(17) John wants to catch a fish. Can you see it from here?

(18) John knew that Mary had a car. But he had never seen it.

(19) Mary wants to marry a rich man. He must be a banker.

In each case, we limit our attention to readings where the operator ("wants," "knew," and "wants," respectively) takes scope over the indefinite in the first sentence. This implies that none of the three examples will permit non-vacuous coindexing between the indefinite and the underlined pronoun. The relevant facts are that in both (18) and (19), but not in (17), we perceive a reading in which the pronoun has the indefinite as its "antecedent," in some intuitive sense. Karttunen observed, as I reported above, that the relevant difference between (17) and (18) is that "know," unlike "want," is factive, and the relevant difference between (17) and (19) is that the second sentence in (19), but not in (17), contains another modal operator (here: "must").

Since non-vacuous coindexing is not an option in these examples, the only possible relation between the indefinite and the pronoun is one where the pronoun triggers an accommodation for which the evaluation of the indefinite is somehow a licensing precedent. Our task, then, is to explain why this sort of accommodation is possible in (18) and (19), but not in (17).

Both "want" and "know" involve universal quantification over a certain set of possible worlds, in one case the set of worlds that conform to the subject's desires, in the other case the set of worlds which are compatible with the subject's knowledge. The worlds that conform to someone's desires often do not include the actual world; but the worlds that conform to someone's knowledge always do, that is what makes "know" factive. The difference between (17) and (18) can now be seen as analogous to the difference between (14b) and (15). In (17), the first sentence says that every world w that fits John's desires has in it a fish that John catches in w. The second sentence is about the actual world w0. In order to get the intended interpretation for "it," we would have to accommodate a card describing a fish that John catches in w0. But we are well aware that the existence of such a fish in w0 is not at all a matter of course, and this awareness apparently makes us resist the required accommodation. In (18), on the other hand, the first sentence says that every world w that is compatible with what John knows is such that Mary has a car in w. The second sentence is about w0. To interpret the "it," we have to accommodate a card describing a car that Mary has in w0. This accommodation adds no new information, because w0 is known to be among John's knowledge-worlds and hence known to contain a car that Mary owns in it. Presumably, the facilitating influence of information-preservingness is here strong enough to license accommodation.

In (19), both the first and the second sentence involve universal quantification over worlds. The operator "must" in the second sentence