Frege and saving substitution

Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern

bryan.pickel@glasgow.ac.uk
The University of Glasgow 
69 Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow
G12 8LP, United Kingdom

brian.rabern@ed.ac.uk
The University of Edinburgh
3 Charles St., Edinburgh
EH8 9AD, United Kingdom

Abstract

Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.

Keywords: Substitution, Frege, Sense, Ambiguity, Opacity, Validity, Leibniz' Law

Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

https://philpapers.org/rec/PICFAS