Use-conditional meaning in Rational Speech Act models

Ciyang QING — Stanford University
Reuben COHN-GORDON — Stanford University

Abstract. Motivated by shortcomings in the modeling of repeated utterances in Burnett’s Rational Speech Act (RSA) model of social meaning, we propose an alternative analysis in terms of use-conditional meaning, which we implement in an extended RSA framework. We show that it can not only model the production of a sequence of utterances throughout a discourse, but also captures the similarities between social and expressive meaning.

Keywords: social meaning, use-conditional meaning, Rational Speech Act models.

1. Introduction

Since Labov (1963), variationist sociolinguistics has studied the subtle meaning differences between linguistic variants (see Eckert, 2012 for an overview).

(1)
   a. I am walking (velar -ing variant)
   b. I am walkin’ (apical -in’ variant)

For example, (1a) and (1b) have the same truth conditions, but after hearing them, listeners tend to infer different properties of the speaker: (1a) is associated with education, intelligence, articulateness (clustered as competent), and formality and distance (clustered as aloof) whereas (1b) is associated with the opposite properties (Campbell-Kibler, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). To the extent that the inference patterns are different, we can say that the variants in (1) have different social meanings. Moreover, people’s production of language is sensitive to such social meanings and the context. For instance, Labov (2012) analyzes President Obama’s use of (ING) in three recordings taken in three contexts with different levels of formality and finds 72% -in’ at a barbecue, 33% at the press event that followed and 3% in his DNC acceptance speech.

These rich sociolinguistic phenomena have the potential to connect to semantics and pragmatics. Two fundamental research questions are (i) how to represent social meaning in the semantics and (ii) how to integrate it into the pragmatics. Burnett (2017, 2019) pioneers the use of Bayesian Rational Speech Act (RSA) models (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Frank, 2016) to address these questions. In this paper we explore the connections between social meaning and semantics/pragmatics further. In particular, we address the following questions.

1. Empirically, what properties does social meaning have that resemble those studied in the semantics/pragmatics literature?

2. Theoretically, how do we semantically represent social meaning to capture these properties and model people’s use of social meaning in production and comprehension?

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we list empirical properties that social meaning shares with expressive meaning. In section 3, we review and assess Burnett’s

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1We would like to thank Heather Burnett, Judith Degen, Dan Lassiter, Chris Potts, Penny Eckert, the anonymous reviewers and the participants of the SuB conference, for their very helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are our own.

(2017, 2019) analysis of social meaning in the standard RSA framework, focusing on an issue that it has in modeling the production of a sequence of utterances throughout a discourse. In section 4, we propose an alternative analysis of social meaning in the spirit of Kaplan’s (1999) use-conditional meaning, implement it in an extended RSA framework, and show that it can not only model the production of a sequence of utterances throughout a discourse, but can also capture the similarities between social and expressive meaning. We then discuss how this enriched RSA framework can serve as a general paradigm for other use-conditional meanings in section 5.

2. Social meaning and expressive meaning

Potts (2007) summarizes a list of empirical properties of expressive meanings (2).

2

Expressive meanings are

- largely independent of the descriptive meanings (Independence)
- always about the utterance situation itself. (Nondisplaceability)
- not propositional and can be hard to pin down (Descriptive ineffability)
- performative in that the very act of utterance conveys the meaning (Immediacy)
- strengthened when repeated without redundancy (Repeatability)

We note that social meaning also shares these properties. As a concrete example, consider the social meanings of the -in’ variant discussed in section 1.

John likes walkin’

→ The speaker is incompetent
→ The speaker is friendly

Let us check whether such social meanings also have the properties in (2):

- Independence: The social meanings of (3), which are about its speaker, are indeed independent of its descriptive meaning (i.e., the proposition that John likes walking).
- Nondisplaceability: The social meanings of -in’ are about the speaker of the utterance, and therefore about the utterance situation itself. For instance, the social meanings of (4) are about its speaker, even though the -in’ variant is embedded under past tense and said.

Mary said that John was walkin’.

