

# PORTIONS, PROPORTIONS, AND RELEVANCE IN GENERALIZED QUANTIFICATION

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**Abstract:** Mostowski's (1957) Generalized Quantifier [GQ] framework is extended within a Decision-Theoretic Semantics (Merin 1999a). With cardinality recognized as being a special case of measure, portion and proportion readings are routinely distinguished. The latter are seen to induce probability measure, whence evidential relevance relations are defined. The actuarial operation of Reflection of Proportion (ROP) is supplemented by the inverse operation of Projection of Proportion (POP). Both are shown to be legitimized by De Finetti's (1937) representation theorem. A paradigm-setting role for POP is played by 'Protagorean' determiners, *many* and *few*, which intuitively designate large and small quantities, but are shown equally to express positive and negative relevance. A new, economical explanation is offered for presuppositionality of 'strong' (readings of) quantifiers. The thesis advanced and defended is that the set of co-cardinal (co-intersective) natural language determiners is empty. Some puzzles about monotonicity of natural language GQs are noticed and solved. This includes a solution to Barwise and Cooper's (1981) puzzle about coordinate determiner phrases, where constituent DPs of like boolean monotonicity refuse coordination with *but*, while those with constituents of unlike monotonicity require *but* and refuse coordination with *and*. Evidential relevance relations between restrictor predicates *N* and attribute predicates are shown to induce proportion quantifier interpretations of indefinite *DetN*.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This essay and Merin (2005), which is a briefer version printed in the *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, are companion pieces. The present work is referred to there as 'Merin 2005', but has since been revised in the light of editorial and referee comments on the shorter piece. Both papers expand parts of Merin (2001a,b). A reader coming to the present paper might conceivably have read the *BJL* piece first, and so I have numbered examples that are in common identically. Examples or definition variants which are either not included or not numbered in the shorter piece are labelled by letters or by a proper extension of an extant label. The present essay can accordingly be read as a hypertext version of the shorter one. If you find one of the two worth citing, consider citing the other one too, with a parenthetical indication of their proper inclusion relation.

# 1 Introduction

In Generalized Quantifier Theory [GQT] as it was originally presented by Mostowski (1957) and Lindström (1966), quantifiers  $Q$  are uniformly and literally specified in terms of quantities, i.e. numbers. They are defined as constraints on the respective or relative numbers of elements of sets of individuals, i.e.

Generalized quantifiers [GQs] in the sense of Mostowski are constraints on cardinalities  $|X_i|$  of  $n$ -tuples of sets  $X_i$  ( $n \geq 1$ ), or they are constraints on ratios of such cardinalities.<sup>2</sup>

We develop this approach, taking account of 1980s transfers to natural language by Barwise, Cooper, Keenan and others. Our focus will be  $Q$ s whose natural language expression correlates are determiners ('*dets*') in their most common and simple occurrences.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, let  $Q(A, B)$  be a quantifier proposition denoted by a sentence schema *Det A are B*, for short:  $D(A, B)$ , e.g. *All artists are beekeepers*.<sup>4</sup> Then the pertinent sets will be elements of the boolean set-algebra,  $\mathcal{F}$ , generated by  $A$  and  $B$ .<sup>5,6</sup> Apart from  $A$  and  $B$ , the sets  $AB$  ( $= A \cap B$ ),  $A - B$  ( $= A \setminus B$ ) will be of particular interest among the elements of  $\mathcal{F}$ , whose maximal element,  $\Omega$ , is defined by  $\Omega = X \cup \bar{X}$  for any  $X$  in  $\mathcal{F}$ , and whose minimal element,  $\emptyset$ , is given analogously by  $\emptyset = X \cap \bar{X}$ .

For the familiar, 'logical' quantifiers,  $Q(A, B)$  can be specified in terms of just *one* of cardinalities  $|A \cap B|$  (write:  $|AB|$ ) or  $|A - B|$ . Thus,

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<sup>2</sup> 'Measure' GQs no longer define proportions as ratios of cardinalities. See below.

<sup>3</sup>  $Q$  is a Lindström type  $\langle 1, 1 \rangle$  quantifier. Noun phrases,  $Det\bar{N}$ , denote type  $\langle 1 \rangle$  quantifiers, in terms of which Mostowski's discussion proceeds.

<sup>4</sup> Johnson-Laird (1983). As usual, context will decide whether  $A, B$  denote nouns and verb phrases or whether they denote sets or yet more abstract extralinguistic entities.

<sup>5</sup> This will in general be a sub-algebra of a larger algebra  $\mathcal{F}'$  and, in principle, elements of the relative complement  $\mathcal{F}' - \mathcal{F}$  could be involved in specifications.

<sup>6</sup> **Notation:** For the sake of simplicity, juxtaposition  $AB$  will often denote indifferently conjunction ( $A \wedge B$ ), set-intersection ( $A \cap B$ ), and lattice meet ( $A \sqcap B$ );  $A \vee B$  so denotes disjunction, set-union ( $A \cup B$ ), lattice join ( $A \sqcup B$ ); the bar as in  $\bar{A}$  so denotes negation ( $\neg$ ), set-complement, lattice complement.  $A - B =_{df} A\bar{B}$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
\exists(A, B) \text{ [is true]} &\text{ iff } |AB| \neq 0; \\
\forall(A, B) &\text{ iff } |A - B| = 0; \\
\neg\exists(A, B) &\text{ iff } |AB| = 0; \\
\neg\forall(A, B) &\text{ iff } |A - B| \neq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Since  $|X| \geq 0$  for all  $X$ , the inequality sign, ' $\neq$ ', can be rewritten to ' $>$ '. Thus, e.g.  $\neg\forall(A, B)$  iff  $|A - B| > 0$ .

These generalized quantifiers are still 'first-order definable', i.e. specifiable by conditions expressed purely within the theory of first-order predicate logic (see e.g. Westerståhl 1985). This also implies that they are specifiable without basic appeal to numbers, solely in terms of boolean, set-algebraic relations:

$$\begin{aligned}
\exists(A, B) &\text{ iff } AB \neq \emptyset, \\
\forall(A, B) &\text{ iff } A\bar{B} = \emptyset, \\
\neg\exists(A, B) &\text{ iff } AB = \emptyset, \\
\neg\forall(A, B) &\text{ iff } A\bar{B} \neq \emptyset.
\end{aligned}$$

This second formulation of GQs was first proposed in all essentials by Leibniz. What is written here as the empty set,  $\emptyset$ , was referred to by Leibniz as '*non ens*'. The condition ' $\neq \emptyset$ ' was specified by '*est ens*'. A sentence '*AB est ens*' was to be understood as asserting compossibility of  $A$  and  $B$ , and so the interpretation was intensional in the first place. However, as in Leibniz's logical systems more generally, there was also an extensional interpretation which corresponded to set-theoretic relations (see Kneale and Kneale 1962:339). But MOST is not so definable. Here number—indefinite in size—is essential:

$$\text{MOST}(A, B) \text{ iff } |AB| > |A - B|.$$

Note that the condition  $|AB| > |A - B|$  is equivalent to  $|AB|/|A| > 1/2$  when  $A \neq \emptyset$ . Hence, MOST already introduces the notion of proportion, as will HALF-OF-ALL and TWO-THIRDS-OF.

Proportion, in turn, is explicated in mathematics as a special case of 'measure', namely 'normed measure', also known as 'probability measure' (cf. e.g. Halmos 1950).<sup>7</sup> It also precludes formulation purely in terms of

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<sup>7</sup> We shall properly introduce all notions now mentioned.

set-relations, which is feasible for the first-order definables, as has just been recalled.

Cardinality, too, is a special case of measure, namely ‘count measure’. Finally, note that any set-algebra is an instance of a boolean algebra. In an abstract boolean algebra,  $\mathcal{B}$ , nothing is specified further about the nature of its elements, save that they satisfy the constraints implied by the boolean axioms. In the instance of a set-algebra, the elements of  $\mathcal{B}$  are all sets.<sup>8</sup>

We shall now treat GQs uniformly as constraints on measure on boolean algebras. In doing so we capture in a uniform way semantics of *Det N*, not only for count *N*, but also for mass *N*, as in *much love* and *little money*.<sup>9</sup> But just as importantly, if not more so, we thereby return to the quantitative roots of GQT in Mostowski (1957), which have been somewhat obscured from view and indeed cut back in transport to natural language semantics.<sup>10</sup> Recall first the following standard definitions of measure and probability.

A *measure*  $\mu : \mathcal{B} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  is a function from a boolean algebra  $\mathcal{B}$ , with minimal, ‘null’ element  $\mathbf{0}$  and maximal or ‘top’ element  $T$ , to the non-negative extended real numbers,  $\mathbb{R}_{++} = \{r \in \mathbb{R} : r \geq 0\} \cup \{\infty\}$ ,<sup>11</sup> and which satisfies the axioms

$$(M1) \quad \mu(\mathbf{0}) = 0 \neq \mu(T);$$

$$(M2) \quad AB = \mathbf{0} \rightarrow \mu(A \sqcup B) = \mu(A) + \mu(B).^{12}$$

Measure is *regular* in the sense of Carnap iff  $\mu(X) = 0 \rightarrow X = \mathbf{0}$  [MR]. The cardinality function  $|\cdot|$  on sets is a regular measure and is known as *count measure* under the usual embedding of the natural numbers into the

<sup>8</sup> Put simply, the boolean aspect of elementary set theory is captured by everything that can be written without use of the ‘ $\in$ ’ symbol.

<sup>9</sup> Higginbotham (1996) and earlier Terry Parsons treated mass quantifiers separately in terms of measure. The present treatment exploits the obvious generalization. When the restrictor *A* is a count noun with plural inflection, the measure is count measure.

<sup>10</sup> Cp. Barwise and Cooper (1981), Keenan (2002). Linguists adopt wherever possible a non-numerical format. By GQ they usually mean the Fregean (Frege 1884, etc.) higher-predicate, or relational conception of *Qs* characterized by Richard Montague’s typing of NPs as  $\langle\langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$  and of dets as  $\langle\langle e, t \rangle, \langle\langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle\rangle$ . The deeply syntactic issue of variable-free specification may have drawn attention away from quantity.

<sup>11</sup> There are various conventions for specifying operations on boolean algebras and their distinguished elements. In set-algebras,  $\mathbf{0}$  (a.k.a.  $\perp$ ) is standard for the element that specializes, thus, to the empty set  $\emptyset$ , and  $T$  (a.k.a.  $\mathbf{1}$  or  $\top$ ) to the universal set  $\Omega$ .  $T$  is my preferred mnemonic for the vacuous property ‘thing’, as Keenan’s (1987)  $E$  is for ‘exists’. Thus, *Every(T, M)* might stand for *Everything moves*.

<sup>12</sup> M2 implies  $\mu(A \sqcup B) = \mu(A) + \mu(B) - \mu(AB)$ .

reals. A measure  $\mu$  is *normed* iff  $\mu(T) = 1$  [MN]. Its range is therefore  $[0, 1]$ . Hence, if  $C \subseteq A$  and thus  $\mu(C)/\mu(A) \in [0, 1]$ , the quotient  $\mu(C)/\mu(A)$  defines a normed measure,  $\mu'(\cdot)$ , on subsets of  $A$ ; the normalizing factor being  $1/\mu(A)$ .

Normed measure is also known as *probability measure* regardless of interpretation, since M1, M2 and MN axiomatize the finitely additive probability calculus. Under the probability interpretation, normed measure  $\mu(\cdot)$  is usually written  $P(\cdot)$ . If  $A$  is a proposition,<sup>13</sup> then  $P(A)$  denotes the *probability* of  $A$ , and  $P(T) = 1$  always. The expression  $P(B|A)$  denotes the *conditional probability* of  $B$  given  $A$ , defined by  $P(AB)/P(A)$ .

Against this formal background, we turn to the taxonomy of quantifiers in natural language theory. All our observations will be about type  $\langle 1, 1 \rangle$  quantifiers, i.e. relations on sets or on elements of an abstract boolean algebra whose natural language correlates are determiners (dets).

Turning now to data, we attend only to those (aspects of) det phrases which are properly quantificational. Intuitively, this means that we do not attend to determiners such as English *a certain*, or Dutch *sommige* (de Hoop 1995). These dets imply reference to a particular individual. We likewise ignore the non-generic uses of the indefinite and definite articles (Engl. *a*, *the*) whose procedural functions of introducing and anaphorizing individual referents predominate in their use. Thus, *A cat walks* will be in our ambit; *A cat walked down Picadilly* is not; *One cat walked down Picadilly* is.

We shall thus attend only to those dets or properties of which satisfy Permutation Invariance (PERM) or more generally Invariance under boolean Isomorphisms (ISOM).<sup>14</sup> On sets, ISOM says: Let  $f$  be any bijection (i.e. a one-to-one total, i.e. invertible mapping) from universes  $T$  to  $T'$  of entities with  $A, B \subseteq T$ . Then

$$[\text{ISOM}]: Q^T(A, B) \text{ [is true] iff } Q^{T'}(f(A), f(B)) \text{ [is] for all } f.$$

PERM labels the important special case where  $T' = T$  and where  $f$  is therefore any permutation  $\pi$  of  $T$ .<sup>15</sup> The function  $f$  maps any finite subset  $\{t_1, \dots, t_n\}$  of  $T$  to an equipollent subset  $\{t_{\pi(1)}, \dots, t_{\pi(n)}\}$  of  $T$  in mapping elements  $t_k$  to elements  $t_{\pi(k)}$ .

<sup>13</sup> One might, but need not, think of this as a set of 'possible worlds'.

<sup>14</sup> The following standard definitions are again found, e.g. in Westerståhl (1985).

<sup>15</sup> A permutation is the special case, when  $T$  is a set, of an *automorphism* (AUTOM), i.e. a structure-preserving bijection of an algebraic structure, e.g. particular boolean algebra,  $\mathcal{B}$ , into itself. See Keenan (1987).

ISOM is part of any definition of logical constant, but it really also defines the concept of a property, which is essentially trans-individual.

PERM/ISOM is equivalent to specification of quantifiers in terms of numerical relations (cf. Mostowski 1957, Westerståhl 1998). We call ‘*q-dets*’ those dets which satisfy PERM/ISOM. Deictic and anaphoric dets (or uses of dets) such as *a* and *the* are not *q-dets* (nor *q-det* readings of dets).<sup>16</sup> Outstanding among further properties that GQs may satisfy are ‘Extension’

$$[\text{EXT}]: Q^T(A, B) \text{ iff } Q^{T'}(A, B) \text{ for } A, B \subseteq T \text{ and } T \subseteq T';$$

and ‘(Left) Conservativity’

$$[\text{LCONS}]: Q^T(A, B) \text{ iff } Q^T(A, AB).$$

Received opinion is that natural language dets satisfy both, “discounting a few marginal (and debatable) exceptions” (Westerståhl, 1998:876), and that *many* and *few* are exceptions which may not even be determiners. We argue that these exceptional *q-dets* are important for understanding *all* *q-dets*.

Another word on *q-dets* is perhaps in order. Number, as Frege (1884) affirmed, is always a property of sets or properties, never of individuals. It is for this reason that the Mostowski GQ approach to quantification in natural languages should resolutely ignore determiners or readings of determiners which subvert this principle. We admit such determiners, notably *the*, only in subsidiary positions, as in the *Det of the* construction, where they pick out entities that are non-singleton sets.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> If  $A, B \subseteq T$ ,  $A', B' \subseteq T'$ ,  $|A \cap B| = |A' \cap B'|$ ,  $|A - B| = |A' - B'|$ ,  $|B - A| = |B' - A'|$ , and  $|T - (A \cup B)| = |T' - (A' \cup B')|$ , then  $Q^T(A, B) = Q^{T'}(A', B')$  (after Westerståhl 1998). The numerical conditions, rewritten in the compact Reichenbach notation much used in probability theory, read as  $|AB| = |A'B'|$ ,  $|A\bar{B}| = |A'\bar{B}'|$ ,  $|B\bar{A}| = |B'\bar{A}'|$ , and  $|T\bar{A} \cup \bar{B}| = |T'\bar{A}' \cup \bar{B}'|$ .

<sup>17</sup> Suppose, no doubt counterfactually, that we have identified the essence of ‘definiteness’. And suppose we have found it concentrated in the referential properties of properly used proper names, specifically proper names of first-order entities that you can touch, or lock up. Then, for all the theological fancy of Leibniz and secular artistry of Montague in treating a proper name *a* as the set  $\{P : P(a)\}$  of all properties *P* of its bearer, the term ‘quantifier’, not the indefinite article, would stand for the very essence of ‘indefiniteness’. That universal determiners are often associated with markers of definiteness under a typological, cross-linguistic perspective (as Irina Nikolaeva of Oxford University has pointed out) might yet be explained by their paraphraseability which, in English, is the partitive *of the* construction.

## 2 ‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’ Readings of Determiners

Natural correlates of quantifiers  $Q$  come in two broad kinds, ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. This generally accepted taxonomy of natural language determiner phrases originates with Milsark (1977).<sup>18</sup> The labels were motivated by metonymic transfer from two phonological realizations of English *some*: with

- strong vowel quantity /*sam*/ and
- weak quantity /*sm*/.

Milsark’s semantic thesis was analogous. Weak readings of dets  $D$ , said Milsark, are ‘cardinal’, and go with ‘transient’ or ‘accidental’ (i.e. *estar*-type) predicates. Strong readings are ‘quantificational’, paraphraseable partitively ‘*DET of the*’ and go with ‘stable’ or ‘essential’ (i.e. *ser*-type) predicates.<sup>19</sup>

Milsark’s syntactic criterion for strong dets, a criterion that gave the weak vs. strong distinction its immediate bite, was inadmissibility in what might be called ‘there-be’-sentences [TBSs].<sup>20</sup> Weak dets include those traditionally classed as indefinites, notably *a* and *some*. Curiously, the archi-definite det *the* is not securely strong by the TBS test. Examples:

- (1°) There are {five/some/many/few/no/\*all/\*most} cats in the court.
- (2°) There is {a/#the/\*every/\*each} cat in the court.
- (3°) There isn’t {a/every/any} cat in the court.

The # on *the* in (2°) signifies alleged deviancy, but I find here a perfectly good ‘availability’ sentence exhibiting the familiarity condition characteristic of *the*. Its acceptable occurrence in TBSs induces a reading widely deemed deviant. Let me paraphrase: ‘There is always the cat in the court (if you are stuck for cats or just sentient beings).’ I should deny deviance if

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<sup>18</sup> Excerpting his 1974 dissertation.

<sup>19</sup> Carlson (1978) develops the predicate distinction to ‘stage level’ and ‘individual level’.

<sup>20</sup> The traditional name is ‘existential’. TBS is yet more observational than Fernando and Kamp’s (1996) ‘there-insertion sentence’. Their labelling already reflects a recognition that ‘existential’ prejudices an open theoretical issue. Mine goes a little further in not inviting a judgment of synonymy with putative transformational correlates.

