions, or even non-expressions or gibberish:

- (42) a. 'Ich habe Hunger' is a German sentence.
b. 'iefn9' contains a numeral and is not a word.

There are many different analyses of pure quotation – classics include the proper name, disquotational, demonstrative and demonstration theories – all of which are able to deal with examples like these (cf. Cappelen & Lepore 2012; Saka 2013; Maier 2014c). In this paper I remain agnostic about which pure quotation analysis is best. I have sketched a disquotational analysis in section 2.2.2, so I'll stick with that below. Nothing much hinges on this choice.

We find language shifts also in mixed quotation (43) and free indirect discourse (44).¹²

- (43) a. Nicola said that Alice is a "philosopher". [Cappelen & Lepore 1997]
b. Bush said that the enemy "misunderestimates me" [Maier 2014b]
c. A doctor tells him he is like a "vieille femme hystérique" [de Brabanter 2010]
- (44) a. She was angry. Oh, how they underestimated her! [Maier 2014a]
b. Ah well, her fathaire would shoorly help her out, she told John in her thick French accent. [idem]
c. Brainy Smurf was not going to give up. Tomorrow was Smurfday, wasn't it? The perfect time to smurf his big surprise. How they would smurf!

The various analyses reviewed in the previous section (e.g., Zimmermann's or Potts's for mixed quotation, or Sharvit's for free indirect discourse) use a monster to shift the context and thereby also the interpretation of indexicals. But since language is not a Kaplanian context parameter, this does not account for language shifting.

5.2 Supermonsters?

A natural response from the monster-theorist would be to extend the notion of a context shifting operator to include language shifting by simply adding the language of utterance as just another contextual parameter. Thus, Recanati writes:

¹² I predict and suspect that similar shifts are allowed under role shift in sign language, but I don't have the data to back that up.

[(43a)] involves what I dubbed a language-shift: the words within the quotation marks are interpreted as belonging to the ‘language’ (idiolect) of the source, and this affects not only their content but also their linguistic meaning or character. Yet, as I pointed out in several places, the two phenomena can be unified if we let the language spoken in a context be one of the coordinates of the context in question. [Recanati 2008:452]

In other words, by switching to “supercontexts”, which contain the language under consideration as a parameter, we can analyze mixed quotation (or free indirect speech) as involving a “supermonster” that shifts those.¹³

Concretely, supercontexts are quadruples, $\langle s_c, t_c, w_c, L_c \rangle$, where L_c denotes the language of c . In Zimmermann’s terminology, the context alluded to by the reporter’s use of a mixed quotation ($c + “\alpha”$) will have the language of the quoted speaker as its language parameter. This seems to give the right result for examples like (43b). By uttering (43b) I allude to some earlier occasion where Bush uttered ‘misunderestimates me’, in his own idiosyncratic variety of English, Bunglish. The allusive mixed quotation rule tells us to evaluate the mixed quoted expression relative to that utterance context, i.e. relative to Bush as the first person agent and to Bunglish as the language under consideration:

$$(45) \quad \llbracket \text{“misunderestimates me”} \rrbracket^{\langle \text{Emar}, \dots, \text{English} \rangle} = \\ = \llbracket \text{misunderestimates me} \rrbracket^{\langle \text{Bush}, \dots, \text{Bunglish} \rangle}$$

The effect is that while the part outside the quotation (*Bush said that the enemy*) is interpreted according to the rules of English, the quoted phrase (*misunderestimates me*) is interpreted according to the semantic rules of Bush-English.¹⁴

5.3 Against supermonsters

On the surface, this solution looks like a straightforward, minor extension of the use of monsters in an otherwise traditional Kaplanian framework. However, while Kaplan’s strict ban on monsters may prove untenable as a language universal in light of the Schlenker/Anand data, I will argue that allowing these supermonsters is unacceptable because it involves a fundamental confusion between semantic context-dependence (viz. indexicality)

13 The term supermonster is borrowed from Schlenker (2014a) who uses it to characterize role shift data that require quotation-like faithfulness in addition to indexical shifting.