→ The speaker is incompetent
→ The speaker is friendly

- Descriptive ineffability: The social meaning of -in’ is hard to pin down. The propositions in (3) are only approximations.
- Immediacy: Social meanings are performative. It is the very act of using the -in’ variant that conveys its social meaning.

2For simplicity, we do not discuss the property of perspective dependence in Potts’s list, but note that his treatment of it can be similarly incorporated in our proposal.
• Repeatability: the repeated use of the ‘in’ variant can strengthen its social meaning without redundancy. For instance, the inferences in (5) can be stronger than in (3).

   \[ \sim \text{The speaker is incompetent} \]
   \[ \sim \text{The speaker is friendly} \]

In sum, the empirical properties of expressive meanings in (2) are also shared by social meanings. These are properties that need to be accounted for by our analysis of social meaning.


3.1. The Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework

Burnett’s analysis is based on a Bayesian game-theoretic pragmatics framework, which provides a probabilistic formalization of Gricean reasoning (Frank and Goodman 2012; Goodman and Frank 2016; see also Franke 2009). In this framework, listeners and speakers recursively reason about each other (6).

(6) a. \[ L_0(w \mid u) \propto \Pr(w) \cdot \mathbb{I}[u](w) \] LIteral listener
   b. \[ S_1(u \mid w) \propto \text{Optimize}(L_0(w \mid u)) \] Pragmatic speaker
   c. \[ L_1(w \mid u) \propto \Pr(w) \cdot S_1(u \mid w) \] Pragmatic listener

We will use a concrete example discussed by Burnett (2017) to illustrate the basics of this framework. Suppose you left three cookies on the dinner table for your roommates. When you come home, John, one of the roommates, tells you (7).

(7) I ate some of the cookies.

You will likely infer from (7) that John ate one or two cookies but probably not all three. An intuitive explanation is that if he had eaten all three cookies he would have told you (8), which is more informative. How do we formalize this reasoning in the probabilistic framework above?

(8) I ate all of the cookies.

First, we consider a literal listener (6a), who interprets an utterance \( u \) simply based on its truth-conditional content \( \mathbb{I}[u] \). This can be seen as a probabilistic generalization of a Stalnakerian model of conversation: instead of treating a context \( C \) as a set of possible worlds, a context is now treated as a probability distribution \( P(\cdot) \) over possible worlds. Updating an initial context (implemented as a prior distribution \( \Pr(\cdot) \)) with an utterance \( u \) results in a new context, i.e., the conditional probability \( L_0(\cdot \mid u) \), obtained by probabilistic conditioning (9b) (cf. the traditional contextual update via set intersection (9a)).

(9) a. \[ C + u = C \cap \mathbb{I}[u] \]
b. \[ L_0(w \mid u) \propto \Pr(w) \cdot \mathbb{I}[u](w) \]

Concretely, in the cookie example, let \( w_i \) be the possible world in which John ate exactly \( i \) cookies \( (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) \). Just for illustration let us assume that the prior probabilities of \( w_0 \) to \( w_4 \) are 0.1, 0.4, 0.3, and 0.2, respectively (first row in (10)).

\[ ^3 \text{Assume that it is clear that eating all three cookies is totally acceptable, so John would have no reason to hide the fact if he did eat them all.} \]
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An assumption is made that all relevant utterances are equally likely a priori. This assumption is used to simplify the calculations and does not affect the main points of the paper.

The utterance \textit{I ate some of the cookies} is true in \(w_1, w_2,\) and \(w_3,\) i.e., \([\text{some}](w_i) = 0\) and \([\text{some}](w_i) = 1\) for \(i = 1, 2, 3\) (second row in (10)). Based on the prior distribution \(\Pr(\cdot)\) and the truth-conditional meaning \([\text{some}],\) we compute their product in the third row in (10). The proportionality operator \(\propto\) in (9b) means that its left term is obtained by multiplying a constant to the right term to ensure that the left term is a probability distribution (i.e., all the probabilities sum up to 1). This is done by dividing each element in the third row of (10) by the sum of that row, and the resulting conditional probabilities \(L_0(w | \text{some})\) are shown in the last row. Note that \(L_0(w_3 | \text{some}) = 2/9 \approx .22,\) which means that after hearing \textit{I ate some of the cookies}, the literal listener thinks it is roughly 22% likely that John ate all 3 cookies.