TBSs are recognized as expressing in the first resort availability. The sentence is, I think, deviant only to the extent that *the* is not a q-det at all. One might object that familiarity also violates AUTOM/PERM. But then most uses of *the* are subject to this condition and so would not be q-dets.

Familiar formal criteria for Milsark's distinction are due to Barwise and Cooper (1981) [B&C] and Keenan and Stavi (1986) [K&S].

B&C subdivide *Q*s into positive  $Q^+$  (e.g. *most*, *all*) and negative  $Q^-$  (e.g. *not all*, *few*) and define:  $Q^+$  is strong iff  $Q^+(A, A)$  holds for all  $A$ ;  $Q^-$  is strong iff  $\neg Q^+(A, A)$  holds for all  $A$ . All other  $Q$  are weak.

K&S proceed inversely. They turn into a definition an observation of B&C's: Let  $T$  be the pertinent universe of existents, of which  $A$  and  $B$  are subsets. Then  $Q$  is weak iff  $Q(A, B) \leftrightarrow Q(AB, T)$ , else strong. The English translation of  $T$  (K&S write it  $E$ ) is the verb *exists*. Thus, *Some ants are in the bar* will be true iff *Some ants in the bar exist* is. Equivalence fails on replacing *some* by *most*. *The cat is a cat* will make *the* B&C-strong. K&S (1986: 301) class *the* as non-existential, i.e. strong.

Keenan (1987) notes that the B&C criterion for strong dets is a class of sentences without communicative uses, e.g. *All cats are cats*.<sup>21</sup> Worse yet, I feel, would be *Most cats are cats*. This seems closer to being false than to being mere ironic litotes. The only way to make it properly true would be to have *cats* designate perceptually apparent cats in the  $A$ -restrictor position, and real cats in the  $B$ -predicate. (If you were to appeal to scalar conversational implicature to make the sentence literally true, you would not predict this reading, since the alleged implicature, 'Some cats are not cats', being contradictory, could not even arise in the first place on the standard semantic account of implicature-generation.)

However, Keenan's own criterial class, for weak dets, was no less strange phenomenologically. *Some cats in the bar exist* invokes a host of ghostly, non-existent cats drinking alongside their real kinsfolk. And *\*No cats in the*

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<sup>21</sup> That his own definition, unlike B&C's, predicts the admissibility of *at least zero*, *fewer than zero* and *neither infinitely many nor finitely many* in TBSs is surely a mixed blessing. De Hoop (1995) welcomes their mellifluity; one might, however, object to their lack of use and, in the second case, their necessary falsity for all domains of physical countables. Chomsky's famous 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is mellifluous, but also in parts contradictory and in others a category mistake. It is for this reason that it was advanced to argue for the independence of syntax and truth-conditional semantics and for the former's primacy for intuition. But GQT, even in its linguistic form, was not intended as a theory of syntax, but as a theory of truth-conditional semantics.



*bar exist* would not even be English. One should have to say ‘*None of the cats in the bar exist*’ or ‘*There are no cats in the bar*’.<sup>22</sup>

B&C and K&S definitions of weak and strong have two features in common: (a) They aim to rely exclusively on set-theoretic specifications of the distinctions; (b) The empirical correlates of the specifying instances, both positive and negative, evoke unreal or non-existent entities.

Empirical instantiations of the K&S definitional criterion also have a distinctive feature related to this existential strangeness: readings of ‘weak’ dets in *Det AB exist* not only sound strange, but also retain a proportional reading. Thus, (i) *Some ants in the bar exist* is equivalent, under any natural reading of (i), to (ii) *Some of the ants in the bar exist*. A *proportion* of inexistent ants among ants in the bar is suggested by (i).<sup>23</sup>

We shall now more generally propose conditions for a proportional (i.e. ‘strong’) reading to emerge for ‘weak’ determiners. Our theoretical framework will be the doxastic fragment of Decision-Theoretic Semantics [DTS] and Pragmatics [DTP] (Merin 1994b, 1999a).

In what follows, not much store is set by diagnostic environments of doubtful reliability such as TBS.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The injection of intensionality into the extensional framework of GQT is not intended. Keenan (1987) insists on the technical nature of his use of property labels ‘exists’ or ‘is an individual’. Such insistence would indeed be legitimate if the terms were part of the metalanguage. But they occur in an object-language test condition (a thought-experimental ‘stimulus’) and so the technicality claim means that the empirical evidence validating the definition does not consist of sentences of everyday English, but of some non-natural language. (A similar problem arises in Keenan and Faltz 1985, where certain examples for putative boolean equivalences, e.g. absorption, distribution, are spelt out not in English, but in a language whose content words are single letters. Corresponding strings of English would be unacceptable and cannot jointly be salvaged by implicature as currently understood; see Merin 1997, 2002d). The defence that implicature will explain the strangeness of these quantifier sentences is costly, too. There are any number of tautologies which sound perfectly fine without re-construals of their lexical items, for example *If it rains, it rains* or *Either it rains or it doesn’t rain*. So what makes the present case different? The doctrine of implicature has no obvious answer to this question; and so I feel we should not write a blank cheque drawn on its account.

<sup>23</sup> A referee for Merin (2005) noted ‘right conservativity’ (i.e.  $Q(A, B) \leftrightarrow Q(AB, B)$ ), which is employed as a criterion for weakness in Keenan (2003). But now, in place of the existence of inexistent *AB* intimated by  $D(AB, T)$ , English  $D(AB, B)$  intimates there being *ABs* that are not *Bs*. Try: *{Some/\*No} cats in the bar are in the bar*. Appeal to ‘implicature’ does save truth-conditional felicity, but thereby only for a regimented, theory-laden form of English.

<sup>24</sup> See also below for a critical observation by Fernando and Kamp (1996).

### 3. Portion and Proportion

Let us proceed in terms of a theoretical distinction familiar under the label ‘cardinal’ vs. ‘proportional’, though in terms which make full use of the concept of ‘quantity’ at the heart of Mostowski’s GQT:

- HYPOTHESIS 1: *Portion quantifiers*, commonly known as ‘cardinal’ or, more generally, ‘intersective’ (or loosely: ‘weak’) quantifiers, are constraints on measure, i.e. on the values of measure functions  $\mu(\cdot)$ .
- HYPOTHESIS 2: *Proportion quantifiers* commonly known as ‘proportional’ (or loosely: ‘strong’) quantifiers are constraints on quotients of measure, i.e. on quotients of values of measure functions  $\mu(\cdot)$ . The constraints are such as to make them constraints on the values of normed measures.

Portion quantifiers are so called because they measure extensions. They specify that so-and-so-many individuals have a certain property, or that there is so-and-so-much stuff of a particular kind.<sup>25</sup> Proportion quantifiers, by contrast, have for criterial values rational numbers or real numbers approximated by rationals. A rational number  $q = a/b$  is a function that takes numerical arguments  $x$  to values  $y$  with  $q$  solving the equation  $y = q(x)$  such that  $ax = by$ . In material terms, a proportion is therefore a function from portions of something to subportions of it. It is, in algebraic terms, a ‘residuation’ of a portion, rather than a portion.<sup>26</sup>

The warranted assertability- or truth-conditions of *portion* quantifiers instantiate the schema<sup>27</sup>

$$(1) \quad D_w(A, B) \text{ [is true] iff } \mu(AB) \in \text{WCON}_D$$

<sup>25</sup> In the latter case ‘cardinal’ would be inapplicable, and ‘intersective’ fails to bring out the essential notion of quantity. ‘Amount’ seems overly specific, too.

<sup>26</sup> Bare plural NPs illustrate the distinction, proportion being associated with lawlike statement forms. Example (after Carlson 1978):

- (I.) Firemen are available [here and now]  
vs.  
(II.) Firemen are courageous.

(I.) indicates a portion of the fireman kind being literally available, i.e. a concrete entity or bunch of entities. (II.) indicates nothing of the sort, but rather a general law, give or take insignificant exceptions. In Merin (2001a) I propose non-standard (a.k.a. hyperstandard) measure to model the exceptional part.

<sup>27</sup> Notation:  $Q(A, B)$  stands for a proposition,  $D(A, B)$  for a sentence. Here Indexation,  $D^T(A, B)$ , of  $D(A, B)$  to some universe  $T$  is usually understood.

where  $\text{WCON}_D$  (for ‘weak’) is a constraint set specific to the particular weak or weakly read determiner  $D = D_w$  and where measure is count-measure,  $|\cdot|$ , for count noun  $A$ .<sup>28</sup> The warranted assertability conditions or truth-conditions of *proportion* quantifiers instantiate the schema

$$(2) \quad D_s(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(AB)/\mu(A) \in \text{SCON}_D$$

where  $\text{SCON}_D$  (for ‘strong’) is again  $D_s$ -specific,  $D = D_s$  being a strong or strongly read determiner.

Now, since  $AB \subseteq A$ , we have  $\mu(AB)/\mu(A) \leq 1$ . Hence  $\mu(AB)/\mu(A)$  is a normed measure: the normed measure of  $B$  under the norm induced by  $\mu(A)$ . When  $A$  and  $B$  are sets of individuals, it specifies the proportion of  $B$ s in the population  $A$ . Analogous relations hold for mass continua, e.g. the volume proportion  $\mu_V(E)$  of ethanol,  $E$ , in vodka,  $V$ . Let us notate  $\mu_A(B) =_{df} \mu(B|A) =_{df} \mu(AB)/\mu(A)$ .<sup>29</sup> Then two ways of rewriting (2) are

$$(2') \quad D_s(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) \in \text{SCON}_D.$$

$$(2'') \quad D_s(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu_A(B) \in \text{SCON}_D.$$

Here are two prominent and simple examples:

$$(3) \quad \text{All}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) = 1.$$

$$(4) \quad \text{Most}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) > 0.5.$$

Since  $\mu(B|A)$  is defined only if  $\mu(A) > 0$ ,  $A$  cannot be the  $\mathbf{0}$ -element—in set-algebras: not  $\emptyset$ —if proportional  $D(A, B)$  is to have warranted assertability or truth conditions. Quantifier readings which demand  $A \neq \emptyset$  in order to be assigned a truth value are known as ‘presuppositional’. Our definition now *entails* the following

**Observation:** Proportion quantifiers are presuppositional.

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<sup>28</sup> For example, if  $D(A, \cdot) = \text{some } N_{pl}$ , then on the standard construal of natural language dets,  $\text{WCON}_D = \{x : x > 1\}$ , i.e.  $\text{Some}(A, B)$  iff  $|AB| \in \{x : x > 1\}$ . Of course, if  $D(A, \cdot) = \exists(A, \cdot)$  (short for  $\lambda P \exists x [Ax \wedge Px]$ ) or if  $N$  is in the singular, then  $\text{WCON}_D = \{x : x > 0\}$  and we have the standard logical interpretation of ‘some’:  $\text{Some}(A, B)$  iff  $|AB| \in \{x : x > 0\}$ .

<sup>29</sup> Notation  $\mu_A(B)$  is suggestive of normed measure, analogous to a neat old notation,  $P_A(B) =_{df} P(AB)/P(A)$ , for conditional probability. By contrast,  $\mu(B|A)$  is analogous to the usual notation  $P(B|A) =_{df} P(AB)/P(A)$  for conditional probability. But note that we do not demand that plain unconditional  $\mu(\cdot)$  already be a normed measure, as  $P(\cdot)$  is by definition.

On the Fregean interpretation, *all* is non-presuppositional. When the restrictor,  $A$ , is empty,  $\forall(A, B)$  will be true by default, as a set-theoretic instance of *ex falso quodlibet*. Accordingly, Mostowski defined  $\forall(A, B)$  iff  $|A\bar{B}| = 0$ . Adaptions to natural language in the wake of Barwise and Cooper (1981) have translated this into the purely set-theoretic or boolean formulation  $\forall(A, B)$  iff  $A\bar{B} = \mathbf{0}$ . Keenan (1987) has labelled the dets having truth conditions specified in terms of  $A\bar{B}$  ‘co-cardinal’ and more generally (with complex dets such as *all but two* included) ‘co-intersective’. I will defend the following

**Hypothesis:** The class of co-cardinal and, more generally, co-intersective determiners in natural languages is empty.

That strong dets tend to presuppositional readings has been asserted in view of sentences such as

- (N) All survivors of Napoleon’s 1812 campaign are regulars  
at Disneyland.

The construction principle is clear: in view of our world knowledge, the antecedent is empty. In the example sentence, a strong intuition to this effect is assured by our knowledge that Disneyland first opened its gates at a time when no-one alive let alone of fighting age in 1812 was still walking this earth. Under the Leibniz/Frege construal of *all*, sentence (N) should be true. Yet hearers are generally hesitant to call it true. By contrast, *No survivors of Napoleon’s 1812 campaign are regulars at Disneyland* will generally be classed as true.

Explanations have been proposed in terms of processing order (Lappin and Reinhart 1988) and implicature (Abusch and Rooth 2004).<sup>30</sup> However, the assumption that strong quantifiers are literally, i.e. quantitatively, proportional<sup>31</sup> offers a more elegant

**Explanation:** Division by 0 is undefined in the fields of real and rational numbers.

Previous arguments for proportional readings of *all* and *every* have not, I think, gone as far as actually sustaining the Hypothesis. Milsark’s thesis

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<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the present proposal was mooted as a response, at Hans Kamp’s 60th Birthday Conference on Presupposition in Stuttgart, October 2–5, 2000, to Abusch and Rooth’s presentation.

<sup>31</sup> Recall the equivalence of ISOM/PERM and specifiability by measure.

was, I think, essentially for proportionality. Other authors, to the extent of going farther than acknowledging occasional proportional use, argued for presuppositionality, i.e. for mandatory  $A \neq \emptyset$ , which, by the above argument, is entailed by proportionality.

Thus, Strawson (1952:148) prudently chooses for example *All the books in his room are by English authors*. The definite article of natural languages already ensures a non-empty domain<sup>32</sup> and so the claim really is about the complex determiner *all the*, rather than about simple *all*.

De Jong and Verkuyl (1985) [J&V] see  $All(A, B)$  as presuppositional, but do except from the scope of this claim law-stating sentences such as *All ravens are black*. These are held to be ‘conditional’ use that is based on inherent relations among properties. J&V hold such use to be ‘marked’, arguing that our entertaining theories is not a property of natural language.

Hegel anticipated an objection to this claim when he observed that people tend more to talk in generalizations, the less sophisticated they are. At any rate, the present framework affords a unified treatment, as will soon become apparent. J&V’s offer

(J) All unicorns are waiting for the traffic lights

as an example of a sentence the truth of which would be “strange” in a model whose domain of individuals contains no unicorns. This will contrast with a law-stating example such as

(L) All unicorns have a mane,

which is a real test case for putative  $A = \emptyset$  in nomological use. It will also contrast with epic

(J) Every unicorn {is/was} in love with a maiden.

Hearers will take unicorns to be held existent somewhere, even if only in a world of fiction. There are intelligible semantics for fictional entities (Parsons 1980, Zalta 1988) which explicate this unforced intuition. Lappin and Reinhart (1988) hold that each of

(U) Every unicorn is a unicorn

(U') Most American kings are American kings

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<sup>32</sup> Modulo analyse of sentences such as *The largest prime number does not exist* or, more felicitous and easier to deal with, *The Count of Monte Cristo does not exist*.

should be true, granted that there are neither unicorns nor American kings. Again, that ‘unicorn’ sentences sound all right is surely due to unicorns being accorded existence in a world of fancy which is richly structured enough to count as some form of reality. This would not hold for American kings at present, and indeed

(V) Every American king is an American king

is poorly acceptable. So would be the less artefact-prone, pluralistic variant with *nobleman* in place of *king*.<sup>33</sup>

Presuppositionality meets putative counterexamples such as

(5) {a. All trespassers/b. Every trespasser} will be prosecuted.

However, the widespread belief that such examples support the Fregean interpretation of *all* and *every* is illusory, and our framework explains why.

The key observation is that (5) cannot give us a frequency judgment. No-one can count what has not yet happened, nor therefore can anyone establish actual frequencies. The most we can hope for is to be able to entertain *expected frequencies*.<sup>34</sup> Actual frequencies are obtainable in principle for

(6) All trespassers were prosecuted.

By contrast, what (5) says is that the conditional probability for future trespassers being prosecuted is unity.

The formal statement of this will require some care in the interpretation of familiar and new symbols. I first give a paraphrase that might fit many determiners: ‘For any randomly chosen individual  $x$ , the probability that  $x$  will be prosecuted, if  $x$  is a trespasser, is in the interval  $[a, b]$ ’. In our example  $[a, b] = [1, 1]$ , i.e. the number 1. Formally, and with care required

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<sup>33</sup> *American* meaning ‘North American’, just to be safe. This is not a matter of legal status, of course; but simply a matter of dim, subconscious probability distributions fed on late night TV movies that feature people called ‘Don Diego de  $X$  y  $Z$ ’. There is little chance that artefact-inducing vibrations from Count Basie, Duke Ellington, Prince Lasha, King Curtis, King Pleasure, and Queen Latifa will cross the juridical moat around ‘nobility’, as they might for stimulus sentences containing the more specific titular predicates. For *Most(A, A)*, recall Section 2.

<sup>34</sup> By the de Finetti (1937) Representation Theorem, expected frequencies are indistinguishable from epistemic probabilities (see Jeffrey 2004). (5b) suggests higher  $P(A)$ .

in interpreting notation,<sup>35</sup>

$$(7) \quad \forall x [P(\textit{prosecuted}(x)|\textit{trespasser}(x)) = 1] \quad \text{for } P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\textit{sym}}.$$

If the example had been

$$(5') \quad \text{Most trespassers will be prosecuted,}$$

we should have written, most liberally,

$$(7') \quad \forall x [P(\textit{prosecuted}(x)|\textit{trespasser}(x)) > 0.5] \quad \text{for } P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\textit{sym}}.$$

The intuitive condition on  $\forall x$ —random choice—is visibly important in this non-extreme case. If we knew for certain of some  $x$ , dub it  $c$ , that it will *not* be prosecuted if it trespasses, the conditional probability

$$P(\textit{prosecuted}(c)|\textit{trespasser}(c))$$

would be zero and hence the bare universal of statement (7'), i.e. without the condition  $P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\textit{sym}}$ , would be false.<sup>36</sup> The random choice condition is explicated by the formal condition  $P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\textit{sym}}$ . This says that  $P(\cdot)$  is 'symmetric' in staying invariant under permutations of the universe over which  $x$  ranges.<sup>37</sup> PERM is satisfied. In other words, the possible instances of  $x$  should be 'exchangeable' or 'interchangeable' *salva probabilitate*. An alternative or shorthand way of putting this is that  $x$  should be an *arbitrary* individual instantiating the properties in question. 'Arbitrary' means that nothing particular is known about it apart from the information held in the predicates, or rather nothing which would interfere with the probability assignment based on this information.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> The notation employs the ordinary universal quantifier symbol. As in all quantification into modal contexts, of which probability is an instance, there are restrictions on universal instantiation, an inference rule which captures the very meaning of  $\forall$ . The restriction is captured in the constraint  $\mathcal{P}_x^{\textit{sym}}$  explained below. We rule out vacuous truth. But really what we want, for ontological realism, is a conditional probability defined on the algebra of properties containing those of being a trespasser and of being prosecuted. It is in terms of such conditional probabilities that a realist notion of propensity would be defined (see Skyrms 1984).