14 Cf. Shan (2011) for a fully developed formal proposal along these lines.

and pre-semantic context-dependence (viz. language-dependence), which in turn means giving up on some of the key selling points of Kaplan's *Logic of Demonstratives*.

As a first, concrete illustration, let's consider the effect of introducing supercontexts on Kaplan's analysis of the a priori. Kaplan's original semantics allows us to capture the notions of a priori and a posteriori truth as distinct from the metaphysical notions of necessity and contingency. A sentence uttered in a context c is necessarily true iff the content it expresses in c is true in all indices. A sentence is true a priori iff it cannot be uttered falsely, i.e. iff it is true in every utterance context (relative to the actual index associated with that context).

- (46) a. an utterance of φ in c is necessarily true iff for all i : $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_i^c = 1$
 b. a sentence φ is a priori true iff for all c : $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\langle w_c, t_c \rangle}^c = 1$

Sentences like $2+2=4$ or *Kripke = Kripke* come out a priori and necessary; my utterance of *I am Emar* comes out necessary but not a priori; and *I am here now*, *I exist*, and *I'm uttering this sentence* are a priori but not necessary.

When we allow supercontexts, the definition of the a priori in (46b) becomes vacuous, because no sentence is true in all languages. For instance, I can easily imagine a supercontext c' with a language just like English except that '2' denotes the number 1, making $2+2=4$ a false utterance, relative to c' .

This argument bears a striking resemblance to Kripke's earlier argument that language-dependence is not intensional:

One doesn't say that 'two plus two equals four' is contingent because people might have spoken a language in which 'two plus two equals four' means that seven is even. (Kripke, 1980)

Similarly, for the Kaplanian system, we wouldn't want to say that the truth of *I am here now* or $2+2 = 4$ cannot be known a priori merely because there are possible supercontexts where people speak a language in which *I* denotes Frege and *am here now* denotes the property of being an idiot.

Language-dependence is neither intensional (i.e., index-dependent), nor indexical (i.e., context-dependent, in the sense of Kaplan's logic) – it does not really belong to the realm of semantics at all.

Semantics can associate meanings with expressions ... but given an utterance, semantics can't tell us what expression was uttered or what language it was uttered in. This is a pre-semantic task. (Kaplan, 1989)

Somewhat idealized, the job of a semanticist is to take a language (with a syntactic specification of its grammatically well-formed sentences, preferably formalized in terms of a finite set of syntactic rules and a lexicon), and capture, in a systematic and empirically adequate way, how the truth conditions of the well-formed sentences of this language derive from a set of basic meanings associated with the lexical units. Kaplan has shown that a theory of indexical context-dependence has a place in such a conception of semantics. But a theory of language-dependence does not, because we're always giving a semantics relative to a given (fragment of a) language.

If language-dependence is indeed of a fundamentally different nature than indexical context-dependence, then the notion of a supercontext, unifying these two types of context-dependence, is a non-starter. Consequently, supermonsters, i.e., semantic operators that shift supercontexts, should be avoided at all cost.

Where does this leave us? A regular monster is not powerful enough to capture the language shifting phenomena observed in section 5.1, but supermonsters are conceptually ill-founded. I suggest we go back to Kaplan's original strategy for dealing with indexical shifts, as outlined in section 2.2: explain away the apparent shifts as the result of a use/mention distinction. In the following I will push this strategy further by first providing a monster-free analysis of mixed quotation and then analyzing the other phenomena from section 4 in terms of that mechanism.

6 A quotational alternative

6.1 Mixed quotation without monsters

Having argued against the monstrous and supermonstrous accounts of mixed quotation I sketch here a monster-free account of the phenomenon. I will then use this to analyze the other putatively monstrous phenomena from section 4. The analysis of mixed quotation I sketch here is based on the so-called presuppositional analysis of mixed quotation that I have developed elsewhere (Maier, 2014b).

The intuition behind the current approach to mixed quotation is that a mixed quotation denotes “what the original speaker referred to when she uttered the quoted phrase”, i.e. the meaning of (47a) can be paraphrased as (47b):¹⁵

15 This informal paraphrase is the starting point of other approaches as well, cf. e.g. Recanati (2001).

- (47) George said that the enemy “misunderestimates me”
 \approx George said that the enemy does what he referred to as ‘misunderestimates me’.