Similarly, the conditional probabilities \(L_0(w | \text{all})\) are computed in (11).

Now we will consider a pragmatic speaker, whose definition (6b) is repeated below as (12) to formalize the reasoning “if John had eaten all three cookies, he would have used \textit{all} instead of \textit{some} because \textit{all} is more informative.”

\begin{equation}
S_1(u | w) \propto \text{Optimize}(L_0(w | u)) \quad \text{Pragmatic speaker}^4
\end{equation}

What (12) says is that the probability of a pragmatic speaker choosing utterance \(u\) in world \(w\) is determined by optimizing (in some sense) the probability the literal listener assigns to \(w\) after hearing \(u.\) For the purposes of the current paper we only require that \text{Optimize} satisfies (13), i.e., the pragmatic speaker would be more likely to choose \(u\) than \(u'\) in world \(w\) iff the literal listener would assign higher probability to world \(w\) after hearing \(u\) than \(u'.\)

\begin{equation}
S_1(u | w) > S_1(u' | w) \text{ iff } L_0(w | u) > L_0(w | u')
\end{equation}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[4] Here we make the simplifying assumption that all relevant utterances are equally likely a priori. A more realistic speaker model that takes into account utterance priors would be \(S_1(u | w) \propto \Pr(u) \cdot \text{Optimize}(L_0(w | u)).\) The simplification made here does not affect the main points of this paper.
  \item[5] In many RSA models a priori preferences for utterances are represented as costs and the \text{Optimize} function is sensitive to them. In such cases (13) does not hold in general, but it still holds when all relevant utterances are assumed to be equally likely a priori.
\end{itemize}
In the cookie example, given that $L_0(w_3 \mid \text{all}) = 1 > L_0(w_3 \mid \text{some}) = 2/9$, from (10) we have $S_1(\text{all} \mid w_3) > S_1(\text{some} \mid w_3)$, i.e., the speaker would prefer to use all to some if he had eaten all 3 cookies.

Once we choose an exact definition of Optimize, we can make quantitative predictions about the production probabilities and apply Bayes’ rule to make quantitative predictions about how a pragmatic listener would interpret an utterance (6c).

3.2. Personae and Eckert-Montague fields

In order to apply the RSA framework to analyze social meaning, we need to address two issues: (i) What do possible worlds represent? (ii) How do we represent social meaning?

Burnett (2019) uses Obama’s use of (ING) as a working example and assume two candidate utterances $u_{-ing}$ and $u_{-in’}$ that are different only in terms of the realization of (ING).

For (i), Burnett uses possible worlds to represent the speaker’s possible personae. A persona $i$ is a maximally compatible set of properties. In the Obama example, Burnett assumes that the relevant properties are competent and aloof and their opposites. The four possible personae and their names are in the table below (14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>STERN LEADER</th>
<th>COOL GUY</th>
<th>ASSHOLE</th>
<th>DOOFUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(comp., aloof)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(comp., friendly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incomp., aloof)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incomp., friendly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For (ii), Burnett essentially treats an utterance $u$’s association with certain properties as a compatibility relation and uses type lifting to derive the set of personae that $u$ is compatible with (i.e., treating personae as Montagovian individuals). A persona is compatible with $u$ if it contains a property that is compatible with $u$. Given that $u_{-ing}$ is compatible with both competent and aloof, the only persona incompatible with $u_{-ing}$ is DOOFUS. Similarly, since $u_{-ing}$ is compatible with both incompetent and friendly, the only persona incompatible with $u_{-in’}$ is STERN LEADER. Burnett calls such compatibility relations between linguistic variants and personae Eckert-Montague fields and uses them in the literal listener model as representations of social meaning (15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>STERN LEADER</th>
<th>COOL GUY</th>
<th>ASSHOLE</th>
<th>DOOFUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[-ing]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[-in’]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a concrete example, Burnett models Obama’s use of (ING) at the barbecue as follows. She assumes that, because Obama is the president, the prior probability distribution slightly favors personae that are aloof (i.e., STERN LEADER and ASSHOLE) than those that are friendly (i.e., COOL GUY and DOOFUS) (first row in (16)). Given the Eckert-Montague field of the -ing variant (second row in (16)), the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing the -ing variant can be calculated according to (6a) and is shown in the last row in (16). In particular, $L_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -ing) = 2/8 = .25$. That is, after hearing the -ing variant, the literal listener thinks that it is 25% likely that Obama is a COOL GUY.