<sup>36</sup> A heuristic for reading (7') comes from quantified modal logic:  $\not\vdash \forall x \diamond Qx \rightarrow \diamond \forall x Qx$ . Invalidity of the implication means that wide-scope universal quantification must not be misread for narrow scope here. The problem does not arise in (7) itself. ' $P(\cdot) = 1$ ' behaves like doxastic necessity, ' $\square$ ', for which  $\vdash \forall x \square Qx \rightarrow \square \forall x Qx$  holds.

<sup>37</sup> See Bacchus (1990) and Merin (1996: 84–104) for exposition and discussion.

<sup>38</sup> Here is another notation which presupposes probabilities defined on algebras of properties suitably restricted to instances in the space-time region envisaged:

$$(7'') \quad P(\textit{prosecuted}|\textit{trespasser}) = 1.$$

This is perhaps less likely to engender confused readings.

Exchangeability or symmetry means: only *numbers*, not the order of instances matter in the formation of a reference class for induction to a new instance,  $x$ . An intuitive way of putting the condition in (7/7') is indeed that  $x$  should be randomly chosen from the pertinent future populations, here of trespassers.<sup>39</sup>

Having made plausible, I hope, the formal representation, I shall now make use of it. Modals such as *will* impose a mandatory interpretation of putative frequencies in terms of epistemic probabilities, i.e. degrees of belief. The prediction of (7) is that (5) is fine only as long as the epistemic probability of someone trespassing is non-zero. If it were zero, (7) would be undefined. To test the prediction, simply utter *There will be no trespassers*, right before uttering (5), and watch the latter's felicity go:

(5'') There will be no trespassers. #All trespassers will be prosecuted.

The hypothesis that none of the known natural language dets are co-cardinal remains unfalsified. The correct way to look at this, I believe, is that the modal *will*, or, for that matter, any other modal, blocks an interpretation of probability relations in terms of actual frequencies.

**Theoretical Implication:** The data here supply a criterion for discriminating (i) the incidence of theoretical intensionality of the probabilistic belief variety which is not ostensibly tied to matching portion or proportion extensions and is therefore given an intuitably intensional interpretation from (ii) such intensionality which is firmly tied to an ostensible portion or proportion extension and is, therefore, given an ostensibly extensional reading.

The modal introduces intuitable intensionality and therefore non-degenerate speaker-hearer probability distributions over portions or proportions, i.e. of type (i). Absence of the modal leads to collapse of any such probability distribution to one which concentrates all probability on a single portion or proportion (single 'frequency'). See Section 6 below.

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<sup>39</sup> Bacchus (1990) notates  $[Qx]_x$ , the probability, in frequency terms, that a random element  $x$  of our universe ('sample space') has property  $Q$ . The conditional version,  $[Qx|Rx]_x$ , would give the probability or chance relative to the subset  $\{x : Rx\}$  of the universe. If  $R$  and  $Q$  are the respective sets we should have  $[Qx|Rx]_x = \mu(Q|R)$ .  $[Qx]_x$  thus cannot simply be equated with a belief-probability without further ado—least so in the kind of futurate, openly intensional context we have here. See Section 5.



The Hypothesis can thus be sustained in the face of the data on *all*. Nor is it falsified, I think, by data involving *any*.<sup>40</sup> My first inclination would be to argue that *any* is not even a q-det under its universal affirmative reading. It cannot occur felicitously as a stand-alone in contexts where other dets can:

(6') \*Any trespassers were prosecuted..

For full grammaticality, *any* needs supplementation by an amount relative outside of contexts which block an extensional proportion reading to start with. Thus,

(6'') Any trespassers {\*∅/there were} {were/have been} prosecuted.

(For 'have been' the \* might be replaced by a '??' acceptability grading.)  
By contrast, we are fully at ease with

(6''') Any trespassers will be prosecuted..

The positive hypothesis about *any* (Merin 1985, 1994a) is that it denotes an agent-indexical choice operator. The addressee chooses in the case of imperative sentences, Nature chooses in the case of indicatives under worst-case conditions for instance verification.<sup>41</sup>

If this procedural feature of *any* is admitted as constitutive of its meaning, it will prima facie jeopardize PERM.<sup>42</sup> What I should say, therefore, is that *any*, in contexts that give it universal import, affords universality indirectly. This is essentially the thesis of Fauconnier (1975a,b), who appeals to a pragmatic principle: truth of a predicate schema instantiated to a distinguished, extreme element of a ranking or 'scale' entails truth for all elements against a background of suitable assumptions. The investigation

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<sup>40</sup> The claim made in the title of Dayal (1998) would dispose one to make an argument for *any* which, in the manner just outlined excludes recourse to actual frequencies. This need not, however, entail to an endorsement of the way her claim is spelt out.

<sup>41</sup> This is the scenario which would counsel the 'minimax' loss decision rule in statistical decision theory (Wald 1950, Blackwell and Girshick 1954). Alternatively Nature's choice could represent that of an outright opponent in argument, who is bent on falsifying the speaker's assertion. Falsity for the instance picked would entail falsity of the corresponding universal claim. This is the routine construal of the logical universal quantifier in game-theoretic construals of predicate logic, beginning with C.S. Peirce.

<sup>42</sup> Secunda facie it would not. See below.

of *any* is a monograph topic of its own.<sup>43</sup> Thus, everything I have to say about *any* here is no more than a heuristic hint, and anything in support for the thesis (that the set of co-cardinal dets is empty) which hinges on *any* must be read with a proviso. That said, the upshot of a choice-theoretic construal would be that *any* is not itself a q-det because it makes no direct appeal to quantity or proportion.

What might speak for *any* being a q-det is, first, that it does *warrant* an appeal to quantity because any choice procedure involved will have to preserve invariance under permutation. So PERM will be satisfied which implies that numerical conditions are sufficient statistics for what its intuitively being expressed. If the *ex ante* most likely exception, that which spiteful Nature or an opponent in argument would choose as an instance proves unexceptional, then the *ex ante* less likely to be exceptional instances should each prove unexceptional too.

Empirical evidence for q-det status is that *any* occurs in coordinate collocations such as *any and every* or *each and any*. To deny *any* q-det status, one should then either (i) have to class the collocations as ‘legalese’<sup>44</sup> and hence not part of ordinary English or else (ii) give up the default interpretation of coordination as signaling maximal type-identity. (There are, of course exceptions and ways to domesticate them, explored in Gazdar, Klein, Pullum and Sag (1985).) This is perhaps too high a price to pay. If, accordingly, *any* is classed as a q-det, observe the uniform goodness of

(6''') {Any and all/All} trespassers {∅/there were}  
 {have been/were} prosecuted.

The amount relative, which is a ‘to-be’ construction postposed by inversion, acts as a dubitative. In non-futurate or non-modal contexts, it blocks the intimation that frequencies have been counted. The fact that *Any A* cannot occur without it in non-futurate contexts casts doubt on the ability of this

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<sup>43</sup> To get an inkling of this, begin by adding the page lengths of Kadmon and Landman (1993) and Dayal (1998). I cannot thus possibly embark on a proper discussion of this word here, which comprises many features that seem parochial to English.

<sup>44</sup> The collocation *any and every* is an instance of a ‘doublet’, an expressive device that is interpreted in sociolinguistic literature as giving an aura of extra *gravitas* to legal discourse. It seems to me, however, that this undoubted effect is a side-effect of things being made explicit which looser usage would simply presuppose or intimate as a defeasible part of a package.

NP to admit empty *As* without help. So, either way, CO-CARDINAL-DETS =  $\emptyset$  will continue to hold.

#### 4. Indefinites and ‘Strong’ Readings

Determiner phrases *DetN* that have weak readings can have strong readings too, which paraphrase *Det of the N salva veritate*. This paraphrase is possible for all of the strong Dets, too where it makes no difference to crude truth or assertability conditions in extensional contexts.<sup>45</sup> Exemplars of bona fide weak English determiners with quantifier readings are *a few, some, several, five, many, not a few, few, no* as shown by the Milsark test. All of them can freely instantiate the variable DET in *There are DET cats in the garden*. All of them can occur in the collocation DET *of the*, except *no* which must be amended to *none*.<sup>46</sup> Availability of strong readings of plain, prima facie weak dets is most familiar from accounts of *many*. This is held to have upward of three readings, but in return is not classed as a determiner at all by Keenan. Westerståhl (1985: 401–405) offers (modulo order of presentation and numbering)

- (8) *Many*<sub>1,k</sub>(*A, B*) iff  $|AB| > k$  for contextual *k*;  
*Many*<sub>2,k'</sub>(*A, B*) iff  $|AB| > k' \cdot |A|$  ( $0 < k' < 1$ );  
*Many*<sub>3</sub>(*A, B*) iff  $|AB| > [|B|/|T|] \cdot |A|$ ;  
*Many*<sub>4,f</sub>(*A, B*) iff  $|AB| > f(|T|)$  ( $0 < f(|T|) < |T|$ );  
*Many*<sub>5,k''</sub>(*A, B*) iff  $|AB| > k'' \cdot |B|$  ( $0 < k'' < 1$ );  
*Many*<sub>6\*,x,y</sub>(*A, B*) iff *Many*<sub>x</sub>(*A, B*) and *Many*<sub>y</sub>(*A, B*)

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<sup>45</sup> It does make a difference to procedural (i.e. discourse) information in that the definite article, *the*, ceteris paribus induces an existential presupposition. In intensional contexts it makes a difference to substantive (i.e. about-the-world) information. Thus, compare (14a) above to (14a') *All of the trespassers will be prosecuted*. By default, this presupposes that there have been trespassers by now, and that their prosecution will take place. The default can be shifted if there is prior discourse making a firm prediction that there will be a specific set of people trespassing at some future date.

<sup>46</sup> It seems reasonable as an empirical generalization that *There-be* Sentences (TBS) always express availability or unavailability of portions (special case: subsets) of the denotatum of the restrictor common noun. This does not rule out that the PP of a prepositional TBS acts as a tacit norm for proportional measure.

for  $(x = 2, k', \text{ or } 3; y = 1, k, \text{ or } 4)$ .

Indices  $k, k'$ , etc. will be tacitly understood in what follows.<sup>47</sup> Note for future reference that  $Many_3$  is equivalently specified by

$$Many_3(A, B) \text{ iff } |AB|/|A| > |B|/|T|$$

when  $|A| \neq 0$ , which is always presumed for readings that are essentially proportional. Note also for now that, when  $k = k' \cdot |A|$ ,  $Many_2$  becomes a special case of  $Many_1$ . Similarly,  $k' = |B|/|T|$  makes  $Many_3$  a special case of  $Many_2$ .<sup>48</sup> We thus observe:

Conditions for readings  $Many_1, Many_2$ , and  $Many_3$  are simultaneously satisfiable, pairwise and jointly.

Moreover, on dropping Westerståhl's condition  $0 < f(|T|) < |T|$ ,  $Many_3$  becomes a special case<sup>49</sup> of  $Many_4$ , namely  $f : x \mapsto |A| \cdot |B| \cdot x^{-1}$ . A special case satisfying the condition could be  $Many_1$ . Note finally, that analogous readings can be had for *few*, identical modulo conversion of ' $>$ ' to ' $<$ '. Example:

$$(9) \quad Few_3(A, B) \text{ iff } |AB| < [|B|/|T|] \cdot |A|.$$

In view of their formal unruliness, Keenan has denied *many* and *few* determiner status. He classes them as adjectives (see K&S). Now, *His faults are very {few/many}* does attest adjectival occurrence, but I should yet opt for categorial polysemy.<sup>50</sup> Retaining *many* thus, we recall that  $Many_2$  is already proportional. It is so intuitively, since its nearest explicit paraphrase,

<sup>47</sup> Take for example *Many Scandinavians are Nobel laureates*. The intuition is that  $Many_1$  makes  $|AB|$  large in some absolute sense;  $Many_2$  makes it a large enough proportion of  $A$ ; and  $Many_3$  makes that proportion larger than the proportion of  $B$ s in the set of all individuals considered. Clearly, that last specification takes some intuiting, but we shall soon offer an interpretation of it that makes it most intuitive.  $Many_5$  is like  $Many_2$ , save in having  $B$  as the comparison class;  $Many_4$  has the universe as a comparison class;  $f(\cdot) = k''' \cdot$ , i.e. multiplication by a constant ( $0 < k''' < 1 = |T|/|T|$ ) is just one option.

<sup>48</sup>  $Many_{5,k''}(A, B) = Many_{2,k'}(B, A)$ .

<sup>49</sup> A referee for the Merin (2005) pointed out that, in this case,  $Many_3(A, B)$  would not be false when  $|AB|/|A| = |B|/|T| = 1$ , which suggests replacing " $>$ " with " $\geq$ " everywhere. I retain formulations with " $>$ ", since they are more intuitive to read, but clearly, the  $k, k'$  could be chosen to make " $\geq$ " appropriate.

<sup>50</sup> K&S's policy decision is costly. First, *many* and *few* fit neatly into scalar determiner paradigms, as shown e.g. by  $\{Many/*Red\}$  *if not most cats walk* and  $\{Few/*Abnormal\}$  *or no cats walk*. Secondly, asymmetries of intuition about *many* which the literature explains by way of essentially proportional readings (see below) also appear with *some*.

ignoring intimations of anaphoricity, would be *Many of the A are B*. And it would be so formally, give or take definedness for empty *A*. Alternatively, then:

$$(10) \quad \text{Many}_{2'}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) > k' \quad (0 < k' \leq 1).$$

This differs in assertability conditions from  $\text{Many}_2(A, B)$  only in being undefined when *A* is empty, whereas  $\text{Many}_2(A, B)$  will be false.<sup>51</sup>

All of  $\text{Many}_x$  ( $x \neq 1$ ) are motivated by the following facts. Westerståhl (1985) remarks a difference in the intuitive meanings and assertability of<sup>52</sup>

(11) Many Scandinavians are Nobel laureates.

(12) Many Nobel laureates are Scandinavians.

You might assent to (12) while rejecting (11). Under a reading  $\text{Many}_1$  this would be inexplicable; indeed contradictory, given context constancy.

It would even be contradictory if your judgments had to satisfy specified truth conditions and no arbitrary changes of *k* were allowed from one sentence to the other in a given context of comparison.<sup>53</sup> However,  $\text{Many}_2$  and a fortiori  $\text{Many}_{2'}$  afford an explanation. Let *N* the set of Nobel prize winners in Literature. Let *S* the set of Scandinavians. Clearly  $0 < |NS| < |N| \ll |S|$ . At a guess,  $|N|$  and  $|S|$  differ by a factor of  $10^5$  to  $10^6$ . Suppose we associate a context of judgment for the pair of sentences with some fixed *k'*. Then

$$(11F) \quad \text{Many}_2(S, N) \text{ iff } |NS| > k' \cdot |S| \quad (0 < k' < 1);$$

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<sup>51</sup>  $\text{Many}_{2'}(A, B)$  is not superfluous. If you find either of

(i) Many survivors of 1812 are regulars at Disneyland,

(ii) Many triangular squares are hexagons,

weird before deciding that it is false, or if you think that

(iii) Many triangles are hexagons

is more straightforwardly false than (ii) you might well be reading *many* as  $\text{Many}_{2'}$ .

<sup>52</sup> Read 'laureates' short for his 'prize winners in literature'.

<sup>53</sup> Westerståhl proposes textitMany<sub>5,k'</sub> of (8) to interpret (11'') *Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel prize in Literature* and so to explain why it sounds so much better than (11'), *Many Scandinavians are Nobel prize winners in Literature*, for which form  $\text{Many}_{2,k'}(A, B)$  is proposed. Here is support: (11'') The first, (11''), paraphrases quite readily to (11''') *Among those who have won the Nobel prize in Literature, there are many Scandinavians*. The second, (11'), does not. Note also that main stress shifts more easily onto 'Scandinavians' in the first. One off-the-cuff explanation would be that the perfective VP links more easily with immediately prior mention of the Nobel Prize i.L. A more interesting reason is that the perfective does not introduce a timeless property which can enter into canonical relevance relations with the the restrictor property.

$$(12F) \quad \text{Many}_2(N, S) \text{ iff } |NS| > k' \cdot |N| \quad (0 < k' < 1).$$

For any  $k'$  (12F) holds whenever (11F) does. However, there are  $k'$  such that (12F) holds while (11F) does not.<sup>54</sup>

Fernando and Kamp (1996) [F&K] point out that the asymmetry behind  $\text{Many}_2$  survives in TBSs:

(13) There are many lawyers who are criminals.

(14) There are many criminals who are lawyers.

In Keenan's " $D(X, Y)$  iff  $D(XY, T)$ " criterion for weakness,  $\llbracket XY \rrbracket = \llbracket YX \rrbracket$  by definition. And so it would also be in F&K's suggested form,  $D(T, Z)$ , for TBSs, which contrasts with Keenan's  $D(Z, T)$ . What  $D(T, Z)$  (let us expand  $Z = XY$ ) offers, if the standard ordering is followed—i.e. left: restrictor and possible denominator argument, right: predicate—is the possibility of an abstract proportion reading with truth conditions

$$(15) \quad D(T, AB) \text{ iff } |AB|/|T| \in \Gamma.$$

But for finite  $T$  (or, given a suitable measure, for infinite  $T$  and  $AB$ )<sup>55</sup> this yields the frequency of  $AB$ , which F&K supplement with a broadly analogous interpretation in terms of probability.<sup>56</sup> F&K employ such an epistemic probability formulation to model the intuition that *many* means 'larger than expected'; cp. Merin (1994b, 1996, 1999b) on *but*. It differs from the present approach (i) in not linking epistemic probability with frequency and (ii) in not proposing a relevance interpretation for either. See Section 6, below. F&K's gloss would indeed be implied by mapping Westerståhl's most complex frequency interpretation,  $\text{Many}_3$ , to epistemic probabilities. Their analysis in terms of unexpectedness is consistent with the general programme in Merin (1994b) and particularly with probabilistic analysis

<sup>54</sup> Given the enormous difference between  $|N|$  and  $|S|$ ,  $k'$  might even vary considerably between the two conditions.

<sup>55</sup> As e.g. the set of natural numbers and the set of primes ending in '1' are, which might be addressed in mathematical applications of 'measure quantifiers' (Morgenstern 1979).

