

Literal and enriched meaning of sentences with weak definites and bare singulars

Ana Aguilar Guevara

This paper studies literal and enriched meanings of sentences with weak definites and bare singulars in complementary distribution. It discusses, among other things, whether or not they display reinforceability, defeasibility, at-issueness and projectivity, which are properties usually used in the literature to characterize different types of inferences. The main conclusions are that literal meanings are regular entailments and that the best way to analyze enriched meanings is as a combination of entailed and conversationally implicated content. This treatment can explain their mixed behavior and, furthermore, is compatible with Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts's (2011, 2013) analysis of weak definites and its possible extension to bare singulars.

Keywords: literal meaning, enriched meaning, weak definites, bare singulars

1.1 Introduction

Some languages, like English, have two types of nominal constructions in complementary distribution, namely, weak definites and bare singulars, as the examples in (1) and (2) respectively illustrate. Sentences with these nominals convey two kinds of content: the *literal meaning* (LM), which is evidently derived from the combination of the meaning of the sentence's constituents, and the *enriched meaning* (EM), which in principle cannot be directly attributed to any constituent:

- (1) Marta called the doctor
LM = Marta called a doctor.
EM = Marta called to ask for medical assistance.
- (2) Lu is in jail.
LM = Lu is in a jail.
EM = Lu is to serve a sentence.

At first glance, it seems that, whereas LMs reflect truth-conditional content, EMs do not do so. The fact that, for instance, nothing in (1) explicitly commits to asking for medical assistance rather suggests that these inferences are some sort of secondary content, such as conversational implicatures. On the other hand, Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts's (2011, 2013) semantic analysis of weak definites, which could be easily extended to bare singulars, predicts that EMs are at least partly truth-conditional.

In order to corroborate that LMs should be considered truth-conditional content, and to determine the best way to analyze EMs, the present paper examines in more detail the semantic and pragmatic behavior of both types of content. To do so, it discusses, among other things, whether or not LMs and EMs display a number of properties used in the literature to characterize different types of inferences. The main conclusions of this inquiry is that LMs are, in fact, regular entailments and that the best way to treat EMs is as a combination of entailed and conversationally implicated content.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes weak definites and bare singulars. Then, Section 1.3 presents Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts's (2011,2013) analysis of weak definites and its possible extension to bare singulars. Section 1.4 analyzes the semantic and pragmatic nature of LMs and EMs. Finally, Section 1.5 provides conclusions.

1.2 Weak definites and bare singulars

In this section, weak definites and bare singulars are characterized. The description starts with weak definites, then it continues with bare singulars, and then it ends remarking a relevant difference between them.

1.2.1 Weak definites

This type of nominals is illustrated as follows:

- (3) a. Elena took her daughter to **the zoo**.
- b. Today I listened to **the radio**.
- c. I'm on **the phone**!
- d. My daughter just went to **the dentist**.

As from Carlson and Sussman (2005) first systematic description of these nominals, they are identified as *weak definites* because they represent a challenge for the uniqueness approach to definiteness: they can be felicitously used in contexts in which individuals satisfying the descriptive content of the definites are not uniquely identifiable:

- (4) *Context*. Lola traveled by train from Amsterdam to Nijmegen, but she actually made a transfer halfway.
Sentence. Lola took the train from Amsterdam to Nijmegen.

The difference between regular and weak definites regarding (non-)unique reference is reflected in sentences containing elided verb phrases (*VP-ellipsis*). For example, in sentence (5a), which contains the regular definite *the secretary* in the overt VP, the elided verb phrase is referentially linked to the overt one so that the elided definite must refer to the same entity that the overt definites refer to. In other words, the secretary in question must be the same one involved in the two events that the sentence describes. In contrast, in the weak definite sentences in (5b), the definites can receive a “sloppy” interpretation, that is, the definite of each verb phrase can have a different value. From now on, the sequence “(#weak)” next to sentences will be used as an indication that the definite in them does not have a weak reading, i.e. that definite only has a regular, specific reading. For the sake of space this will not be proven every time, but the reader is invited to verify that by himself with the VP-ellipsis test:

- (5) a. Mateo called the secretary and Sabina did too. (#weak)
(Mateo and Sabina must have called the same secretary)
b. Mateo called the doctor and Sabina did too.
(Mateo and Sabina could have called different doctors)

In addition to non-unique reference, weak definites display a number of other special properties (see Carlson and Sussman, 2005 and Aguilar-Guevara, 2014 for a detailed explanation of each of them). For example, they show ‘narrow-scope’ (covarying) interpretations when they interact with quantified expressions:

- (6) Every boxer was sent to the hospital.
(Each boxer could have been sent to a different hospital)

Weak definites also present lexical restrictions: not every noun can occur in a weak definite configuration (7) and not every verb or verb-preposition combination can govern a weak definite (8):

- (7) a. Martha listened to the radio.
b. Martha listened to the walkie-talkie. (#weak)
(8) a. Martha listened to the radio.
b. Martha fixed the radio. (#weak)

Also, weak definites only accept modification yielding subtypes of individuals:

- (9) a. Lola went to the old hospital. (#weak)
b. Lola went to the psychiatric hospital.

Weak definites typically only occur in object position of episodic sentences and are unacceptable in subject position:

- (10) a. I read the newspaper today.
b. This morning the newspaper arrived wet. (#weak)

Interestingly, definites headed by the same nouns occurring in weak definites can occur as subjects of generic sentences:

- (11) a. The newspaper is an excellent source of information and entertainment.
b. Is the doctor always right?