(16) Literal listener after hearing -ing
As notational variants we will write \( L_0 \) simply as \( L_0 \), \( \Pr \) simply as \( \Pr \), write \( L_0^{(1)} \), \( \Pr^{(1)} \) as \( L_0', \Pr' \), write \( L_0^{(2)} \), \( \Pr^{(2)} \) as \( L_0'', \Pr'' \), etc. Also, when the initial sequence \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \) is clear from the context,
we will write $L_0^{(n)}(i \mid u_{n+1})$ instead of $L_0^{(n)}(i \mid u_1, \ldots, u_{n+1})$.

Once the literal listener is defined over a sequence of utterances, the pragmatic speaker model can be similarly generalized (21).

(21) $S_1^{(n)}(u_{n+1} \mid i) \propto \text{Optimize}(L_0^{(n)}(i \mid u_{n+1}))$

Now let us consider what Burnett’s model predicts when the speaker needs to make multiple utterances, again using Obama’s use of (ING) as a concrete example.

From the previous discussion we already know that $S_1(-\text{in’} \mid \text{COOL GUY}) > S_1(-\text{ing} \mid \text{COOL GUY})$ and therefore let us assume that Obama first chooses the -\text{in’} variant and see what the model predicts about his second utterance.

In this case, the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -\text{ing} as the second utterance is computed in (22). Note that the prior $\Pr'(i)$ is by definition $L_0(i \mid -\text{in’})$, i.e., the last row in (17).

(22) Literal listener after first hearing -\text{in’} and then -\text{ing}.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Persona } i & \text{STERN LEADER} & \text{COOL GUY} & \text{ASSHOLE} & \text{DOOFUS} \\
\hline
\Pr'(i) & 0 & \frac{7}{7} & \frac{2}{7} & \frac{2}{7} \\
[-\text{ing}](i) & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
L_0(i \mid -\text{ing}) & 0 & \frac{2}{3} & \frac{3}{5} & 0 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Similarly, the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -\text{in’} as the second utterance is identical to the prior $\Pr'(i)$: Since all the personae with non-zero prior probabilities are already compatible with the -\text{in’} variant, no information is gained from hearing it.

(23) Literal listener after first hearing -\text{in’} and then -\text{in’} again.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Persona } i & \text{STERN LEADER} & \text{COOL GUY} & \text{ASSHOLE} & \text{DOOFUS} \\
\hline
\Pr'(i) & 0 & \frac{7}{7} & \frac{2}{7} & \frac{2}{7} \\
[-\text{in’}](i) & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
L_0(i \mid -\text{in’}) & 0 & \frac{2}{7} & \frac{3}{7} & \frac{2}{7} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Since we have $L'_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -\text{ing}) = \frac{2}{7} > L'_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -\text{in’}) = \frac{2}{7}$, from (13) we conclude that $S'_1(-\text{ing} \mid \text{COOL GUY}) > S'_1(-\text{in’} \mid \text{COOL GUY})$. That is, after using the -\text{in’} variant once, it is no longer preferred, because it is not informative anymore.

Finally, let us assume that Obama first uses -\text{in’}, and then -\text{ing}, and see what Burnett’s model predicts about the third utterance.

In this case, the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -\text{ing} as the third utterance is computed in (24). Note that the prior $\Pr''(i)$ by definition comes from the last row in (22). Also note that the conditional probability $L''_0(i \mid -\text{ing})$ is identical to the prior $\Pr''(i)$, because all the persona with non-zero priors are already compatible with -\text{ing}.