<sup>56</sup> If attempts were made to interpret Keenan's form,  $D(XY, T)$ , in line with the left-right convention, it would rule out by sheer undefinedness any proportion reading, save for the degenerate case  $|T| = |XY|$ , where it is unity. Thus it would not yield a frequency (or, by Section 6 below, a probability) for  $XY$ .

The asymmetry of readings discovered by F&K is incompatible with either of  $Q(XY, T)$  or  $Q(T, XY)$  being the semantics of TBSs in general. Hence it is also incompatible with readings predicated on nonzero relevance of  $X$  to  $Y$ .

of *A but B* for the special case  $P(B|A) < P(B)$  associated with Frege's paraphrase '*B* unexpected in view of the preceding'. See also my 1996 and 1999a.

The gloss will likewise hold for q-det readings of *some*.<sup>57</sup> To see how smoothly the proportion readings of weak dets fit into a conditional probability 'scale', pragmatize strong det *most*, somewhat in line with Ramsey (1929):

*Most A are B* signifies: 'If you meet an *A*, there is an overwhelming probability that it (or he or she) will be a *B*'.

What makes a probability overwhelming is again open to discretion. But there is an objective non-trivial infimum:  $B(B|A) > 0.5$ . Next consider analogues where the pair (*most, overwhelming*) is replaced by (*many, very significant*) and (*some, non-negligible*).

*Many A are B* signifies: 'If you meet an *A*, there is a very high probability that he, she, or it will be a *B*'.

*Some A are B* signifies: 'If you meet an *A*, there is a non-negligible probability that he, she, or it will be a *B*'.

In the usual context of use, each would be larger than expected. We shall see that in such contexts this means: *A* is positively relevant to *B* (cp. Merin 1999a, 2002 on *even*).

## 5. TBSs and 'Weak' readings of Weak Dets

F&K's empirical discovery that TBSs do not ensure 'cardinal' or 'existential' readings of prima facie weak dets implies that neither of  $Q(AB, T)$  or  $Q(T, AB)$  can always be the (explanatory) quantifier schema induced by TBSs.<sup>58</sup> Consider

- (16) a. There are many Scandinavians who are Nobel laureates.  
b. There are many Nobel laureates among Scandinavians.

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<sup>57</sup> Those which are not given a very defensive Fall-Rise intonation. The latter might simply indicate a non-zero probability or non-zero portion, corresponding to the submissive 'consolation prize' criterion projected by a Fall-Rise whine and which will admit a gloss 'larger than claimed by Addressee'.

<sup>58</sup> Keep in mind that  $AB = A \cap B = B \cap A = BA$ .

and analogously with *Nobel laureates* and *Scandinavians* exchanging position. We observe (a) iff (b). Paraphrases (b) confirm that *There are many A who are B* is indeed evaluated in terms of the proportion of As who are Bs, i.e. as a relation involving  $\mu(B|A)$ .<sup>59</sup> Pure cardinal ‘|AB|’ readings for TBS<sup>60</sup> are, I think, guaranteed only by the likes of

(17) There are many individuals who are both criminals and lawyers.

Thus, the complex predicate, ‘individual who is both an *A* and a *B*’ is the best English equivalent for the conjunctive property *AB*. The det *both* ensures commutativity for *A* and *B*. Indeed, (17) is synonymous with *There are many individuals who are both lawyers and criminals*. Moreover, the same ‘cardinal’ reading survives in

(18) Many individuals are both lawyers and criminals

which best extends F&K’s logical form  $D(T, Z)$  for TBSs on expanding  $Z = AB$ . But of course (18) is a sentence of form *Many(A, BC)* where *A* happens to be the set of individuals, presumably of human beings. (Unlike the notion of an all-comprehensive set, this is a coherent notion in familiar working set theories.) Hence, the defining property of *A* (presumably that of being human) is special at most in terms of relevance relations, to which we come below. One difference between ‘individual who is both an *A* and a *B*’ and ‘As who are Bs’ is, semi-theoretically, a suspicion that the proportion of *ABs* to *As* is engaged in the latter. A more directly apprehended one is a difference in ostensible relevance between *A* and *B*.

## 6. Frequency and Probability: Reflection of Proportion and Projection of Probability

Futurate *all*-sentences such as (5) offered one glimpse of relations between probability and frequency. We had no frequencies, only probabilities.<sup>61</sup> In probability theory there is, of course, a close relation between frequencies

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<sup>59</sup> In the longer version, I argue that standard, default-stressed TBS which carry a location PP have the measure  $\mu(PP)$  of their PP inducing a norm yielding a proportion,  $\mu(DP)/\mu(PP)$ , and thence do not admit DPs other than those which have a portion reading.

<sup>60</sup> Accompanied, no doubt, by readings of very significant ceteris paribus probability-of-meeting,  $P(AB) := |AB|/|T|$ .

<sup>61</sup> GQT in metamathematics has ‘probability quantifiers’ as they are called, in the formal sense of being based on normed measure. They are employed to deal with infinite sets



and probabilities. Still, it is not so close as to bear a definitional relationship. The two concepts are distinct, but related in inference and indeed shackled together by limit theorems when absolute numbers get large.<sup>62</sup>

We use the proportion information in statistical data to form beliefs by a process of inference, and for the purposes of further inference and action. We use sample size information to establish how resilient to change our beliefs should be in the light of future evidential instance-events (Jeffrey 1965).<sup>63</sup>

A standard way of doing inference from statistical data is to establish a table of frequencies for the instantiation of one or more properties of interest within a population. Having done so, such a frequency is taken as the basis for assigning a probability to future events or at any rate events not yet observed. The probability is not *defined* in terms of frequencies, and this is in fact how we see that it is something *sui generis*. It is defined in terms of the odds we would give for wagers.

For the case where statistics are available, the standard exemplar of such a wager is an insurance policy sold by an insurance company to risk-averse clients. Its price is related to statistics, say accident or mortality rates. But note that events may occur which do not yet reflect in statistics, but give us reason to believe that statistics will change. Rates will presumably change, too, and we impute this change to a change in probabilities. However, in the absence of extraneous knowledge or suspicions, we generally let our probabilities become numerically identical to proportions in the sample observed. Proportion is ‘reflected’ into our probabilities.

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where statements in terms of quotients of cardinality would fail: e.g. for ‘Most numbers are not prime’. Here, both the set of natural numbers and its proper subset, the set of primes, are infinite, so the quotient of cardinalities would be undefined. (If one looked at the meaningless expression ‘ $\infty/\infty$ ’ with intuitions schooled on the rule  $a/a = 1$ , it would suggest that all numbers are prime.) Theories of measure are designed to deal with problems posed by infinities and infinitesimals and to yield the intuitively right result (cf. e.g. Halmos 1950 for measure theory; Morgenstern 1979 on measure quantification).

<sup>62</sup> Limit theorems say that, in the very long run, repeated events that have such and such probabilities will settle down very closely to overall frequencies (i.e. proportions) that reflect these probabilities accurately. The principle behind them will concern us in a crude way when it comes to minimum sample size. For what limit theorems say, as a rule, is that proportions reflect probabilities the more accurately, the larger the sample from which they are computed. What they add to this commonsense idea, all-importantly, is quantitative specifications.

<sup>63</sup> Three heads after a run of one head and one tail might well sway us to think the coin we tossed is biased. Three heads after a run of 50 or 51 heads and 49 or 50 tails probably won’t.

‘Reflection of Proportion’ [ROP], as I propose to call it, is a standard transfer principle from proportion or frequency assessments  $\mu(\cdot|\cdot)$  to judgmental probabilities  $P(\cdot)$  on widest-scope universally quantified property abstracts.<sup>64</sup> It says: ‘assess your epistemic probability for an  $A$  being a  $B$  as being equal to the proportion of  $A$ s that are  $B$ s’. In the compact notation introduced for (7), above:

$$(19) \quad [\text{ROP}] \quad \forall x[P(Bx|Ax)] := \mu(B|A) \quad \text{for } P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\text{sym}}.$$

Read schema ‘ $v := z$ ’ as ‘Set the value of  $v$  to  $z$ ’. Read ‘ $\forall x$ ’ intuitively in the way suggested for (7), i.e. as specifying ‘for arbitrary or randomly chosen  $x$ ’. An equivalent formulation of ROP is in terms of the single case probability for an arbitrary individual  $d$ , arbitrary in the abovementioned epistemic sense:

$$(19') \quad [\text{ROP}] \quad P(Bd|Ad) := \mu(B|A) \quad \text{for } P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\text{sym}}.$$

Next, note that  $\mu(B|A)$  is a proportion of set-sizes, here of  $AB$  to  $A$ , while the clauses  $Bx$ ,  $Ax$ , and  $Bd$ ,  $Ad$  stand respectively for predicates denoting properties and for sentences denoting propositions. In Bacchus’ notation, slightly adapted, this assignment verifies  $P(Bd|Ad) \parallel [Bx|Ax]_x = \alpha = \alpha$ . It will be subject to the constraint that  $P((Bx|Ax)_x = \alpha) \wedge K > 0$ , where  $K$  is any background knowledge added. Whichever way we write it, it tells you: conditional on the frequency being  $\alpha$ , your probability will be  $\alpha$  (if you are the reasonable sort).

For the special case  $A = T$ , with  $T$  the maximal element in the algebra  $\mathcal{F}$  of the underlying measure space, ‘ $\forall x[P(Bx|Tx)] := \mu(B|T)$ ’ rewrites to ‘ $\forall x[P(Bx)] := \mu(B|T)$ ’. Westerståhl’s right-hand side of the condition for  $\text{Many}_{A,f}$  of (8), as interpreted by him, is in effect of the form  $k \cdot \mu(B|T)$ .

The next modification to ROP hinges on a problem that would be most acute in a futurate context. Proportions  $\mu(B|A)$  interpreted as frequencies are *ceteris paribus* understood as obtaining in our world. But suppose we do not know what the world is like in this respect, or suppose we must consider future worlds or propensities. In such cases, the best we might have to go on would be an expectation of proportions. To ‘kill’ a variable over ‘worlds’ or

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<sup>64</sup> Bas van Fraassen (1984) dubbed ‘reflection’ its less ancient intrapersonal analogon. This is setting your expected future probabilities equal to your current probabilities (or rather vice versa). ‘Reflection’ so conceived is a constraint on intertemporal coherence of belief. ROP is also known as ‘direct inference’ among philosophers of science, having been so dubbed by Hans Reichenbach.

maximally specified knowledge states, we should set our probability to the probability-weighted average of these proportions, frequencies (cf. Halpern 1990, Bacchus 1990, Merin 1996). This is in essence the procedure legitimized by de Finetti's theorem.

In the notation of Bacchus, here is a statement, as simplified and specialized in Merin (1996: 91). Let  $\mathcal{E}([Qx]_x)$  stand for 'the expectation of' a random variable,  $[Qx]_x$ , understood as taking worlds  $w_k$  for argument and delivering, say, frequencies on the ground. Then  $\mathcal{E}([Qx]_x) = \sum_k [P(w_k)] \cdot [Qx]_x^{w_k}$  for all  $w_k$  in the universe of 'worlds', where  $[Qx]_x^{w_k}$  stands for  $[Qx]_x$  in world  $w_k$ . As written, the  $w_k$  are assumed to be atoms of the boolean algebra of propositions on which  $P$  is defined. A proposition of interest in such contexts of reasoning and representing is frequently some set  $Q_{\alpha,\beta} =_{df} \{w_k : [Qx]_x^{w_k} \in [\alpha, \beta]\}$  of worlds. Your epistemic probability  $P(Q_{\alpha,\beta})$  would represent, how probable you think it is that property  $Q$  occurs with a frequency in the interval  $[\alpha, \beta]$ . When  $P(Q_{\alpha,\beta})$  is 1 or 0, you are certain what the world is like (within the allowance of the interval). The effect is most convincing in the special case where  $\beta = \alpha$  and the frequency is point-valued. Frequency or proportion is just one random variable that can be treated thus. Another is cardinality or portion.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> F&K define in much this way an intensional condition (slightly and inessentially rewritten here) ' $n$ -IS-MANY $_x(Ax)$ ', to be true iff "it is probable that  $\exists_{<n}x[Ax]$ " iff  $P(\{w : |\{x : Ax \text{ in } w\}| < n\}) > c$  for some contextual threshold  $c$ . (Think of  $c = 0.6$ .) The condition says: 'It is probable that there are less than  $n$  As.' A semantics for 'cardinal' *many* is proposed, label it  $Many_{6*FK}(A, B)$ , which is kin to the  $Many_{6*}$  schemata of (8): ' $Many(A, B)$  iff there is some  $n \geq 1$  such that (for some  $c$ )  $\exists_{\geq n}x[Ax \wedge Bx] \wedge n$ -IS-MANY $_x(Ax)$ '. (Here  $Many(A, B)$  is  $Many_{6*FK}(A, B)$ .) This ought to explicate, roughly, the following description: There are at least  $n$   $AB$ s, for some positive  $n$  and you would have expected there to be fewer. But clearly, it does not quite do so for utterers. If you know the  $AB$  are 5, your probability that they are 4 is zero.  $Many_{6*FK}(A, B)$  would literally gloss 'There are at least  $n$   $AB$ s, for some positive  $n$  and it is probable that there are fewer'. This is a variant of a 'Moore' sentence (Moore 1912, Hintikka 1962) i.e. something of the form ' $\Phi$  and/but I don't fully believe  $\Phi$ '.

The change from gloss 'is probable' will thus have to be followed up by more changes. My favourite would be to replace the main-scope conjunction by some dynamic update regime which makes  $n$ -IS-MANY $_x(Ax)$  a probabilistic presupposition in evidential time. Another is to index  $P$  to a third party. For both, see Merin (2003a) and, for the special case of *but*, Merin (1996). An alternative is to use a probability construction for counterfactuals. F&K have similar treatments for proportion readings. One question they raise is whether parameters such as  $c$  depend on (sizes of)  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $AB$  or some other comparison set  $C$ . Taking expectations over possible worlds is one suggestion (F&K, Sec. 3.3) which appears, in effect, to follow de Finetti's mixture approach.

But now consider the possibility of the inverse inferential process, call it ‘Projection of Probability’ [POP]:

$$(20) \quad [\text{POP}] \quad \mu(B|A) := \iota y \forall x [P(Bx|Ax) = y] \quad \text{for } P \in \mathcal{P}_x^{\text{sym}}.$$

This says—again modulo the interpretive explanations and qualifications noted for ROP: ‘assess the proportion of *As* that are *Bs* as being equal to your probability for an *A* being a *B*’.

The abstract justification for the transfer in both directions is found in the Representation Theorem of de Finetti (1937) (cf. Jeffrey 1965, 2004). What it says is that we can represent our subjective probabilities, under conditions which amount to permutation invariance (PERM), as expectations of objective chances, and these in turn can be operationalized least obscurely in terms of frequencies of property instantiations, i.e. proportions.

ROP is standard statistician’s fare. POP introduces ‘objectification’ (Jeffrey 1965) as a possibility and exploits it by way of the inverse rhetorical process:

**Thesis** (Merin 2001a,b): Putatively intersubjective, rhetorical and thus highly intensional relevance relations serve to induce putatively objective and extensional quantificational relations.

In the case of *many* this would open the possibility that  $Many_2(A, B)$  is, at root, a judgment of conditional probability projected onto frequencies. Roughly speaking, it would say that the probability that an *A* is a *B* is significantly high.  $Many_3(A, B)$  would then be, at root, a judgment that *A* is positively relevant to *B*.<sup>66</sup> In the context of verbal expression, the latter is, above all, a rhetorical judgment. In the case of *many* and, dually, *few*, turning the tables on ROP by way of POP seems plausible enough *faute de mieux*.

But there is also a more interesting thesis. This is that *all* proportion quantifiers admit of such a projectivist treatment. This could be an empirically motivated instance of a projectivist metaphysics of meaning suggested in more general terms by Blackburn (1984) in development of Hume (1739/40). I say: ‘admit of such a treatment’. I do not have to say: ‘this is what they really are’. The de Finetti season ticket does not, formally, discriminate between either Projection or Reflection. Opting for admissibility is sufficient for all the explanatory purposes I consider.

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<sup>66</sup> The present approach differs from F&K’s in considering relevance relations, ROP and POP, and the de Finetti route of representing frequency as a degenerate case of epistemic expectations over frequency. Our futurate examples were instances of non-degeneracy.

Just as in measure the natural progression of exposition is from portions to proportions to differences or quotients of proportions, in probability a very natural progression is in the opposite direction. This is because the fundamental concept that distinguishes probability theory from general measure theory is the role played therein by a complementary pair of concepts: *dependence* and *independence*. But these are synonyms for relevance and irrelevance, respectively, of which the evidential kind is a prominent special case. And evidential relevance is always equivalent to quotients or differences of conditional probabilities. So the idea would be to *start* with relevance. We then analyse relevance as functions of probabilities. In projecting probabilities onto frequencies, i.e. proportions, we are projecting onto quotients of portions. In certain contexts that give us some portions, we cash out proportions into other portions.

Having explored technicalities underlying this process in the body and footnotes of this section, I proceed as simply as possible, not least in notational polysemy. Expand to taste.

## 7. Probability and Relevance

Recall that  $\text{Many}_3$  as defined predicts  $\text{Many}_3(A, B)$  iff  $|AB| > (|B|/|T|) \cdot |A| = (|B| \cdot |A|)/|T| = (|A|/|T|) \cdot |B| < |AB|$  iff  $\text{Many}_3(B, A)$ . As Westerståhl noted,  $\text{Many}_3$  will not thus explain meaning and assertability differences between the two forms. Still,  $\text{Many}_3$ , unlike  $\text{Many}_x$  ( $x = 1, 2$ ), affords a non-arbitrary criterion. We often do have a reasonable estimate of the size of the relevant universe  $T$  alongside those for  $A$  and  $B$ .<sup>67</sup> The cost, so Westerståhl, is loss of LCONS and EXT. One might yet be sanguine about CONS, which is a neat technical and empirically widespread property (so widespread that many take it to be criterial for q-dets under one or another definition). However, loss of EXT must worry any right-thinking person.  $\text{Many}_3(A, B)$  implies that, merely by varying the size of the universe  $T$  while keeping that of  $A \cup B$  constant, we can change its truth value.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, complicated-

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<sup>67</sup> Indeed, Westerståhl (1985:402) appears to favour it as *the* meaning of *Many A are B*, at least for examples such as *Many students in the class are righthanded*. He glosses: “the frequency of Bs in A is greater than a certain *normal* frequency of Bs”. His suggestion then is to let this normal frequency be the frequency  $|B|/|T|$  of Bs in the universe, which yields  $\text{Many}_3$ .