Crucially, as in Potts’s account, the paraphrase involves a reduction to pure quotation, for which, I assume, we already have a suitable theory in place – the disquotational theory from section 2.2.2 will do for now. We can simplify our informal paraphrase a little by splitting it up into two components: (i) George said that the enemy has property X , and (ii) George used the expression *misunderestimates me* to refer to X . This split corresponds roughly to Potts’s split between a use-dimension and a mention-dimension, respectively. I want to remain agnostic about the semantic/pragmatic status of the mention-dimension (i.e. is it presupposition, conventional implicature, or otherwise not-at-issue), so I’ll adopt a simple two-dimensional logical form. In the mention-dimension I’ll use the shorthand $refer(x, y, z)$ for x used the expression y to refer to z . Applied to our example:¹⁶

$$(48) \quad \left\langle \begin{array}{l} \textit{George said that } X(\textit{the enemy}) \\ refer(\textit{George}, \textit{‘misunderestimates me’}, X) \end{array} \right\rangle$$

The crucial difference with Potts’s two-dimensional proposal is that the two dimensions are linked and underspecified in this logical form: the at-issue component and the mention component share a free property variable X . The idea is that exactly which property it is that George referred to, and that he allegedly ascribes to the enemy, is not part of the semantics. As far as semantics is concerned, the expressions in the mixed quoted phrase, i.e., the shifted indexical *me* and the language shifted portmanteau *misunderestimate*, are only mentioned, not used. This is an essential step in avoiding monsters. However, the logical form in (48) doesn’t yet do justice to the intuition of shifting, i.e., that *me* here refers to George. For this we have to turn to the pragmatic resolution of the underspecified X .

¹⁶ We can derive such two-dimensional logical forms compositionally with a rule like:

$$\llbracket \textit{‘}\alpha\textit{’} \rrbracket = \left\langle \begin{array}{l} X \\ refer(x, \textit{‘}\alpha\textit{’}, X) \end{array} \right\rangle$$

Here, x is a free variable that should pick out the source of the quotation, and X is a free variable of the type corresponding to the syntactic category of α . Like Potts we have to assume that a mixed quoted expression has a syntactic category that corresponds to a semantic type. The difference with Potts’ account is that α need not be semantically interpretable. We need to know that *misunderestimate* is a transitive verb, expressing a relation, but we don’t need to know exactly what relation it expresses in order to interpret (47).

Let's start with the language shift. If the context provides information about George's idiolect, e.g. that he sometimes uses a verb *misunderestimate* to mean 'underestimate based on misunderstanding' we use that information to pragmatically narrow down the range of possible values for *X*. If the context provides no such clues, the interpreter will just have to accommodate that George used it to refer to *something*. In this way we effectively shift from the reporter's to the reportee's language, but without the need for supermonsters.

Then the indexical shift. The key is to assume that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, the quoted speaker's language is the same as the reporter's i.e., English, in this case. Indeed, it seems rather safe to assume that George used *me* as a first person pronoun, i.e., to refer to himself. This explains the intuition of indexical shifting, pragmatically, without a monster.

In sum, we predict both language and indexical shifting effects, based on a two-dimensional use-plus-mention semantics and some pragmatic inferences, rather than through the invocation of a (super)monster.

6.2 Apparent monsters as mixed quotation

Our monster-free analysis of mixed quotation can handle all our examples of mixed quotation with indexical shift (section 4.4) and language shift (section 5.1). We can also use it to re-analyze the apparent monsters in Ancient Greek as instances of mixed quotation. That is, instead of postulating monsters in the syntax of some ancient Greek reporting constructions, we can postulate typographically unmarked quotation in the Greek text. On such an alternative conception, the underlying logical form of (28) is something that in modern English we would express with overt mixed quotation, like this:

- (49) Another man arose to point out the foolishness of the speaker who had urged them to ask for vessels, just as if Cyrus were going home again, and to point out also how foolish it was to ask for a guide from this man "whose enterprise we are ruining."

With this move we would in effect formalize a widespread intuition among classical scholars that cases like our (28) involve a kind of indirect-to-direct switch that is typical of oral storytelling and early writing in various languages (Rajić, 2008; Richman, 1986; Maier, 2015b).