(24) Literal listener after first hearing -\text{in’}, followed by -\text{ing}, and then -\text{ing}.
Similarly, the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -in’ as the third utterance is computed in (25). Once again, note that the conditional probability $L^\prime_0(i \mid -in’)$ is also identical to the prior $Pr^\prime(i)$.

(25) Literal listener after first hearing -in’, followed by -ing, and then -in’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persona $i$</th>
<th>STERN LEADER</th>
<th>COOL GUY</th>
<th>ASSHOLE</th>
<th>DOOFUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Pr^\prime(i)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{5}$</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{5}$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$<a href="i">-in’</a>$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L^\prime_0(i \mid -in’)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{5}$</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{5}$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since we have $L^\prime_0(COOL GUY \mid -ing) = \frac{2}{5} = L^\prime_0(COOL GUY \mid -in’)$, from (13) we conclude that $S'_1(-ing \mid COOL GUY) = S'_1(-in’ \mid COOL GUY)$. That is, after using both -in’ and -ing variants once, Burnett’s model predicts that the speaker should have no preference for either variant.

In sum, Burnett’s model predicts that at the barbecue (i) Obama would initially prefer the -in’ variant, (ii) after he has produced one variant but not both, he would prefer the one he has not produced, and (iii) after he has produced both variants, he would be indifferent. Together, this means that Obama’s production rate of -in’ is predicted to be around 50% when the speech is sufficiently long (i.e., there are enough instances of (ING) after he produces both variants), contrary to fact.

Note that the problem with multiple utterances does not crucially rely on the way the sequential update of the prior distribution is defined in (20). For instance, after hearing the first -in’, we can compute the pragmatic listener’s interpretation $L_1(i \mid -in’)$ and use it as the new prior $Pr^\prime(i)$, instead of using $L_0(i \mid -in’)$ as $Pr^\prime(i)$. However, the same problem will arise, because it is still the case that every persona $i$ whose new prior $Pr^\prime(i)$ is greater than 0 is already compatible with -in’. This means that -in’ is totally uninformative (i.e., $L^\prime_0(i \mid -in’)$ is identical to $Pr^\prime(i)$) and therefore will never be preferred.

However, we note that this problem does depend on the simplifying assumption that the persona intended by the speaker stays constant throughout the sequence of utterances in the discourse. If we give up this assumption, and analyze the social meaning of a linguistic variant as a proposition relativized to the utterance time $t$ (e.g., the meaning of -ing is “I am competent or aloof now’’), then the repeated use of a variant can be informative because two instances of use correspond to different propositions (e.g., “I am competent or aloof at $t_1/t_2$’’).

Although such an approach can potentially rescue Burnett’s analysis, many more complicated issues need to be addressed to provide a realistic model. For instance, in order to calculate the speaker’s production rate of a variant over a sequence of utterances in the discourse, we will need to specify how the prior over personae is updated throughout the discourse, which is more complicated because we need to take into account the potential change in persona.

Therefore, we conclude that Burnett’s analysis faces difficulties in modeling the production of a sequence of utterances throughout the discourse. In the next section, we propose an alternative
analysis of social meaning in terms of use-conditional meaning, and show that it not only can
easily model the production of a sequence of utterances throughout the discourse, but also
captures the similarities between social meaning and expressive meaning very well.

4. Social meaning as use-conditional meaning

4.1. Use-conditional meaning

According to Kaplan (1999), the meanings of expressions such as *ouch* and *oops* are not cap-
tured by their truth conditions (since they do not have any), but rather by their conditions on
use, i.e., contexts in which they can be correctly/felicitously used. For instance, the use condi-
tion of *oops* can be roughly characterized as follows: *oops* is felicitously used iff the speaker
observes a minor mishap. Knowing this use condition, the listener of *oops* can infer that the
speaker observes a minor mishap, by virtue of knowing what it takes for the speaker to produce
this utterance.