<sup>68</sup>  $\text{Many}_2$  preserves LCONS and EXT, but only by letting the context provide a parameter,  $k'$ , for each occurrence of *many* (Westerståhl’s observation). We should add: this will preserve EXT only if one can be sure that the parameter is provided in independence

looking  $Many_3$  has an attraction not hitherto recognized. It has a most natural interpretation by ROP and POP:

Being an  $A$  is *positively relevant* to being a  $B$  (and vice versa) in the sense of being evidence for it.

At this point, the interpretation in terms of probability measure has entered our considerations.  $Many_1$  had not afforded normed measure. By contrast, ROP performed on the basis of  $Many_2$  yields

$$Many_2(A, B) \text{ iff } P(B|A) > k' > 0.$$

This says that the probability of something being  $B$ , conditional on its being  $A$ , exceeds some positive  $k'$ . The comparison of our examples  $Many_2(N, S)$  and  $Many_2(S, N)$  now also leads to a natural interpretation of the difference in intuitions: The (conditional) probability of a Nobel laureate being Scandinavian is much higher than the (conditional) probability of a Scandinavian being a Nobel laureate, briefly:  $P(S|N) \gg P(N|S)$ . Next, again utilizing ROP,  $Many_3$  yields<sup>69</sup>

$$Many_3(A, B) \text{ iff } P(B|A) > P(B).$$

But, standardly, one says with Keynes, Carnap, Jeffrey and others:

$A$  is *positively relevant* to  $B$  iff  $P(B|A) > P(B)$ .

$A$  is *negatively relevant* to  $B$  iff  $P(B|A) < P(B)$ .

$A$  is *irrelevant* to  $B$  in any other case.

These three nominal relations of evidential relevance are symmetric. In obvious shorthand:  $A \text{ xrel } B \rightarrow B \text{ xrel } A$ , ( $x = \text{pos, neg, ir, } \emptyset$ ).<sup>70</sup>  $A$  posrel  $B$  means roughly: if  $P(\cdot)$  represents your current degrees of belief or probabilities, then, on getting to know  $A$  (and just  $A$ ), your degree of belief in  $B$  or probability for  $B$  should go up. In property terms: on simply learning that something is an  $A$ , your probability for it being a  $B$  should rise. Analogously for negrel and irrel. Thus,  $Many_3$  of (8) expresses the frequency correlate

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of  $T$ . That is a very strong assumption. (For more general explorations of contextual parametrization see Lappin 2000).

<sup>69</sup>  $\mu(B)/\mu(T) = \mu(BT)/\mu(T)$ , since  $B \subseteq T$  always.

<sup>70</sup> Relevance here always refers to relation need not imply that, if, say,  $A$  posrel  $B$ ,  $A$  cannot be more positive to  $B$  than  $B$  is to  $A$  in terms of some quantitative explication of degree or amount of relevance.

of positive evidential relevance. By ROP, we obtain from frequencies a formulation in evidential terms. By POP we project evidential relations onto frequencies.

Next, we address asymmetry intuitions in terms of relevance. The bare, nominal relations of positive and negative relevance and of irrelevance are symmetric. If  $A$  is positive to  $B$ ,  $B$  is positive to  $A$ . The specification of *Many*<sub>3</sub> simply picks up the symmetric nominal relevance relation. But matters may change on considering numerical measures of relevance. Some are symmetric in their arguments, e.g. that arising from *Many*<sub>3</sub>, viz.  $P(AB)/[P(A)P(B)]$ . However, many other functions are not symmetric in their arguments. Indeed For all quantitative relevance functions  $\text{rel}_X^i(Y)$ , defined in terms of probability functions  $P^i$ , that are not we can state the following

**Proposition:** If  $\text{rel}_X^i(Y)$  is not symmetric in its arguments<sup>71</sup> the less probable of two propositions  $A$  and  $B$  that are positive to one another under  $\text{rel}^i$  is more positive to the more probable than conversely:

$$\text{rel}_B^i(A) > 0 \rightarrow \text{rel}_B^i(A) > \text{rel}_A^i(B) \quad \text{iff} \quad P^i(A) < P^i(B).$$

Functions validating this are e.g.  $\text{relD}_B(A) =_{df} P(B|A) - P(B)$ ,  $L_B(A) =_{df} P(A|B)/P(A|\bar{B})$  and  $r_B(A) =_{df} \log[P(A|B)/P(A|\bar{B})]$ . Since  $\mu(N) \ll \mu(S)$ , and therefore  $\mu(N)/\mu(T) \ll \mu(S)/\mu(T)$ , we have by ROP also  $P(N) \ll P(S)$ . For our example this means: Being a Nobel laureate ( $N$ ) is more positively relevant (evidentially, not causally) to being Scandinavian ( $S$ ) than being  $S$  is to being an  $N$ .<sup>72</sup>

The relation between this fact and the corresponding one for *Many*<sub>2</sub> is obvious for the  $\text{relD}$  relevance function. Moreover, whatever naive intuitions support *Many*<sub>3</sub> will also support the yet more complex-looking but equivalent relevance specification by ROP,

$$\text{Many}_7(A, B) \text{ iff } |AB|/|A\bar{B}| > |B|/|\bar{B}|.$$

This says that  $\text{Many}_7(A, B)$  is true or assertable iff the ‘Bayes Factor’ of  $A$  in favour of  $B$  is positive, for another way of writing this is  $\text{Many}_7(A, B)$  iff

<sup>71</sup> I.e. if  $\text{rel}_X^i(Y) \neq \text{rel}_Y^i(X)$  for some  $X$  and  $Y$ .

<sup>72</sup> This holds in terms of *evidential* relevance. Causal relevance in the intuitive sense always runs from the past to the future. There is no backwards causation. Hence, being an  $N$  cannot be causally relevant to being born as an  $S$ , the sense being  $S$  understood here. Causal relations can, of course, co-obtain with evidential relations.

$\mu(A|B)/\mu(A|\bar{B}) > 1$ , yielding by ROP

$$\text{Many}_7(A, B) \text{ iff } P(A|B)/P(A|\bar{B}) > 1.$$

Now we can go a step further to

$$\text{Many}_{8,k''}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(A|B)/\mu(A|\bar{B}) > k'' \text{ (} k'' \geq 1\text{)}.$$

Here,  $k''$  might be such that  $\text{Many}_{8,k''}(A, B)$ , but not  $\text{Many}_{8,k''}(B, A)$  its criterion.<sup>73</sup> The Proposition tells us that in this case,  $A$  is smaller than  $B$ .

The import of these findings is, I think, that a comparative concept of relevance, not simply a nominal concept of it, can reflect in robust intuitions. But if this is so, there is also hope for ranking determiners in terms of evidential relevance relations. And this will raise the question: Relevance to what?

## 8. Exocentric and Endocentric Relevance Relations

Pure portion quantifier sentences,  $S$ , i.e. pure portion readings of sentences  $S$  of schematic form  $D(A, B)$ , offer no scope at all for relevance relations between  $A$  and  $B$  to be expressed by the sentence so construed. Yet even then  $\llbracket S \rrbracket$  might be relevant to some other proposition of interest,  $H$ . Call such a relevance relation between  $S$  or some sub-clause of  $S$  and some  $H$  lexico-syntactically external to  $S$  *exocentric* (to  $S$ ).<sup>74</sup>

There are also relations between elements of a paradigm of quantifier sentences such as the above, e.g. inductive relations to instances of the sentence schema  $All(A, B)$  (Merin 2003b). Instances of it express a deterministic, lawlike relationship or at any rate a universal generalization likely to be explained by such a law. For example, we might compare the relevance of each of  $Some(A, B)$  and  $Many(A, B)$  to  $All(A, B)$  in a context in which the utterer of the first two has not yet sampled all of the underlying universe.

Situations such as these must give rise to a pragmatics of assertion in which quantifier sentences inherit the tacit qualifier paraphrased by ‘at least’

<sup>73</sup>  $\text{Many}_7 = \text{Many}_{8,1}$ , just as  $\exists = \text{Many}_{1,0}$ .

<sup>74</sup> In the case of exocentric relations we might have relations to arbitrary  $H$  at issue. Thus *Some cats walk*, *A few cats walk*, perhaps even *Several cats walk*, *Many cats walk*, *Most cats walk*, *All cats walk* and on the other hand *Few cats walk*, *No cats walk* can all be compared in a context by their relevance to some  $H$ —even to something as remote as *The price of cheese will rise*. (Think of mice and traps as intermediate causal variables.)



or ‘at most’.<sup>75</sup> This need not hold for the first case. However, we might also consider the first case (or a special case of it) as follows:  $H$  is chosen such that  $All(A, B)$  or its contrary  $No(A, B)$  is most positively relevant to it. And then the relevance to  $H$  of other expression alternatives in the determiner paradigm is ranked. In many cases this ranking should be identical to the ranking in the condition of inductive support for the extreme item in the expression alternative set.

By contrast, proportion quantifier sentences of form  $D(A, B)$  offer scope for relevance relations between properties  $A$  and  $B$ .<sup>76</sup> Similarly, subclauses of a complex sentence  $S$  or propositions canonically associated with phrasal constituents of  $S$  might be relevant (or mandatorily irrelevant) to one another.<sup>77</sup> Call such relevance relations *endocentric* (to  $S$ ).

Endocentric relations can be at the root of certain exocentric relations. For example, suppose

( $\Gamma$ ) Many cats walk.

establishes a significant positive relationship between zoological felinity and a particularly robust form of locomotion. This very relationship may, in turn, be what makes ( $\Gamma$ ) positive for

( $\Delta$ ) The Baskerville outlet of Kat-Mart will be sited  
on Bramble Heights.

Below we shall see how endocentric relations between the  $A$  and  $B$  parts of  $D(A, B)$  instances cohere with such relations. But focussing on endocentrics alone we make an

**Observation:** Endocentric relevance relations between  $A$  and  $B$  are concomitant with proportion readings of q-dets  $D$  occurring in sentences  $D(A, B)$ .

There is no simple q-det which lacks a proportion reading.<sup>78</sup> All simple q-dets, give or take suffixation of *-one*, admit interpolation of the string *of*

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<sup>75</sup> Depending on positivity or negativity of the underlying determiner.

<sup>76</sup> These will be construable by relevance relations between corresponding propositions obtained upon instantiating them by suitable arbitrarily chosen individuals.

<sup>77</sup> This coheres with the Milsark’s finding that ‘*ser*-type’ VPs elicit strong readings of weak dets. It might also shed light on de Hoop’s (1995) analogous observation specifically about transitive verbs.

<sup>78</sup> We have ruled out the articles *a* and *the*, whose overwhelming referential interpretations fail PERM. If they are included, this assertion is obviously false.

the between *Det* and  $N'$ . All of them admit of readings paraphraseable in this way even when the string is not interpolated.<sup>79 80</sup> Truth conditions of portion and proportion readings of *some* defined by  $\exists(A, B)$  coincide, but falsity conditions do not, due to undefinedness of proportion readings. With truth and falsity transposed, the same holds for  $\neg\exists(A, B)$  i.e. *no*.<sup>81</sup> This knowledge will come in useful for examples (21/22), analogous to Westerståhl's (11/12) for *many*:

(21) Some Scandinavians are Nobel laureates.

(22) Some Nobel laureates are Scandinavians

Recall Westerståhl's observation that (12) sounded more reasonable than (11). The same will, I think, still hold for (22) and (21). Like things might also hold for a variation on F&K's populations for (13/14), introduced after complaints from the legal profession: (i) *Some academics are criminals*, (ii) *Some criminals are academics*.<sup>82</sup> All these examples introduce scope for

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<sup>79</sup> If you follow my proposal to re-assign the extension of 'definiteness' you will see that the definite dets of English (definite *and* indefinite articles) are precisely those for which \**Det of the(A, B)*.

<sup>80</sup> Fact:  $\mu(B|A) > 0$  whenever  $\mu(AB) > 0$ ; and  $\mu(AB) > 0$  whenever  $\mu(B|A) > 0$  (but note:  $\not\vdash \mu(B|A) = 0 \leftarrow \mu(AB) = 0$ .)

<sup>81</sup> Thus,  $\vdash \mu(B|A) = 0 \rightarrow \mu(AB) = 0$ , but  $\not\vdash \mu(B|A) = 0 \leftarrow \mu(AB) = 0$ . True affirmations of Fregean *some* verify the corresponding proportion reading. Dual co-incidence of falsity conditions obtains for portion and proportion readings of *No(A, B)*. This is false on the portion reading when  $\mu(AB) > 0$ , i.e. when  $\mu(B|A) =_{df} \mu(AB)/\mu(A) > 0$ . Remembering now: over infinite domains, existential empirical assertions *Some(A, B)* and *Some(A,  $\bar{B}$ )* cannot be falsified while their respective duals *All(A, B)* and *No(A, B)* cannot be verified. Thus, we note the importance of falsity conditions for *No* and of truth conditions for *Some*. The conditional probability induced by ROP from Fregean proportion *some* has a definite lower bound:  $P(B|A) \geq 1/|A|$ . That induced from proportion *no* has a definite value:  $P(B|A) = 0$ .

<sup>82</sup> There might also be an intensional cousin of LCONS (i.e. of  $Q(A, B)$  iff  $Q(A, AB)$ ) at work here. We tend to interpret the string  $AB$  not as boolean meet ('both *As* and *Bs*') but as '*As* who pursue their *A*-hood in a *B*-ish way'. The typical English renderings of the right-hand side of CONS actually import just this idea: (i') *Some academics are academics who are criminals*; (ii') *Some criminals are criminals who are academics*. The former tends to envisage academics who set about academic business in unwholesome ways. The latter envisages criminals who set about *their* business in a particularly learned or scientific way. Yet the relative clause construction blocks readings where 'academic' merely means 'university graduate'. A further complication is that a necessary and sufficient criterion for being an academic or a lawyer is, respectively, employment as such by an institute of higher learning and work in legal practice. By contrast, having been convicted of a crime in a court of law is assuredly not a necessary criterion for

intuitions primed by set-sizes, folk prejudice, and relative intrinsicity of predicates. So now consider true blandness of relative size and sentiment:

- (23) Some acrobats are beekeepers.  
 (24) Some beekeepers are acrobats.

Here we get as close as we ever get to a cardinal reading by default, short of saying

- (25) Some people are both beekeepers and acrobats.

This is presumably because there is no very obvious context of use for these sentences. For all that, even (25) has a proportion reading: the proportion here is that of acrobats-cum-beekeepers in the populace. This reading is not readily intuited, however, because it cannot induce non-zero evidential relevance of peoplehood to *AB*-hood when relevance is computed—as it ordinarily will be—with respect to the pertinent maximal universe of entities, the universe of people.

## 9. Determiner ‘Scales’

$Many_3^T(A, B)$ , when false or inassertable, can usually be massaged into truth by expanding  $T$  to a large-enough  $T'$ . A true instance can be falsified by contracting the universe. Adopting a dual definition for the corresponding reading of *Few*, we can falsify by expanding, and verify by contracting  $T$ .

For *Most* or *All* no such tricks, worthy of Protagoras, the Sophist, will work. In practice, though, we find reasonable bounds on  $T$ , and so *Many* and its kin retain their usefulness. For the other non-*No* and non-numeral dets, compatibility with numbers on the ground is enormous, too. Take

- (26) DET Scandinavians are Nobel laureates  
 (27) DET Nobel laureates are Scandinavians.

No matter if we instantiated DET to *Many*, *Some*, *A few*, or *Few*: each instance would be consistent with actual and presumable numbers on the ground.<sup>83</sup> This suggests we try making progress in context-dependent se-

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being a criminal, nor invariably a sufficient one. Again, reflection on criteria would yield an extensional reading for *AC*.

<sup>83</sup> In this particular example DET = *Several* would be infelicitous. Fourteen or so *SN* is too many. A handful of *AB*s known by name or by sight, or known metonymically by perception of marks they have left, is my intuition for the assertability condition of *Several(A, B)*. The speaker should be able to *subitize* the set *AB*. The knowledge condition might even rule out *several* as a q-det. My intuitions for Fr. *plusieurs*, whose etymology does not hearken back to the notion of being ‘distinct’, are not secure enough to vouch for a like specification. See Jayez (2005) for a proper account of it.

mantics by looking to the tradition of ‘structural semantics’ (Saussure 1916, Lyons 1963), which contrasts with the ‘denotational’ tradition in drawing principally on relations within a paradigm of expression alternatives. Ducrot (1973) is indeed very much in this tradition. But, of course, the structural and denotational approach are by no means incompatible, and the issues of present interest will hinge on the choice of spaces of denotata. My proposal is to classify q-dets by ranking them

- (a) by ostensible endocentric conditional probability  $P(B|A)$  and
- (b) by ostensible endocentric relevance e.g.  $\text{rel}D_B(A) =_{df} P(B|A) - P(B)$ .

Each of these will be induced by ROP or will induce frequencies and sometimes portions by POP. For constant  $P(B)$ , to which constant  $\mu(B|T)$  will correspond by ROP or POP, positive relevance is an increasing function of  $P(B|A)$ . In turn, for constant  $P(A)$  (given constant  $\mu(T)$ ) or simply given constant  $\mu(A)$ , conditional probability  $P(B|A)$  will be an increasing function of  $P(AB)$  and  $\mu(AB)$ , respectively. ( $\mu(T)$  cancels out here.)

Evidential relevance is the explication I have proposed for Ducrot’s notion of *valeur argumentative* (Ducrot 1973, Merin 1994b, 1996, 1999a). And an ordering of quantifying determiners in terms of their ostensible value in argument is a key part of Ducrot’s theory. His theory remained informal and by and large and it came with the idea—erroneous it seems—that there was no useful theoretical relation between logical, truth-conditional and argumentative properties of expressions.<sup>84</sup>

Anglo-American ‘quantitative’ or ‘pragmatic’ ‘scales’ were in parts intended to retain this relationship. They took off from quantifier and connective schemata (Fogelin 1967) and inherited the Fregean semantics of *some* and the Aristotelian meaning of *all*. Thus, *Some(A, B)* was defined by  $AB \neq \emptyset$ , whose rigorous gloss ‘At least one *A* is *B*’ and quantitative translation  $|AB| \geq 1$  is an inequality. Horn (1972) extended this distinctive property of logical *some* to numerals. The lexical meaning of *five* was, not  $\llbracket \textit{five} \rrbracket = 5$  but roughly, ‘at least 5’:  $\llbracket \textit{five} \rrbracket = \{x : x \geq 5\}$  or perhaps  $\llbracket \textit{five} \rrbracket = \epsilon x[x : x \geq 5]$ . The reasons for this were (i) admissibility in collocation with suspender clauses *five if not indeed six/more* and (ii) an effect of negation, observed by Jespersen, namely that *not five* usually meant ‘less

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<sup>84</sup> Ducrot’s insight is taken up and his error subjected to constructive critique in Jayez’ (1987) formal semantics of *presque* (‘almost’) and *à peine* (‘hardly’). Their properties are importantly related to *peu* (‘few/little’) and *un peu* (‘a little’). Jayez’ (1987) treatment is in a deterministic framework without appeal made to the notion of evidential relevance.

than five'. Scalar implicature was to induce final readings equivalent to plain 5 in unnegated contexts.