This leaves role shift and free indirect discourse. Can we re-analyze the examples of section 4.2 and 4.3 in terms of our non-monstrous mixed quotation? Such an analysis is supported by the fact that both constructions are known to have some seemingly quotational characteristics.

Role shift is traditionally seen as the equivalent of quotation in spoken language, primarily because it allows the reporter to faithfully reproduce not just the content, but also various non-linguistic, “iconic” features of the reported speech/sign act. For instance, signing with a happy face during the role shift indicates that the reported speaker or signer was happy (Schlenker, 2014b; Davidson, 2015).

Free indirect discourse is traditionally described as a “blend” of direct and indirect speech. It shares with direct speech a faithfulness to the form or “(internal) wording” of the original thought or speech (Schlenker, 2004). This explains the faithful renditions of pauses, hedges, and exclamations (Banfield, 1982). Free indirect reporting even allows the narrator to use unfamiliar phrases from the subject’s (internal) dialect or idiolect, as we saw in the language shift examples from section 5.1 (Fludernik, 1995; Maier, 2014a).

All of these facts are very difficult to reconcile with monstrous indirect discourse analyses, like those in sections 4.2 and 4.3. What’s more, as I argued in 5.3, the language shifting data are even fundamentally beyond a monstrous approach. Unfortunately, a straightforward mixed quotation approach for these phenomena would look somewhat ad hoc. In both role shift and free indirect discourse it seems to be the case that the entire report is faithful/iconic and hence, presumably, within the scope of some kind of clausal mixed quotation, with the only exceptions being some pronouns and indexicals. So, rather than a subclausal switch from indirect to direct, what we have in these cases is more like a full direct speech with occasional “holes”. In the next subsection I’ll introduce the notion of unquotation to make this idea more precise.

6.3 Unquotation

To implement the idea of a quotation with holes, we need an unquotation operator that is in some sense the dual of mixed quotation. Such an operator is independently needed to analyze editorial adjustments to quotations, often marked in square brackets in newspapers and academic prose.

(50) Obama said that the news “took [him] by surprise”.

I refer to Shan (2011) and Maier (2014b) for a precise semantics of unquotation. Here I sketch a somewhat simpler semantics, based on quantification over expression variables (ϵ) (Koev, 2015). The idea is to analyze (50) as saying that Obama said that the news has the property X that he referred to as ‘took ϵ by surprise’, where e is some unspecified expression that he used to

refer to himself (probably, but not necessarily, ε in this case would have been the English first person pronoun ‘me’). Formally (ignoring the context and index parameters for readability, and using \cap for concatenation of strings):

$$(51) \quad \llbracket \text{the news “took [him] by surprise”} \rrbracket = \\ = \left\langle \begin{array}{l} X(\llbracket \text{the news} \rrbracket) \\ \exists \varepsilon [\text{refer}(x, \text{‘took’} \cap \varepsilon \cap \text{‘by surprise’, } X) \wedge \text{refer}(x, \varepsilon, \llbracket \text{him} \rrbracket)] \end{array} \right\rangle$$

For completeness, x denotes the source of the quoted words, i.e. (probably) Obama, and him gets its regular semantic interpretation, so in this case that will also be Obama. We can paraphrase (51) then as saying that the news has the property that Obama referred to as ‘took . . . by surprise’, where the dots denote some expression that Obama used to refer to himself.

With this analysis of unquotation in place we can make sense of the idea that role shift and free indirect discourse are quotations with holes. Let’s look at two concrete examples, one role shift and one free indirect discourse.