In the case of social meaning on the one hand, the choice of variant is not totally constrained by
linguistic norms. For instance, anybody may use *-ing* and *-in’* and using either variant would
be correct. On the other hand, we can still apply Kaplan’s insight to analyze social meaning,
in that the hearer of a linguistic variant can gain information about the speaker, by virtue of
knowing (or more precisely, having an ideology about) what it takes for the speaker to produce
that variant, which often has to do with the speaker’s social identity, or *persona*.

Therefore, we suggest that social meaning should be represented as the listener’s ideology
about how the speaker’s persona influences his/her choice of the linguistic variants. Below we
formalize this idea in an extended RSA framework.

4.2. Implementing use-conditional meaning in an extended RSA framework

We generalize the literal listener to integrate both the truth-conditional (26a) and use-conditional
(26b) meanings of an utterance.

\[
L_0(w, i | u) = L_0(w | u) \cdot L_0(i | u)
\]

\[
a. \quad L_0(w | u) \propto \Pr(w) \cdot [u](w)
\]

\[
b. \quad L_0(i | u) \propto \Pr(i) \cdot S_0(u | i)
\]

where \(S_0(u | i)\) is a stereotypical speaker \(S_0(u | i)\): use-conditional meaning

The literal listener updates their prior belief about the world \(w\) by conditioning on the truth
of the utterance \(u\) (26a). Meanwhile, they update their prior belief about the speaker type \(i\)
by reasoning about a hypothetical stereotypical speaker \(S_0\). \(^6\) Crucially, this speaker is not a
production model of any real linguistic agent, but rather one that is based on ideological stereo-
types. For instance, the stereotype that incompetent but friendly people tend to use the *-in’*
variant corresponds to a high value for \(S_0(-in’ | DOOFUS)\), while the stereotype that competent
but aloof people tend to use the *-ing* variant corresponds to a low value of \(S_0(-in’ | DOOFUS)\).
Assuming that the production probabilities of the other two personae are in between, we take
(27) as an example representation of the social meaning of *-in’* and use it to model Obama’s
use of (ING) at the barbecue.

\(^6\)See Henderson and McCreary’s (2017) analysis of dogwhistles for another case of using a speaker model \(S_0\) as
the starting point of the iterative reasoning.
4.3. Multiple utterances

First, we consider Obama’s first utterance. Assuming the same prior probability distribution over personae as before, which slightly favors personae that are aloof, the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -in’ is computed in (28).

\[
\begin{array}{c|cccc}
 i & \text{STERN LEADER} & \text{COOL GUY} & \text{ASSHOLE} & \text{DOOFUS} \\
\hline
 S_0(-in' \mid i) & 0.1 & 0.7 & 0.2 & 0.9 \\
\end{array}
\]

Similarly, the probability that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -ing is computed in (29). Note that \( S_0(-ing \mid i) = 1 - S_0(-in' \mid i) \) for each persona \( i \).

\[
\begin{array}{c|cccc}
 i & \text{STERN LEADER} & \text{COOL GUY} & \text{ASSHOLE} & \text{DOOFUS} \\
\hline
 \Pr(i) & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.3 & 0.2 \\
 S_0(-in' \mid i) & 0.1 & 0.7 & 0.2 & 0.9 \\
 \Pr(i) \cdot S_0(-in' \mid i) & 0.03 & 0.14 & 0.06 & 0.18 \\
 L_0(i \mid -in') & 0.073 & 0.34 & 0.146 & 0.439 \\
\end{array}
\]

Since \( L_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -in') = 0.34 > 0.102 = L_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -ing) \), from (13) we conclude that \( S_1(-in' \mid \text{COOL GUY}) > S_1(-ing \mid \text{COOL GUY}) \). That is, Obama would initially prefer -in’ to -ing to construct the COOL GUY persona.