There is an alternative by way of Act-Based Relevance Orderings (ABROs; Merin 1999a 2003b), which I have offered not least because the 'Horn scale' approach turns out to be incoherent. As Sadock (1984) pointed out, elementary reckonings with numbers can no longer be part of English if the approach is right. It also fails to explain why in certain contexts not involving negation the 'at least' reading, if any there was, gives way to an 'at most' reading. Here are two examples, one imperatival from me, the other indicatival and in essence from Anscombe and Ducrot (1983). Example 1: (Imperative) Compare

- (28) (a) Give me \$5! vs. (b) All right then: take \$5!

Assuming that people like money, we have a distinct intuition for (a) that I shall be happy to get more; and for (b) that I shall be happy to give less. The rationale is found in the 'demand game' of bargaining games as explicated by Nash (1953) and one might call it *preference monotonicity*. If you make a Claim, you ipso facto prefer having what you ask for to not having it; and you prefer having more of it. Dually for Concessions. Examples 2: (Indicative)

- (29) The meeting was a success! ( $H$ )  
       10 people came (if not more). ( $S_1$ )  
       20 people came (if not more). ( $S_2$ )
- (30) The meeting was a flop! ( $H'$ )  
       10 people came (if that many). ( $S_1$ )

If, in response to these examples, yet in line with Horn's proposal, we plead underspecification of lexical entry, the entry should presumably be  $\llbracket ten \rrbracket = \epsilon x[x : (x \geq 10) \vee (x \leq 10)]$ , which entails, e.g.  $\llbracket ten \rrbracket = \llbracket eleven \rrbracket = any\ natural\ number\ you\ like$ .

I follow Ducrot, modulo explication and extension, in allowing for dual mboxargumentative orientations for independently ordered domains of items such as temperatures or numerical quantities, and in ordering determiners by typical relevance, though I specify what typicality means.<sup>85</sup> I diverge from Ducrot, Horn, and ultimately Fogelin in not having two distinct

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<sup>85</sup> Orientation is preferred direction of maximization of independently given physical or numeral accounting quantities. The default bias will be for maximization increasing in quantity.

orderings of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ items which correspond to or extend the vertical sides of the traditional ‘Square of Oppositions’. Relevance to a proposition  $H$  (at issue), unlike entailment, induces a complete ordering of all elements of the proposition algebra which  $H$  belongs to. Irrelevance will be the zero point of the ordering and so there is a single scale, roughly as we know it from the integer or real numbers.

The specification of the canonical intermediate variable as indicating a large value or, on the negative side, a small value<sup>86</sup> already determines our choice of prototypical quantifiers. *Many* and *few*, which are the Protagorean quantifiers *par excellence*,<sup>87</sup> will serve as the role models for the scale. My provisional proposal<sup>88</sup> is a modification of *Many*<sub>3</sub> (i.e. Westerståhl’s *Many*<sub>2</sub>) namely

$$(31) \quad \text{Many}_{8,k+}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(A|B)/\mu(A|\bar{B}) > k \quad (k = 1 + r).$$

Here  $r$  is a small positive real number, or rather a value of a random variable (r.v.)  $X_r$  whose probability density peaks about the number  $r$  and which assigns zero density to values not exceeding zero. The underlying idea is that  $A$  should be positive to  $B$  and *very significantly* so. What ‘very significant’ means, and hence what number the  $r$  or  $X_r$  actually is, will no doubt depend on extra-epistemic considerations of preference, e.g. losses attending false decisions. These are familiar from statistical decision theory (see Merin 1994b:148–158 for brevity, or any textbook).<sup>89</sup> *Few* will be dual to *many*:

$$(32) \quad \text{Few}_{8,k-}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(A|B)/\mu(A|\bar{B}) < k \quad (k = 1 - r').$$

These proposals differ from earlier versions<sup>90</sup> in making the relevance relation non-symmetric ( $B$  must still be relevant to  $A$  but need not be signifi-

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<sup>86</sup> ‘Small’ intuitively includes zero or has it as a greatest lower bound for physical quantities.

<sup>87</sup> Protagoras said ‘Man is the measure of all things’, and took payment for teaching people to make the weaker case appear to be the stronger. Recall what  $\mu(T)$  means.

<sup>88</sup> Specified in terms of inequalities for simplicity, but due to be respecified in terms of equalities in line with the ABRO principle.

<sup>89</sup> What Manfred Krifka suggested to me (at the ESSLLI summer school in 1994) for bare NPs (e.g. *Anopheles bite*), also holds in principle for *many*: The more dangerous the bite, the smaller the proportion of biting anopheles required to make the sentence felicitously assertable. A *some*-reading of bare NP might be induced among possibles in the case of danger, an *all*-reading mandatory where there is little danger from a bite.

<sup>90</sup> In Merin (2001b), I had proposed  $\text{Many}_{k+}(A, B)$  iff  $\mu(B|A) > \mu(B|T) + r$ , and  $\text{Few}_{k-}(A, B)$  iff  $\mu(B|A) < \mu(B|T) - r'$  for  $0 < r, r' < 1$ . Again,  $r$  was specified to stand for an r.v. with a probability density peaked e.g. around 0.1, so that  $r$  should represent a noticeable difference and  $A$  should be significantly relevant to  $B$ .

cantly relevant to it). They also differ in the almost non-committal strengthening of ‘significant’ to ‘highly significant’. In fact, the difference would be committal only if a corresponding change were to be introduced in the semantics for its nearest neighbours, *most* and *some*.<sup>91</sup>

Note that *A* non-negrel *B* holds iff  $\mu(B|A) \geq \mu(B|T)$  assuming  $\mu(B|A)$  defined. Thus, an ordering of *all* the main q-dets by endocentric relevance is possible, provided we can assume constraints on the proportion of *Bs* in the universe. For the extremes we have seen them to be satisfied whenever the sentences so uttered could be informative at all. For the others, I propose that they be considered as default assumptions which hold at least for the mythical ‘zero context’ of utterances out of the blue, but also whenever the world can be represented credibly as conforming to them.<sup>92</sup>

I prefer to specify meanings in terms that stay as close as possible to measure of physical proportions (where physicality applies) via POP or ROP rather than in terms of probabilities that make appeal in essential ways to counterfactual situations and notions of undirected ‘surprise’. Actuaries setting insurance premiums look at proportions and sample sizes on the ground, and this is what perhaps we often pretend to be doing when expressing probabilities in the idiom of quantification.

K&S made a point of separating extensional from intensional, ‘evaluative’ features in quantification. This merits a short excursion, not least because the illustrating model lends itself to specifying a situation where the F&K treatment of intensionality is the treatment of choice. For K&S, dets *a surprising number of*, *many*, *too many*, . . . are among the intensional lot. The criterion is that they do not support substitution of conceptually distinct, but co-extensional *A*, *B* etc. *salva veritate*. Thus consider (after

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<sup>91</sup> In (2001b), I had proposed, for the proportion reading, *Some<sub>s</sub>(A, B)* iff  $\mu(B|A) \geq s > 0$ . The observation attached was that relevance of *A* to *B* by ROP or POP was non-negative provided  $\mu(B|T) \leq s$ , i.e. if the proportion of *Bs* that also were *As* was not exceeded by the proportion of *Bs* in the universe *T* (under consideration).

Example: *A* non-negrel *B* when, of 1 million *T*, 10,000 are *B*, 5000 are *A* and 50 or more are *AB*. If  $|B| = 100,000$  and  $|A| < 1000$ , then just one [!] *AB* will suffice to ensure *A* posrel *B*, by ROP or POP. It is for this reason that we really want for *some* the analogue of the paraphernalia for *many*: i.e. a minimum size of *AB*, greater than just one or two.

<sup>92</sup> In many cases this will mean: the actual world will be misrepresented if transfer by POP is to be legal. At this point, the defaults may have to be revised in the light of better knowledge. This is just as in statistical practice, where you might incline to lay a wager at odds which are very much at odds with actuarial statistics which you have not yet seen.

Keenan 1987)

- (a) DET doctors attended the meeting (DET( $D, M$ ))
- (b) DET lawyers attended the meeting (DET( $L, M'$ ))

Let  $M, M'$  be the attendants at the respective meetings. Let  $D$  the set of doctors,  $L$  the set of lawyers. Suppose  $M' = M$ , so the attendees at meeting (a) and at meeting (b) are identical. This is indeed a necessary condition for meeting (a) and meeting (b) to be identical. Assume, as envisaged when the two sentences are considered jointly, that (a)-meeting and (b)-meeting are identical.

Let also  $DM = LM'$ , which, given  $M = M'$ , rewrites to  $DM = LM$ . All doctors among attendees  $M$  of this meeting (or of the two meetings) happen to be lawyers and all lawyers attending  $M$  happen to be doctors. If DET = *All*, truth-conditions are identical. But for DET  $\in \{a \text{ surprisingly high number of, a large number of, too many, too few, not enough, many, few}\}$  this may fail. Thus, when DET = *a surprisingly high number of*, (b) might be true and (a) false, say, when  $M$  are the attendants at the annual meeting of the Eutopian Medical Association (EMA). (Suppose the meeting was devoted to gory forensic science, but that the reporter did not know this bit. Think of  $M - L (= M - D)$  as the journalists who attended.)

Assume further that  $|L| = |D|$ , i.e. that there are just as many doctors overall (in the country or in the world) as there are lawyers. This is just to block an easy path to asymmetry. Suppose next that the notions of truth and falsity are indeed being well applied in asserting that (b) might be true, but (a) false when DET  $\in \{a \text{ surprisingly high number of, a large number of, too many, too few, not enough, many, few}\}$ .<sup>93</sup> Then the presumption must be that, for the speaker or for the relevant community whose attitudes are deemed criterial, being a lawyer should be negatively relevant to being an attendee at a meeting such as the EMA meeting, while being a doctor is either non-negative; or else that being a lawyer is simply less positively relevant ex ante to being an attendee than being a doctor. Thus,  $\text{rel}_M(L) < \text{rel}_M(D)$

The way the model was set up, statistical information introduced up to now cannot be the source of this belief. Past attendance records of a

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<sup>93</sup> Not a few people would prefer to speak of (warranted) assertability, as Ernest Adams did in the case of conditionals. This concept is more open to having its definition negotiated than is the notion of truth in a model.



suitably skewed kind would be. However, they need not be. People might have theories about behavioural dispositions of typical doctors and typical lawyers that are not based on any statistical evidence at all.

A similar procedure could work for a related example offered by F&K, which concerns attendance of ‘*many*’ people at a meeting under two conditions: knowing either (i) that Chomsky spoke or (ii) that some less famous person spoke. For a given number of attendants, *Many people attended* might be rated ‘true’ under condition (ii), but ‘false’ under condition (i).

F&K appeal to a difference in sets of possible worlds considered for expecting over the two cases. Under a constellation where appeal to frequency data is ruled out, this is, I think, an optimal description, give or take the inessentially different alternative of having one common set of worlds, but assigning measure zero to different subsets of it.<sup>94</sup> However, in cases where no hard work is expended to rule out appeals to frequencies, ROP, i.e. reflection of expected frequency with all epistemic probability weight concentrated on one frequency assessment, is a real possibility. It involves no essential appeal to worlds other than the actual one, given an algebra of propositions. Indeed, such concentration is what inductive experience will lead to in de Finetti’s 1937 framework, and Jeffrey has aptly called this process ‘objectification’. The De Finetti framework of expected frequencies has a standard possible worlds model. But the interesting case for quantification is one where the relevant set of worlds has shrunk to a single one. Thus we leave intensional freedom for situations in which appeal to ROP and POP is blocked; which are situations that one has to work quite hard to set up. After this excursion into delicate matters of various kinds of intensionality, I return to the structure of determiner orderings.

Positive and negative non-numeral dets should leave a middle ground. The nearest we get to this is *a few*.<sup>95</sup> In the case of *a few* you would expect

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<sup>94</sup> F&K are, however, puzzled by what they (rightly) intuit to be an absence of a felt difference in the case of analogous conditionals (*‘If Chomsky speaks . . .’*). A pair of these differing only in antecedent will impose a uniform standard for how many people there have to be to be ‘*many*’. I think this can be accommodated by noting that, on the conditional probability view of conditionals, (asserting “*If A then C*” aims to impose a constraint  $P(C|A) = \gamma$  on the common belief context, where  $\gamma$  is high, for me:  $\gamma = 1$ , see Merin 2002b). Juxtaposition of a pair of conditionals creates a context in which there is a single underlying probability function  $P$  with respect to which conditioning antecedents are evaluated. There is no actual conditioning on the antecedent, which is the case in the non-conditional example, and which does give us two distinct underlying probability functions to juxtapose and thereby distinct measure spaces.

<sup>95</sup> See Merin (2005) for more argument on *a few*.

the distribution to be skewed to the left of that for *some*. The stochastic nature of this is vital. There could be situations where you would be within your rights to say that some people were there when exactly two were there, but you would need three or four to say ‘a few’. In view of such data, I proposed making *a few* relevantially neutral or unspecified.<sup>96</sup> So it would—*ceteris paribus*—present *A* as neither significantly positive nor significantly negative to *B*. It would be like *tepid* on Ducrot’s (1973) temperature scales. What is clear is that *a few* is incompatible with *no*. Yet it is assertable in exceptional circumstances when the *all*-statement would be true. Example: someone utters

(*W*) A few spoilsports complain.

when in fact all the spoilsports there exist complain, every one of them, but there simply exist just a few of them. The same holds on substituting *some* or *many*. Taking as given that all spoilsports complain, the reading in each case must be a portion reading. Verify also—phenomenologically—that in these cases relevance relations of the utterances (i.e. of sentence tokens indexed to a context of beliefs and preferences) cannot be endocentric. There will be no argument from being a spoilsport to being a complainant, for the simple reason that none is needed. By contrast, the portion might be news. Note finally that, even though the universal sentence *All spoilsports complain* may be true and believed true, it cannot be uttered directly alongside without engendering confusion:

(*W'*) {A few/some/many} spoilsports complain,  
 {??all of them (do)/every one of them}.

The difference between *some* and *a few* in terms of relevance emerges when we can rule out endocentric relevance to all intents and purposes. An utterance token

(*W''*) Some people complain

is pretty much of the form *Some*(*T*, *B*), since the only relevant universe *T* is one of people. (If you counted in robots and corporations, you would have to put emphatic stress on *people*.) This could be an argument towards *We must reduce noise levels*. By contrast,

(*W'''*) A few people complain

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<sup>96</sup> *A few*<sub>*r*</sub>(*A*, *B*) iff  $\mu(B|T) - r' \leq \mu(B|A) \leq \mu(B|T) + r$ .

might recommend tossing a coin whether or not to reduce noise. By contrast once more,

(W''''') Few people complain

is definitely against reducing noise. But again, although the probability distribution over possible proportions will have non-zero support almost everywhere, there will be differences in the relative amounts of support. The distribution might well reflect—by ROP, though perhaps imperfectly so—our experience of frequencies of actual uses.

## 10. Stochastic Partitions and ABROS: ‘Scales’

So far we have followed the tradition of specifying q-dets in terms of inequalities, though hints arose that this may be as problematic as it is in the special case of Horn’s concept of numeral. Here now is the alternative, and the role model for its base are the purest of quantity expressions, numerals.

The non-negative integer numerals partition the class of sets or count-type properties into equipollent sets corresponding to the natural numbers. Thus *five* means 5, and *a thousand* means 1000. If there is some fuzziness in practice, especially for high numbers, this will be dealt with pragmatically much like the hexagonality of France (see Merin 2003b on ‘exactly’).

The admissibility of suspender-clauses ‘if not more/fewer’ or, equivalently, disjuncts ‘or more/fewer’ is governed by whether or not the speaker adopts a maximizing perspective (appropriate e.g. for Claims of physical quantities) or a minimizing perspective (appropriate e.g. for Concessions of physical quantities). We saw examples from Ducrot in which ‘ten’ will take either slant, depending on rhetorical objective. The suspender will be ‘if not more’ when the party is being argued to be a success. It will be ‘if not less’ or ‘if that many’, when it is being argued to be a flop. The thesis to pursue, now, is an extension of that of Ducrot’s. Formality and detail apart, it differs doctrinally from his in not treating argumentative relations (e.g. assertions) as constituting a domain *sui generis*, but as special cases of more general social relations (e.g. claims).

Ducrot’s thesis has implicit antecedents also in Sapir (1944) to whom Horn (1972/76) traces back the concept of a ‘scale’, but whose distinctive insight he himself appears to have found no use for.

Sapir found that ‘grading’ expressions can be classified by two parameters: (a) position along a linear ordering of values of a variable, (b) motion along this ordering. Specifically, (a) engaged position at, before, and after

a point of reference; (b) motion towards and away from it, and immobility. The resulting taxonomy is nine-fold. By contrast, Horn's theory engages only the positional properties of grading expressions.<sup>97</sup> Given the venue in which Sapir's paper appeared, one might say: if (a) is a position function, (b) corresponds to the first derivative or impulse in the analogous physical representation of classical particle dynamics. It is Ducrot who attended to (b), but he did so in a way which differs significantly from Sapir's in that it reduces (b) to speaker's conventional rhetorical goals. Ducrot's thesis was that a significant subclass of lexical items had rhetorical direction built into them.

In our terms, one should expect a correlation of small (a) with arguments towards the minimization of a quantity variable. However, the opposite association is conceivable. This could be rationalized: the (a)-small quantity is presented as larger than might have been antecedently expected. Moreover, the direction of argument would lead us to expect that a concession, made by the addressee or opponent in argument, of a larger (a)-value should not be ruled out (i.e. in line with the demand-game). Hence,

(*J*) There was little joy to be had

would induce a pessimistic or unkind minimizing direction, whereas

(*J'*) There was a little joy to be had

would impose a hopeful or kindly generous maximizing direction.

Q-dets would not be specified, in terms of their act-independent semantic component, by inequality constraints. Rather, the inequalities would be superimposed on point-valued or fuzzy interval constraints within a semantics that is given by a pragmatics of social acts (Merin 1994a). Thus, simple (Gazdar 1979) use of *Many*, *Most* and *All* or *Every* would mark the utterance as an abstract Claim by default. So would *Some* and *A few* or mass *A little*, with the rider that these would preferentially be counterclaims to a denial. By contrast, *Few* would by default induce Concessions, while *No* would induce the special case of a zero Concession, a Denial.

The key principle that links quantifying determiners and the taxonomy of act-types is a naive maxim: Claim as much as possible, concede as little as necessary—*ceteris paribus* in each case. Label the parameter here involved

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<sup>97</sup> In this respect it is much closer to the simpler notion of scale found in Urmson (1950), on which Fogelin's (1967) theory of scalar implicature draws.