In section 4.2 we discussed the following role shift report:

$$(52) \quad \text{MARTINE } \overline{\text{IX-1 BETTER SIGN THAN IX-1}}^{\text{RS}} \quad [= (32)] \\ \text{literally: Martine was like “I sign better than I.”} \\ \text{intended: Martine signed that she is a better signer than me.}$$

We’re assuming that the duration of the role shift, i.e. the body shift or break in eye contact, as marked with the overline, indicates the scope of the quotation. Next we assume that signers prefer pointing to something over signing a name. When John wants to refer to Barcelona, while in Barcelona, he’ll prefer the pointing sign HERE over signing the city’s name, and if Macha wants to say something about herself she’ll prefer a simple IX-1 over signing her own name. Within a quotation, satisfying this preference may sometimes require temporarily suspending the quotation, i.e. unquotation. This is precisely what happen in (52), i.e., the logical form of (52) can be paraphrased as in (53):

$$(53) \quad \text{MARTINE “IX-1 BETTER SIGN THAN [IX-1]} \\ \text{Martine was like, “I sign better than [I]} \text{”}$$

Our semantics of mixed quotation and unquotation assigns the following semantic interpretation to (53), with *say* indicating the (unexpressed) indirect discourse saying/signing relation between an individual and a proposition (definable as an intensional operator, cf. section 2.2.4):

$$(54) \quad \llbracket (53) \rrbracket = \left\langle \begin{array}{l} \text{say}(\llbracket \text{MARTINE} \rrbracket, p) \\ \exists \varepsilon [\text{refer}(x, \text{‘IX1 BETTER SIGN THAN’} \cap \varepsilon, p) \wedge \text{refer}(x, \varepsilon, \llbracket \text{IX-1} \rrbracket)] \end{array} \right\rangle$$

In words, Martine said that p , where p is the proposition she (x) expressed by signing a sequence of signs consisting of IX-1, BETTER, SIGN, THAN, and some additional, unknown sign ε that was used to pick out the referent of IX-1 in the actual utterance context, i.e., the reporter Macha. This adequately captures the intuitive truth conditions of the report, without the need for monsters.

The same analysis applies to free indirect discourse (Maier, 2015a). Consider (44b), repeated below. For simplicity, I'll ignore tense, leave out the part about the accent, and assume that x represents the referent of all three third person pronouns.

- (55) a. Ah well, her fathaire would shoorly help her out, she told John
(in her thick French accent). [= (44b)]
- b. “Ah well, [her_x] fathaire would shoorly help [her_x] out,” she_x
told John.
- c. $\left\langle \begin{array}{l} \textit{tell}(x, \textit{John}, p) \\ \exists \varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 [\textit{refer}(x, \textit{‘Ah well, ’} \cap \varepsilon_1 \cap \textit{‘fathaire would shoorly help’} \cap \varepsilon_2 \cap \textit{‘out’, } p) \\ \wedge \textit{refer}(x, \varepsilon_1, x) \wedge \textit{refer}(x, \varepsilon_2, x)] \end{array} \right\rangle$

In words, x told John that p , which is the proposition she referred to with *Ah well ... fathaire would shoorly help ... out* with the empty spaces filled in by terms referring to herself.¹⁷

In sum: a combination of mixed quotation and unquotation allows us to do capture the truth conditions of both role shift and free indirect discourse without resorting to monsters.

7 Conclusion

Schlenker and others have argued that the indexical shifting observed in Amharic, Zazaki and some other languages may be caused by a monstrous operator. Following Schlenker's lead, over the past 15 years, semanticists have been analyzing all kinds of apparent indexical shifts by postulating monstrous operators in a wide variety of report constructions – including indirect reports in Ancient Greek texts, role shift in various sign languages, free indirect discourse in literary narratives, and mixed quotation. However, not every shifted indexical indicates the presence of a monster. In this article I have argued that these phenomena are actually better thought of as forms

¹⁷ Actually, I'm leaving out even more details. As shown in (Maier, 2015a), for instance, it's really only the third person (and past tense) features of a pronoun that get unquoted, so we need to decompose pronouns into feature bundles. Instead of "... Ah well, [her] fathaire..." what we really have is "... Ah well, poss.sg.m.[3] fathaire...".

of quotation – essentially extending Kaplan’s original strategy of defending his prohibition of monsters in light of apparent counterexamples.

The centerpiece of my argumentation is a formal semantic analysis of mixed quotation. I first show that monstrous analyses of mixed quotation are too weak to deal with so-called language shifts. Then I provide an alternative, monster-free analysis of mixed quotation and unquotation. Finally, I show how to re-analyze the various allegedly monstrous constructions in terms of these two mechanisms.

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