Now suppose Obama chooses -in’ as the first utterance. The probabilities that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -in’ or -ing as the second utterance are shown in (30).

\[
\begin{array}{c|cccc}
 i & \text{STERN LEADER} & \text{COOL GUY} & \text{ASSHOLE} & \text{DOOFUS} \\
\hline
 \Pr(i) & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.3 & 0.2 \\
 S_0(-in' \mid i) & 0.9 & 0.3 & 0.8 & 0.1 \\
 \Pr(i) \cdot S_0(-in' \mid i) & 0.27 & 0.06 & 0.24 & 0.02 \\
 L_0(i \mid -ing) & 0.458 & 0.102 & 0.407 & 0.034 \\
\end{array}
\]

Since \( L_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -in') = 0.356 > 0.311 = L_0(\text{COOL GUY} \mid -ing) \), from (13) we conclude that \( S'_1(-in' \mid \text{COOL GUY}) > S'_1(-ing \mid \text{COOL GUY}) \). That is, after using the -in’ variant once, Obama would still prefer it to -ing as the second utterance to construct the COOL GUY persona. This prediction is in stark contrast with Burnett’s model’s, according to which Obama would prefer -ing as the second utterance once he has used -in’ as the first utterance. The reason is that in our model -in’ never completely rules out any persona and therefore its repeated use can still be informative, whereas in Burnett’s model, repeated use of -in’ is never informative and therefore the repeated use is never preferred.
Now suppose Obama chooses -in’ as the first and second utterances. The probabilities that the literal listener assigns to each persona after hearing -in’ or -ing as the third utterance are shown in (31).

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{PERSONA} & \text{STERN LEADER} & \text{COOL GUY} & \text{ASSHOLE} & \text{DOOFUS} \\
\text{Pr}(i) & 0.011 & 0.356 & 0.044 & 0.589 \\
S_0(i \mid \text{-in’}) & 0.1 & 0.7 & 0.2 & 0.9 \\
L_0^s(i \mid \text{-in’}) & 0.001 & 0.316 & 0.011 & 0.672 \\
L_0^l(i \mid \text{-ing}) & 0.047 & 0.508 & 0.166 & 0.28 \\
\end{array}
\]

Since \( L_0^s(\text{COOL GUY} \mid \text{-in’}) = 0.316 < 0.508 = L_0^l(\text{COOL GUY} \mid \text{-ing}) \), from (13) we conclude that \( S_0(i \mid \text{-in’}) < S_0(i \mid \text{-ing}) \). That is, after using -in’ twice, Obama would prefer to use -ing as the third utterance to construct the COOL GUY persona.

This ensures that Obama will not use the -in’ variant indefinitely. Intuitively, this is because using the -in’ variant too much will make the listener assign too much probability to the DOOFUS persona, since that persona corresponds to the highest production rate of -in’.

In general, the speaker’s best strategy to convey the intended persona \( i \) to the listener over multiple utterances is to produce -in’ at the rate that conforms to the stereotype of that persona \( i \), i.e., \( S_0(i \mid \text{-in’}) \). For example, Obama’s best strategy to convey the COOL GUY persona is to produce the -in’ variant 70% of the time. We suggest that this captures the performative nature of social meaning: the speaker can succeed in conveying an intended persona iff the way he/she produces the utterances conforms to the way the intended persona is supposed to produce those utterances. In other words, it is the very act of using linguistic variants in a particular way that constructs and conveys the corresponding persona.

4.4. Capturing properties of expressive meanings

As discussed earlier, social meaning shares many properties of expressive meanings (2), repeated below as (32).

\[
(32) \quad \text{Expressive meanings are}
\]

- largely independent of the descriptive meanings (Independence)
- always about the utterance situation itself. (Nondisplaceability)
- not propositional and can be hard to pin down (Descriptive ineffability)
- performative in that the very act of utterance conveys the meaning (Immediacy)
- strengthened when repeated without redundancy (Repeatability)

We have discussed how our proposal captures Immediacy and Repeatability. The remaining properties are discussed below.

- Independence holds due to our assumption that \( w \) and \( i \) are conditionally independent given \( u \), which is generally the case. However, sometimes this assumption might fail to
hold. Then we use the most general formula \( L_0(w, i | u) \propto \Pr(w, i) \cdot [u](w) \cdot S_0(u | [u], w, i) \), which allows for descriptive and indexical meanings to interact with each other.