‘Preference’. The next important taxonomic parameter might be labelled ‘Dominance’. In the context of Claims and Concessions it engages the backing (by power, evidence, ...)—or the lack of it—for the pursuit of one’s preferences against political or more specifically argumentative opposition.

Suppose we make the parameters binary. Let us have one of speaker and addressee preference for a proposition  $H$  becoming a constraint on joint speaker addressee commitments. Let one of speaker and addressee ostensibly have the resources to make his or her preference prevail. Then there is already a fourfold taxonomy in principle. Add conventional allocation of initiative in a transaction, to one of the two, and there is an eightfold taxonomy.

Thus, a Claim for some  $H$  would instantiate all parameters to Speaker. Concession would instantiate them to Addressee. Denial would instantiate Dominance to Speaker, and the others to Addressee. Hence, act-types stand for parameter configurations. See Merin (1994a) for details and two further loci of binary parametric variation.

Endocentric relevance of  $A$  to  $B$  offers an ordering criterion in terms of direction that is quite independent of extraneous context. Here the proportion reading is all-important. But clearly, from an exocentric perspective, even proportion quantifiers take on a ‘portion’ type quality. For what  $All(A, B)$  says is that the largest conceivable portion of  $As$  is  $B$ . Recall that a proportion is a ‘residuation’ of portions. Given a fixed portion  $A$ , the residuation will yield a portion  $AB$ , or equivalently a portion of  $Bs$  in the universe restricted to  $A$ .<sup>98</sup>

Thus, if our evidential context is one in which  $A$  is already given, the strong quantifiers *will* deliver portions. For *all*, this will be the maximal portion attainable. For *most* it will be smaller, but still very large and not utterly excluding a welcome windfall of more.

‘Welcome’ is important. The preference structure of the act-pragmatics implies that a Claim for a ranked item  $x$  is met if and only if  $x$  or some  $y > x$  is conceded. This routine pragmatic transformation to “ $x$  or better, if there is better” generates a ‘cone’,  $\{y : y \geq x\}$ , diagnosed by admissibility of suspenders *if not indeed y* or by ‘less than  $x$ ’ readings under negation. It will include as alternatives items preferred by the utterer under his current evidential or imperatival preference ranking. Thus, we can dissociate

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<sup>98</sup> As J. Lambek noted in the 1950s, a fractional rational number and a material conditional of logic are alike in such respect.

meanings into components specified by fuzzy equalities (see below) and by inequalities induced by act type.

*Many* will yield less than *most*, but still a relatively large portion. The portion yielded by *some* will not be insignificant; the portion yielded by *a few* will be just enough to either counter a claim of zero or to dampen a hopeful claim of *some* or to dampen a claim of *many*. That for *few* cannot be said to yield fewer than *some*, but the direction of exocentric argument is firmly towards minimization of the variable and the ‘cone’ of possibilities which are not excluded does leave possible a windfall of minimal quantity.

Recourse to proportional  $Many_2(A, B)$  enabled Westerståhl to explain perceived asymmetries in assertability. A proportional reading  $Some_2(A, B)$  could do likewise, albeit for a fainter effect. For suppose our warranted assertability criterion for plain portion *some* was not merely Fregean ( $\mu(AB) = |AB| > 0$ ) or ‘Fregean+1’ for plural count nouns ( $|AB| > 1$ ). Suppose that ‘cardinal’ quantificational *some*, instead, signified a minimal *significant* or standard unit portion. There are indeed good Saussurean reasons for supposing so. Consider count-det *a few* and mass-det *a little*. These appear to denote smaller portions than *some*. The test is their comparative politeness in requests, and impoliteness in offers.

I take it that quantifiers such as *some*, *a few* and *many* on their extensional portion readings are given as random variables, i.e. by rough probability distributions over quantities. The rightward (increasing) tail of the *some*-distribution will extend farther than that of *a few*. More importantly, its ‘mode’—the portion-size point receiving highest probability mass or density, i.e. the most probable size—is to the right of the mode for *a few*. (Perhaps there exists experimental literature on this question.)

What is a standard or significant portion depends not only on external context—e.g. the perceived consequences of making a mistake—but also, least infrequently, on the size of what it is a portion of. But this is a familiar argument for  $Many_2$  that arises well before non-symmetry of its arguments,  $A$  and  $B$ , is being considered. For *some*, we should have by analogy

$$(33) \quad Some_2(A, B) \text{ iff } |AB| > g' \cdot |A| \quad (0 < g' < 1);$$

Thus,  $g'$  stands for an r.v. with a probability distribution whose mode and mean are greater than that of an r.v.,  $g$ , for *a few*, and smaller than that of an r.v.,  $g''$ , for *many*.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> *Several* seems below *many* both on its cardinal and relevance reading. It might well be ranked by portion size below *a few* (which does not require  $AB$  to be subitizable, as

*Some*( $A, B$ ) pronounced with normal stress will at the very least not intimate that  $A$  and  $B$  are negative to one another. It might even intimate positivity, though not in any significant sense *ceteris paribus*. Absence of pronounced *ceteris paribus* significance will distinguish its relevance properties from those of *many*. *Ceteris non paribus* this may change.

## 11. Endocentric Relevance Orderings of Quantifiers

Here we deal with proportion quantifiers (i.e. strong dets and proportion readings of weak dets) only. We have for the strong determiner *all*

$$(34) \quad \text{All}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) = 1.$$

Conditions on positive relevance by ROP or POP are very modest indeed.  $A$  will be positive to  $B$  whenever  $\mu(B|T) < 1$ , i.e. when  $\mu(B) < \mu(T)$ . In other words, whenever  $\text{All}(A, B)$  is assertable at all,  $A$  will be positive to  $B$  provided  $B$  is not a wholly uninformative predicate. Indeed,  $A$  will be *maximally positive* to  $B$ , in that no other property can exceed its positive relevance to  $B$ . At the other extreme, we have for the weak determiner *no*

$$(35) \quad \text{No}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) = 0$$

Here the utterly modest condition  $\mu(B|T) > 0$ , i.e.  $\mu(B) > 0$ , which implies for count measure that  $B$  is non-empty suffices for negative relevance. Indeed,  $A$  will be *maximally negative* to  $B$ , in that no other property can exceed its negative relevance to  $B$ .

Going back to positives, next in line of decreasing endocentric relevance will be the strong det *most*. Rather than go for the minimal ‘more-than-half’ definition, it seems reasonable to allow for a parametrized family of quantifiers  $\text{Most}_{.k}$  which are verified by proportions  $0.k > 0.5$ .

$$(36) \quad \text{Most}_{.k}(A, B) \text{ iff } \mu(B|A) = 0.k \quad (0.5 < 0.k \leq 1).$$

Here a necessary and sufficient condition for  $A$  being positive to  $B$  is that  $\mu(B|T) < 0.k$ .<sup>100</sup> Thus, on the minimal requirement for *most*,  $\mu(B|A) > 0.5$ ,

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I feel *several* does require), but is more positive in relevance. It seems to imply: ‘more than expected’, while *a few*, for all its positivity compared to *few*, might yet intimate: ‘fewer than expected’. Cp. again Jayez (2005) on *plusieurs*, which is a proper analysis of that difficult item. By contrast, my observations on *several* are sketchy at best. It should, however, become clearer in due course to what extent the two items are synonymous.

<sup>100</sup> Make adjustments for the case where  $0.k$  stands for the mode of a probability distribution over possible values and  $\mu(B|A) = 0.k$  is shorthand for a suitably skewed probability distribution over values of  $\mu(B|A)$  whose mode is at  $0.k$  and which assigns zero probability to all values up to  $0.5$ .

a sufficient (but, for this inequality constraint, not a necessary) condition for positive endocentric relevance under ROP or POP is that not more than half of everything is  $B$ , i.e.  $\mu(B|T) \leq 0.5$ . This is still a very modest condition for plausible universes  $T$  and for most useful predicates  $B$ . Since we specify any member of the family by means of an equality, *Most sharks are harmless* will in general be false or at any rate warrantably non-assertable if it so happens that all sharks are harmless. The simple inequality specification would rely on ‘scalar implicature’ to explain why *Most cats are cats* is not seriously assertable. However, there are reasons for proceeding otherwise.

The central idea is that our ordering or ‘scale’ is not based on a pair of positive and negative rankings by logical or set-inclusion (inclusion chains), but rather on *a single ordered partition or probabilistic fuzzy approximation to a partition*.<sup>101</sup> The partition defines quantitative lexical meanings.

In a second step, ‘up-cones’ and ‘down-cones’ will be generated in the act of assertion, conditioned lexically (cp. Ducrot 1973) or else contextually by actual purpose, most notably so for numerals. The principle, recall from Section 10, is that a short-term rational *homo oeconomicus* will not mind getting more (for free!) than demanded, nor having to give away less than conceded. Assertion introduces preferences which might not be prefigured as defaults in the lexicon.

In a third step, upperbounding implicature could undo some or all of the effects of assertoric, act-pragmatic ‘cone-formation’.<sup>102</sup>

The following two tables propose not only a ranking in terms of endocentric—i.e. least context-dependent—relevance relations, but also summarize context-relative or context-independent denotations and rough glosses. Where numerical parameters  $a, b$ , etc. arise, they stand indifferently for random variables  $X_a, X_b$  or their mode value.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> E.g. a series of unimodal probability distributions whose tails overlap considerably. See Merin (1999a, 2003b) on coordinating connectives.

<sup>102</sup> I have for long preferred to treat implicature in terms of a bargaining situation. Economists have done so for just as long in terms of signaling, restricted to assertoric claims. Either way, Horn’s and perhaps Grice’s doctrine based on logical strength—clearly anticipated by Tarski and Schröder—does not generally work (where it appears to work at all) without a substrate of partisan, extra-logical preference rankings, which is common to the bargaining and signaling approaches.

<sup>103</sup> Imagine the  $X_a, X_b, \dots$  as generating skewed bell-shape curves whose peaks are above  $a, b, \dots$  on the  $x$ -axis, height measuring probability of an  $x$ -value. Reminder: A random variable is a number-valued function such that there exists (in the finite case) a probability distribution  $P(v_i)$  over its range of values  $v_1, \dots, v_n$  such that there exists (in the finite case) of values  $v_1, \dots, v_n$  a probability distribution  $P(v_i)$  over its range of



The borderline between what are traditionally called ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ quantifiers corresponds to change of endocentric relevance sign.<sup>104</sup> The important thing to keep in mind is that the *positive dets* ceteris paribus induce an ostensible *quantity-maximizing preference structure* of the speaker’s; and the *negative dets* a dual, *minimizing preference structure*. It is the interaction of these preference structures with ordered fuzzy partitions that yields the inequality readings of intermediate dets which appear to be bounded only by one or the other extreme, and would imply entailments from the extremes towards the mid-point. But such entailments do not hold by general rule, as shown by the absence of any entailment from *all* or *no* to *a few*.

(37)	<i>All</i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(B A) = 1$ .	[ $A$ maxposrel $B$ ]
	<i>Most<sub>a</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(B A) = a$ ( $0.5 < a \leq 1$ ).	[ $A$ v.hiposrel $B$ ]
	<i>Many<sub>b</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(A B)/\mu(A \bar{B}) = b_r$ ( $b_r > 1 + r$ ) and $\mu(B A) = b$ ( $b > 0$ ).	[ $A$ sigposrel $B$ ]
	<i>Some<sub>c</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(B A) = c$ ( $c > 0$ ).	[ $A$ [pos/nonneg]rel $B$ ]
	<i>A few<sub>d</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(B T) + t \geq \mu(B A) = d_t \geq \mu(B T) - t'$ .	[ $A$ lowrel $B$ ]
	<i>Few<sub>e</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(A B)/\mu(A \bar{B}) = e_r$ ( $e_r < 1 - r'$ ) and $\mu(B A) = e$ ( $e < 1$ ).	[ $A$ negrel $B$ ]
	<i>No</i> ( $A, B$ )	iff $\mu(B A) = 0$ .	[ $A$ maxnegrel $B$ ]
	<i>All</i> ( $A, B$ )	[ $\mu(B A) = 1 \rightarrow A$ posrel $B$ iff $\mu(B) < \mu(T)$ ]	
	<i>Most<sub>a</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	[ $\mu(B A) > 0.5 \rightarrow A$ posrel $B$ if $\mu(B) \leq 0.5\mu(T)$ ] [ $\mu(B A) = 0.k \rightarrow A$ posrel $B$ iff $\mu(B) < 0.k\mu(T)$ for $k > 5$ ]	
	<i>Many<sub>b</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	$A$ sigposrel $B$	
	<i>Some<sub>c</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	[ $\mu(B A) = c$ ( $0 < c \leq 1$ ) $\rightarrow A$ posrel $B$ iff $\mu(B) \leq c \cdot \mu(T)$ ]	
	<i>A few<sub>d</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	[ $\mu(B A) = d$ ( $0 < d \leq 1$ ) $\rightarrow A$ lowrel $B$ iff $\mu(B) \approx d \cdot \mu(T)$ ]	
	<i>Few<sub>e</sub></i> ( $A, B$ )	$A$ hinegrel $B$	
	<i>No</i> ( $A, B$ )	[ $\mu(B A) = 0 \rightarrow A$ negrel $B$ iff $\mu(B) > 0$ ]	

values (i.e. each value  $v_i$  occurs with a probability  $P(v_i)$ , the probabilities summing to 1, i.e.  $\sum_i P(v_i) = 1$ ). For the continuous infinite case the distribution becomes a probability density, and so probability mass is assigned to areas under the curve traditionally representing it. The bell-shaped normal distribution has mean (average), mode (peak), and median,  $m$  (equalizing probabilities of values being  $v \leq m$  and being  $v \geq m$ ) coincide. As a stereotypical approximation, think of non-extreme dets generating a series of overlapping shifted bell-curves that attain zero ‘density’ at the extremes.

<sup>104</sup> Intuitions, even for the mythical zero context, no doubt integrate over all sorts of evidential uses, including exocentric uses. Here the exemplary analysis of the ‘party’ is a paradigm of how intuitions engaging endcentric and exocentric relevance articulate.

The paraphrases are approximate. It is, for example, a moot point whether to class the *ceteris paribus* endocentric relevance of *some* as highly as ‘significantly positive’ or as modestly as ‘non-negative’. What speaks against ‘significantly positive’ are *Some {or/if not indeed} {all/\*many/\*most} cats walk*. What speaks for it, is intuition integrating over contexts of use one dimly remembers. Similar uncertainties might affect the glosses attached to other dets. However, in any given context of proportional use, there is a clear ordering of proportions and also of relevances. The random variables  $X_a$ ,  $X_b$ , etc. for which the proportion or relevance, value constants  $a$ ,  $b$ , etc. are shorthand will have single-peaked probability distributions, the peaks (modes) being  $a$ ,  $b$ , etc. Peaks and centres of gravity of probability mass under the density curves will yield strict orderings by increasing proportion and *ceteris paribus* relevance:

$$(38) \quad no \prec few \prec a \text{ few} \prec some \prec many \prec most \prec all.$$

Proportion, like measure in the above sense, cannot be negative; but relevance can be, very much so. This need not imply a difference in ordering, but will imply a difference of intuitive zero point. For relevance the zero point given by sign change is around or just below *a few*. If you want to be very fancy, you can easily form the complex determiner *an insignificant number of*. A richer ordering would then, naturally, include the q-det *a number of* and the difficult item *several*, which might not be a q-det.<sup>105</sup>

## 12. Monotonicity Revisited: Complex VPs and NPs

The notion of monotonicity in the GQ literature is ‘boolean’, being specified in measure-free terms of entailment or set-inclusion. Let me propose an analytic labelling scheme.

Let ‘MON’ stand for ‘monotone’, ‘I’ for ‘increasing’ ‘D’ for ‘decreasing’, ‘L’ for ‘left’, ‘R’ for ‘right’, and ‘¬’ for ‘not’.

$Q(\cdot, \cdot)$  is right increasing (a.k.a. upward) monotone (RIMON) iff  $Q(A, X)$  entails  $Q(A, Y)$  for arbitrary  $X \subseteq Y$ .

$Q(\cdot, \cdot)$  is right decreasing (a.k.a. downward) monotone (RDMON) iff  $Q(A, Y)$  entails  $Q(A, X)$  for arbitrary  $X \subseteq Y$ .

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<sup>105</sup> For sizeable  $A$ , *Several(A, B)* will usually have fewer  $AB$  than *Some(A, B)* would, and might even have fewer than *A few(A, B)*. Yet it will rank above either in the relevance ordering, if only in virtue of demanding small  $A$ . By contrast, *A number of(A, B)*, which behaves much like it, has no such restriction; cp. *A number of Europeans have contracted bovine flu*.

Examples: *Most/Some cats walk* implies *Most/Some cats move*, respectively, so *Most* and *Some* are RIMON. By contrast, *Few/No cats move* implies *Few/No cats walk*, respectively, so *Few* and *No* are RDMON.

More generality is to be had when we move from type  $\langle 1 \rangle$  quantifiers i.e. noun phrases to type  $\langle 1, 1 \rangle$ , i.e. determiners. Now monotonicities may characterize each of two arguments, left and right. Properties LIMON, LDMON, are now specifiable, which pertain to the restrictor argument. Then the following entailment schemata define standard concepts:

$$\text{RIMON} : Q(A, B) \models Q(A, B \vee C);$$

$$\text{LIMON} : Q(A, B) \models Q(A \vee C, B);$$

$$\text{RDMON} : Q(A, B) \models Q(A, BD);$$

$$\text{LDMON} : Q(A, B) \models Q(AD, B).$$

Spell-out example: RIMON reads ‘right increasing monotone’ which means increasing monotone in the rightward ‘attribute/VP’ argument, here  $B$ . LIMON, RMON,  $\neg$ LIMON,  $\neg$ RMON, MON, and  $\neg$ MON will complete the concept inventory in familiar ways. Note that IMON, DMON, and  $\neg$ MON predicated of type  $\langle 1 \rangle$  quantifiers are synonymous with RIMON, RDMON, and  $\neg$ RMON predicated of type  $\langle 1, 1 \rangle$  quantifiers.

In a GQ framework, i.e. under ISOM, the well-known distributions of monotonicities and non-monotonicities follow from  $Q_w$ ,  $Q_s$  being specified by inequality constraints (‘ray-form’, ‘cone’ or ‘half-space’ constraints). If specifications in terms of measure reflect their set-theoretic correlates in applied natural language GQT, there will be no difference to monotonicity classes familiar from the literature. For example,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Most}(A, B) &\in \neg\text{LIMON} \cap \text{RIMON}, \\ \text{All}(A, B) &\in \text{LDMON} \cap \text{RIMON}, \text{ and} \\ \text{Many}_2 &\in \neg\text{MON} =_{df} \neg\text{LIMON} \cap \neg\text{RMON}. \end{aligned}$$

Now we turn to problems with the received account of monotonicity. Let  $X \approx Y$  designate one’s empirical disposition to judge that, if  $X$  holds,  $Y$  holds as well. Now consider *Most*, which on the received account is RIMON, i.e.  $\text{Most}(A, B) \models \text{Most}(A, B \vee C)$ . Indeed,  $\approx$  behaves much like  $\models$  in

- (39) a. Most Arcadians walk.  $\approx$   
 b. Most Arcadians move.

We assume plausibly that the relevant concept of moving is the boolean disjunction of walking ( $B$ ) and any other forms of locomotion ( $C$ ). An equivalent formulation of RIMON which follows the example's syntax more closely would indeed be

$$Q(A, B) \models Q(A, D) \text{ where } C \models D.$$

Trouble arises as soon as we represent  $\vee$  by 'or'.

- (40) a. Most Arcadians walk.       $?? \approx$   
 b. Most Arcadians walk or talk.

One explanation might be that talking is *not contiguous in conceptual space* to walking. So the disjunction will not correspond to a coarsening of a corresponding partition of the set of possible instances.<sup>106</sup> But this relationship can, in turn, be explicated in terms of relevance to typical activities and attendant decisions. For many such problems a partition into individuals that are moving and those that do not would be 'sufficient', i.e. carry all the information one needs (see Merin 1999b). A partition into walking and non-walking individuals would not bring a diagnostic and evidential improvement. By contrast, a partition into individuals that walk or talk and those who do neither will not be readily sufficient for many obvious such tasks.

This may indeed be the explanation for what goes on in the last example. Yet irrelevant explicit disjunction, as one might call it, let alone the magic of 'implicature' *apud* Grice, is not the only explanation for problems with RIMON judgments. There is also a more specific, related explanation. Try first a putative instance of a logically equivalent formulation of RIMON,  $Q(A, BC) \models Q(A, B)$ :

- (41) a. Most upper class Englishmen are gentleman farmers.       $? \approx$   
 b. Most upper class Englishmen are farmers.

In terms of endocentric relevance relations reflecting stereotypes we might say: being upper class English is very positive to being a gentleman farmer,

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<sup>106</sup> See Gärdenfors (2000) who develops an idea of Carnap (1980). Carnap had focussed on the colour space, for which a naturalistic theory can readily be given, predicated on the psychophysics of the human visual system. This is also the most strongly defined part of Gärdenfors' more general account which makes use of more recently discovered mathematical theorems. The present suggestion would appeal to the gross statistical structure of relevances emerging from general, everyday human activities.

but not so—indeed negative—to being a farmer. The converse evidential relevance relation, clearly strongly positive for gentleman farming, but not at all strong for farming, perhaps even negative once upon a time, seems to be important in our judgment. Both relations will feed into presumable exocentric relevance relations. For

- (42) a. Most Arcadians are very friendly.       $\not\approx$   
       b. Most Arcadians are very friendly or very unfriendly.  
       c. Most Mercadorians are philanthropists.       $\not\approx$   
       d. Most Mercadorians are philanthropists or criminals.

You will surely have to denature all your intuitions to let the putative inference from (42a) to (42b) go through. The parallel pair (42c, 42d) will no doubt leave open a sizeable intersection of criminal and philanthropist constituencies, populated by Robin Hood types, local gangster chieftains to whom governmental functions have been outsourced by default, and robber barons grown respectable. And still it jars.

The same troubles arise even when *most* is replaced by *many* or by *some*. On their received semantics for portion and proportion readings, these determiners will be boolean RIMON, too. Hence, the inferences should go through—but intuitively they do not.

The problematic inferences are problematic because they fail to be relevance-preserving in all likely contexts of use. As in the tables above, let ‘ $X$  posrel  $Y$ ’ stand for  $X$  is positive to  $Y$ , and let ‘ $X$  negrel  $Y$ ’ and ‘ $X$  irrel  $Y$ ’ stand for the corresponding analogues.

**Fact:**  $A$  posrel  $B \not\approx A$  posrel  $B \vee C$ .

Indeed, any of ‘ $A$  posrel  $B \vee C$ ’, ‘ $A$  irrel  $B \vee C$ ’, or ‘ $A$  negrel  $B \vee C$ ’ might hold. In fact, ‘ $A$  posrel  $B$ ’, ‘ $A$  posrel  $C$ ’ and ‘ $A$  negrel  $B \vee C$ ’ may simultaneously hold. In (41),  $B \subset C$ , and hence  $B \vee C = C$ . Being upper class is very positive to being a gentleman farmer, but not at all positive to being a common garden variety farmer, i.e. someone in  $\overline{BC}$ . (42a,b) and (42c,d) each make vivid the most relevant stronger

**Theorem** (Merin 1997): In case  $P(BC) = 0$ , hence in particular when  $BC = \emptyset$ ,  $\text{rel}_B(A) \leq \text{rel}_{B \vee C}(A) \leq \text{rel}_C(A)$  or else  $\text{rel}_B(A) \geq \text{rel}_{B \vee C}(A) \geq \text{rel}_C(A)$ .

In the special case where  $\text{rel}_B(A) = \text{rel}_C(A)$ , this entails  $\text{rel}_B(A) = \text{rel}_{B \vee C}(A)$ . Except in this degenerate case, the inequalities will be strict, in which case  $P(BC) = 0$  implies the following:

A posrel  $B$  and  $A$  negrel  $C$ , then  $\text{rel}_B(A) > \text{rel}_{B \vee C}(A)$ .

Boolean RIMON fails to make the correct predictions, then; and where it does appear to predict correctly we find typical coarsenings to elements  $B \vee C$  of ‘sufficient partitions’ (cf. Merin 1999b) i.e. right *relevance monotonicity*.<sup>107</sup> But if this is so, and if indeed those instances of the schema that do follow the predictions of RIMON are few and far between, it would be unwise to treat as a mere auxiliary that part of the theory which predicts most of our data.

Next we appeal to relevance to solve a puzzle about complex NPs, specifically complex determiner phrases (DPs), which is well known to students of natural language quantifiers.<sup>108</sup> The puzzle is illustrated by a set of robust acceptability judgments:

- (43) Most men {but/\*and} no women were invited.
- (44) Most men {\*but/and} some women were invited.
- (45) Few men {\*but/and} no women were invited.
- (46) Few men {but/\*and} some women were invited.

B&C observe a generalization: Conjunctions of natural language type  $\langle 1 \rangle$  quantifiers (i.e. of NPs) must be *and*-conjoined when of equal, and *but*-conjoined when of unequal boolean monotonicity.

This is not yet an explanation. There is no account of why exactly a coordinate NP composed of DPs requires *and* for composition when the Dets of the two DPs have like RMON properties and why it requires *but* when they are in different RMON classes. To be sure, the conjunction of DPs of distinct RMON types does not yield a monotone quantifier. This is a claim about truth conditions. But note in the same breath that the standard

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<sup>107</sup> Letting  $H$  stand for the issue proposition, the criterial case is therefore one where  $\text{rel}_{B \vee C}(H) = \text{rel}_B(H)$ . This will be the case iff  $\text{rel}_C(H) = \text{rel}_B(H)$ . And this means that it makes no difference which sub-cell,  $B$  or  $C$ , of the cell  $B \cup C$  (for which  $B \vee C$  is an alias) characterizes the world deemed actual.

<sup>108</sup> Barwise and Cooper (1981: 194–196). It remained, apparently, unsolved, perhaps even unrecognized as unsolved until 2001, when the following explanation was first presented.

theory of coordination represents both connectives, *and* and *but*, truth-conditionally as boolean meet (conjunction, set-intersection). The truth-conditional semantics of the two coordinate NPs will be identical. Hence it is not clear how the semantic property feature of  $\pm$ -equimonotonicity will imply a choice between the two connectives.

There is, as so often, an incidence of syntactization. (I think it is explicable by typical discourse properties being frozen into constraints on collocations.) Thus, B&C will allow that *Most men were invited and no women were invited* is fairly acceptable. Even better would be *Most men were invited and, in the event, no women were invited*. I offer an explanation below, together with that of an apparent counterexample. In Merin (1994b, 1996, 1999a) there is found a theory of the two connectives in terms of relevance relations. A partial statement of a DTS for *but* given there, still sufficiently strong for an explanation, is

Let  $A, B$  denote propositions. Then  $A$  *but*  $B$  is felicitous in a context  $i$  with ostensible belief function  $P^i$  only if there is an anaphorically given or accommodable proposition  $H$  such that for any numerical relevance function  $r^i$  mapping irrelevance to zero,  $\text{sgn}[r_H^i(A)] = -\text{sgn}[r_H^i(B)] \neq 0$ . I.e.,  $A$  and  $B$  have inverse relevance polarity with respect to  $H$ .<sup>109</sup>

An important special case of this will be  $H = \bar{B}$ . This is a case of endocentric relevance with regard to the sentence schema  $A$  *but*  $B$ . Now consider (43). There may be any number of  $H$  to which (43) is relevant overall. Similarly, those parts of it which are obtained by inverting what used to be known as ‘conjunction reduction’ may each be relevant to it. – We start with a non-starter. Look for an  $H$  such that (43a) *Most men were invited* is positive to it and (43b) *No women were invited* is negative to it. So  $H$  might be

(47) The party was as a party should be.

Without further specification of how exactly a party has to be to qualify for being ‘as a party should be’, (47) will be of little use. For one, (47) would not explain

(K) Most cool cats but  $\{\ast\emptyset/\text{also}\}$  all uncool cats were invited.

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<sup>109</sup> A referee wondered about clausal asymmetry. The fuller statement for prototypical uses of  $A$  *but*  $B$  will account for this with the further clause  $\text{sgn}[r_H^i(AB)] = \text{sgn}[r_H^i(B)]$ . This explains the difference between *It’s pretty, but expensive* and *It’s expensive, but pretty*, inter alia with regard to continuability by *So let’s buy it*. See Merin (1996, 1999a).

The particle *also* is crucial here and not to be neglected (see Merin 1999a). Thus, we should turn to endocentric relevance relations. These require no appeal to extraneous propositions  $H$ . Reflective intuition will note that (43) presents being a man as positive to being invited, and being a woman as negative to being invited. In other words, pick an individual at random, an arbitrary individual, and call it  $x$ . Then (43a) presents evidence or argues that  $Man(x)$  was positive for  $Invitee(x)$ , while (43b) presents evidence or argues that  $Woman(x)$  was negative for  $Invitee(x)$ .

If quantity is what interests us, then the total number of invitees or indeed their proportion in the universe  $T$  of individual will be of interest. So one candidate proposition  $H$  might be

(48) A very large number of people were invited.

The corresponding pair  $\{H, \bar{H}\}$ , of propositions is also perfectly good as an intermediate propositional variable  $\pm H$ . It links (43a) and (43b) to (48) and gives it just the right interpretive twist: Small may be beautiful, but bigger is better.

With (48) as our  $H$ , we have lifted the endocentric relevance relations specified in terms of first-order properties to the level of propositions and of a formally exocentric relevance relation. This is because (43a) is positive to (48) precisely to the extent that  $Man(x)$  is positive for  $Invitee(x)$ , both propositions suitably past-tensed. Analogous things hold for (43b). Indeed (48) can be paraphrased thus: For any  $x$ , the probability of  $x$  having been invited was very high.

The party referred to in (47) would most likely have been presented as a dud. In inviting so few women, the hosts might have discriminated against women, or against men, or whoever. But this kind of reasoning plays no role in explaining (43). Indeed, it should not play a role in explaining constraints which are pretty much syntacticized.<sup>110</sup> Sheer quantity and proportion, by contrast, seem general and simpleminded enough to qualify as a principal part of an explanation. Via (48) considered as an intermediate variable, they could even link up with (47). Both quantity and proportion also underlie the process of simple ‘enumerative induction’. This mode of inference is roughly characterized by the following pair of rules, often conflated into one:

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<sup>110</sup> Just look at how many reasons there might be for this party having been a dud. The two we have just given also require some fancy reasoning to fit the general necessary condition on *but*. Some intermediate variables are required.



*Enumerative Induction:* (1) The higher the proportion of positive as distinct from negative instances of a property  $R$  that you have observed, the more highly you expect the next instance to be positive too. (2) The larger the sample you have considered, the more resilient to counterinstances your expectation will be.<sup>111</sup>

Enumerative induction is one of the fallible mainstays of science, of learning, and of impression-formation.<sup>112</sup> As Bertrand Russell made plain: the chicken that is fed by the familiar hand day after day has a good reason to expect to be fed the next day, though none to anticipate the day when that same hand will wring its neck. A key scientific goal of enumerative induction is support of a universal law. However, both in everyday life and in much of science, support for non-vacuous universal laws ( $\forall x[Ax \rightarrow Bx]$ ,  $\forall(A, B)$ , ...) is not always feasible, nor necessary. Thus, our above example scenarios will not in general have *Everybody was invited*, with a fairly literal reading, in place of (47). Otherwise, only sentences such as *Every woman {and/but} DET N VP* would stand a chance of having a non-redundant instance for *DET N*. Yet we have been dealing all along with a larger range of examples. Indeed (48) will engage all of them in support relations and is sufficient thus for most everyday occasions as an issue proposition. It is 'sufficient' (cf. Merin 1999b) for the pragmatic decision problem that is being transacted by means of discourse.

A referee for Merin (2005), with a keen sense of discrimination, challenged *à propos* (43) with the goodness of *Most men and—obviously—no women were invited*. My explanation would be twofold (possibly threefold; see the next footnote). (I) The syntactic unit is broken up by the parenthetical; and hence the possible incidence of non-stereotypic use conditions is being indicated. (II) The parenthetical adverb, *obviously*, indicates as already presupposed a specific, known fact which pre-empts the action of blind enumerative induction based on quantity. Enumerative induction is the default, and it is being overridden. But it is not simply being overridden casually, and so the notion of default at issue here must be specified more finely. If we

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<sup>111</sup> **Thesis:** Absolute quantity intimations for dets of all kinds (special case: readings) that are non-numerals reflect minimum sample size requirements for reliable induction by ROP. — Recall that, given an estimate of proportion and an estimate of denominator portion  $A$ , you have an estimate for  $AB$ . This might rationalize, just a little, Milsark's idea that 'weak' interpretations of dets are derivative of 'strong' interpretations.

<sup>112</sup> Its first part also underlies the explanation of a language universal concerning *but* and its translation equivalents. See Merin (1995, 1996, 1999a).

associate properties of minimal syntactic units with stereotypical defaults of usage, these will be frozen into the syntax. They will thus have a tendency to overgeneralize. Since inference by enumerative induction is the shining example of an epistemic default strategy *faute de mieux*, its syntactization should be expected. When syntactic units are broken up, local contextual evidential and preferential conditions can throw in their evidential weight, and tight acceptability constraints loosen up. This is, I think, what happens in the example.<sup>113</sup>

Finally, consider the case  $H = \bar{B}$  in our partial semantics for *A but B*. Induction with regard to the reference class (or universe  $T$ ) of people would make (43a) negatively relevant to (43b). So here we have polarity-consonance of endocentric relevance within each of a pair of de-reduced conjunct propositions. Relevance of these two propositions to one another which is endocentric to the coordinate construction shares that polarity.

The same would hold for the corresponding de-reduced conjuncts of (46). By contrast, the de-reduced conjunct sentences of (44) and (45) would surely be related by non-negative relevance.<sup>114</sup> In Merin (1985, 1994a) I have looked at quantifiers and connectives in terms of a ‘maximizer’s’ perspective and a ‘minimizer’s’ perspective, fully in line with what can be extracted from the work of Ducrot (1972) on French *peu* and *un peu*. It seems to me that this, really, is at the root of monotonicity intuitions. Our above counterexamples to the predictions of boolean monotonicity bear out the primacy of these pragmatic concepts.

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<sup>113</sup> There might yet be a further constraint at work; label the associated explanation component (III). On reading the example sentence, one’s sociological sense of decency militates for giving it a sarcastic or ironic reading. It is actually quite hard to read it out of the blue without having the strong impression that the speaker is either a rabid misogynist or else, and rather more likely, someone imitating such a character to highlight discriminatory misogynist presuppositions. These presuppositions can be brought into the form of implicational relations that amount to a meaning postulate in the ‘conceptual role’ semantics of the misogynist speaker or of the misogynist community whose activities are being reported. The constraint says that maximizing the proportion and thus absolute quantity of men to be invited serves the same preferential ends as minimizing the proportion and thence quantity of women to be invited. This may indeed be the presupposition whose presence is indicated by ‘obviously’.

<sup>114</sup> The relationship is therefore like that which characterizes Reichenbach’s (1954) Common Cause Theorem:  $A$  and  $B$  are positive to one another if they have like non-zero relevance sign with regard to some  $H$  that may, for instance, be a common reason for them, and are negative to one another if they have different non-zero sign to it. A sufficient condition is that conditional on each of  $\pm H$ ,  $A$  and  $B$  are probabilistically independent, i.e. are irrelevant to one another.

### 13. Conclusion and Outlook

Our aim has been to associate, rather than dissociate, the ‘extensional’ and ‘intensional’ aspects of quantification. In brief: there is a progression from portion, to proportion, to relevance, i.e. to difference or indeed proportion of proportions. But there is also a way back, call it ‘generalized objectification’, and it induces proportion readings where relevance relations are endocentric.

Relevance as explicated in the probability calculus presupposes proportion. In the light of this measure-theoretic observation, the diagnostic instrument of ‘there-insertion’ sentences (or, as one might alternatively call them, ‘there-be’ sentences) was subjected to further scrutiny. The point was to proceed within a theory which makes a claim to that appellation in solving a number of puzzles which appear less elusive to the touch than the distinction of ‘definite’ and ‘indefinite’ so often does.

These puzzles attend the semantic field of the main non-numeral determiners that one finds in daily use. We proposed a denotational semantics in probability spaces which, in their turn, represent socio-mental state spaces. In doing so we had to rely for our semantic structure on relations between the elements of the semantic fields which have less of an apparent claim to being based on features of an extramental or extrasocial world than would the first-order definable distillates which have a counterpart in our most elementary of working mereologies, that of boolean algebras and their lattice-theoretic generalizations.

In proceeding as we did, we had little choice but to adopt, in effect, a structuralist approach to meaning in the vein of Saussure, John Lyons, and, indeed, Oswald Ducrot. I think this is what an informatively specified, context-dependent semantics inevitably requires.

Quantifiers are concepts of a rather abstract kind. Much if not all of their meaning is given in terms of their conceptual role, explicated in terms of constraints on beliefs and their dynamics. As in the stage world of comedy and drama, abstract roles in the theatre of mind that supervene on physical experience are, in the first place, defined by their relations to one another.<sup>115</sup>

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