- Nondisplaceability: Social meaning, represented as a production probability \( S_0(u | i) \), is always about the utterance situation itself, since the persona \( i \) is always relative to the speaker of the utterance.

- Descriptive ineffability: social meaning is represented as a production probability \( S_0(u | i) \), which is not propositional. It can be hard to pin down because it can be difficult to describe the high likelihood region(s) of this production probability.

5. Further discussion

Representing use-conditional meanings in terms of the stereotypical speaker \( S_0 \) is a natural extension to previous multi-dimensional semantic systems (e.g., Potts, 2007; Gutzmann, 2015).

As a concrete example, consider the following simplified reformulation of Potts’s analysis of the expression the damn dog. This expression has a multi-dimensional meaning. On the one hand, it has a normal descriptive content \( d \) (a type \( e \) individual), which comes from \([\text{the dog}]\). On the other, it also has an expressive content \( f \), a function that updates/alters the context. Here the context is represented by an expressive index of the form \( s/d \), where \( I \) is an expressive interval, i.e., a subset of \([-1, 1]\) representing the set of possible attitudes of the speaker \( s \) towards \( d \). The effect of \( f \) is to shrink the expressive interval \( I \) and ensure that it is a subset of \([-1, 0]\), i.e., the speaker \( s \) holds negative attitudes towards the dog \( d \).

Generalizing the expressive interval \( I \) to a probability distribution \( p(i) \) over the speaker’s possible attitude \( i \) towards the dog \( d \), we can derive a probabilistic literal listener model based on (26b), as shown in (33).

\[
(33) \quad L_0(i | \text{damn}) \propto \Pr(i) \cdot S_0(\text{damn} | i)
\]

We can see that, once \( S_0(\text{damn} | i) \) is specified, (33) will implicitly define a mapping from the input context \( \Pr(i) \) to an updated context \( L_0(i | \text{damn}) \), i.e., the expressive content of the damn dog. In other words, the expressive meaning of the damn dog can be represented as \( S_0(\text{damn} | i) \), a probabilistic use-conditional meaning.

Note that this example can be generalized to a fully compositional analysis of damn: its descriptive content is the identity function \( \text{id} \), and its expressive meaning is represented as \( \lambda k . S_0(\text{damn} | i)k^d(\text{id}) \)). This expressive meaning has two main components. The first is \( \lambda x. S_0(\text{damn} | i[x]) \), the probabilistic use-conditional meaning in (33) relativized to \( x \), i.e., how likely a speaker will use damn, given that his/her attitude towards \( x \) is \( i[x] \). Here \( x \) can be an individual (e.g., the dog \( d \) in the above example), a proposition (e.g., the fact that the speaker lost the key in I lost the damn key), etc. The second component specifies that \( x \) is determined by the scope of damn. Concretely, \( x \) is the result of feeding the descriptive content of the expression that damn takes scope over with the identity function as its argument, i.e., \( k^d(\text{id}) \). For instance, when damn takes scope over the rest of the DP in the damn dog, i.e., the descriptive content of the expression that damn takes scope over would be \( \lambda f. \text{the}(f(\text{dog})) \), feeding it with \( \text{id} \) will make \( x \) be the\text{the}(\text{dog}) \) (i.e., the dog \( d \)). When damn takes scope over the rest of the sentence in I lost the damn key (schematically, damn(\( \lambda f. \) I lost the \( (f \) key)), applying the same procedure makes \( x \) be the proposition that the speaker lost the key.
This probabilistic approach provides a principled way to concretely specify expressive meanings and explain their properties. For instance, when the expressive meaning of *damn* is represented as a function that shrinks expressive intervals, it can be hard and arbitrary to specify how much the function should shrink each interval. In contrast, when the expressive meaning is represented a production probability $S_0(\text{damn} \mid i)$, it is much easier to specify an intuitively plausible production probability or learn it from empirical data.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we analyze social meaning as use-conditional meaning, and provide a formal analysis by extending the RSA framework. We show that such an analysis can well capture the properties social meaning shares with expressive meanings, and discuss how the extended probabilistic framework could model use-conditional meanings in general.

References