In general, weak definites are not good antecedents of anaphoric expressions:¹

- (12) Lola listened to the radio_i until she fell asleep. ? She turned it_i off when she woke up in the middle of the night.

Finally, as it will be discussed in detail in Section 1.4, sentences with weak definites display both literal and enriched meanings:

- (13) Eva read the newspaper
LM = Eva read a newspaper.
EM = Eva was to get informed about the latest news.

As from Carlson and Sussman's (2005) work, the syntax and semantics of weak definites have received significant attention (e.g. Aguilar-Guevara and Schulpen, 2014; Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts, 2013; Aguilar-Guevara, 2014; Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts, 2011; Beyssade, 2014; Carlson, Klein, Gegg-Harrison, and Tanenhaus, 2014; Carlson, Sussman, Klein, and Tanenhaus, 2006; Corblin, 2014; Donazzan, 2014; Klein, 2011; Klein, Gegg-Harrison, Carlson, and Tanenhaus, 2009; Klein, Gegg-Harrison, Carlson, and Tanenhaus, 2013; Pires de Oliveira, 2013; Schwarz, 2014; Zwarts, 2014).

1.2.2 Bare singulars

Weak definites occur in different Indo-European languages besides English, such as Spanish, Portuguese, Catalan, French, Dutch, German, and Greek. Interestingly, in some of these languages, including English, there is a type of bare singular count noun which is functionally analogous to weak definites. The construction is illustrated as follows:

- (14) a. The ship is at **sea/port**.
b. He's in **prison/church**.

¹See footnote 2.

- c. Laura was sent to **bed/jail**.
- d. I watched **television** the whole day.

These bare singulars are in cross-linguistic complementary distribution with weak definites, which means that what is expressed by means of a weak definite in a dialect or language can be expressed by means of a bare singular in another one:

- (15) a. Laura fue al hospital. (Spanish)
'Laura went to-the hospital'
- b. Laura went to the hospital. (American English)
- c. Laura went to hospital. (British English)
- (16) a. Berit tocó el piano toda la noche. (Spanish)
'Berit played the piano all night'
- b. Berit speelde de hele nacht piano. (Dutch)
- c. Berit spielte die ganze Nacht Klavier. (German)

This type of bare singulars shows properties similar to those of weak definites. They display non-unique reference (17) and, therefore, sloppy identity in VP-ellipsis sentences (18). Also, they show 'narrow-scope' interpretations in quantified sentences (19). Likewise, not every noun can occur bare (20), not every predicate can govern a bare singular (21) and modification usually makes bare singulars unacceptable (22a), with exception of some modifiers yielding subclasses of individuals (22b). Bare singulars in subject position of episodic sentences are typically not acceptable (23). As subjects of generic sentences, they are also restricted but some of them possible (24). Bare singulars are not good antecedents for anaphoric expressions (25). Finally, as it will be discussed in detail in Section 1.4, sentences with bare singulars also display both LMs and EMs (26).

- (17) *Context*. Alice has been imprisoned a number of times, all of them in different prisons.
Sentence. Alice has been in jail most of her adult life.
- (18) Alice went to jail and Lola did too.
(Alice and Lola could have gone to different jails)
- (19) Every woman is in jail.
(Each woman could be in a different jail)
- (20) *Alice has been in cage most of her adult life.
- (21) *Alice has been behind jail most of her adult life.
- (22) a. *Alice is in old jail.

- b. Alice is in military jail.
- (23) * Jail was full last year.
- (24) Jail is not a nice place to be for a young woman.
- (25) # Alice is in jail_i but she thinks that it_i will be demolished soon.²
- (26) Alice is in bed
 LM = Alice is in a bed.
 EM = Alice is sick.

The syntax and semantics of these bare singulars and their alternation with weak definites have been studied by some authors (e.g. Baldwin et al., 2006; de Swart, 2013; Kuguel and Oggiani, 2016; Le Bruyn, de Swart, and Zwarts, 2011; Lucas, 2011; Oggiani, 2013; Stvan, 1998; Stvan, 2007; Stvan, 2009; Williams, 2018; Zwarts, 2014).

1.2.3 A relevant difference between weak definites and bare singulars

Weak definites, unlike bare singulars, can always be reinterpreted as specific definites when something in the context blocks the possibility of the definite to be interpreted weakly. The examples in (27) illustrate this by means of the sloppy reading of the definite *the supermarket* as opposed to the strict reading of *the old supermarket*. Crucially, blocking weak readings forces a regular, specific interpretation of the definites, but enables the sentences embedding the definites to remain grammatical:

- (27) a. Lola went to the supermarket and Marco did too.
 ‘Lola and Marco could have gone to different supermarkets’
 b. Lola went to the old supermarket and Marco did too. (#weak)
 ‘Lola and Marco must have gone to the same supermarket’

In contrast to weak definites, bare singulars are not ambiguous between a weak reading and another one. Therefore, sentences embedding bare singulars turn ungrammatical when they include an element blocking the weak reading, like an individual-level adjective:

- (28) a. Lola went to jail.
 b. *Lola went to old jail.

²Admittedly, the unacceptability of (25) seems to be clearer than the one of (12). I attribute this to the fact that, as it will be discussed in subsection 1.2.3, weak definites, unlike bare singulars, can always be reinterpreted as specific definites when something in the context blocks the possibility of the definite to be interpreted weakly, in this case, the subsequent presence of a coreferring pronoun. This intuition requires former confirmation, and given the fact the effect is subtle, it would probably have to be experimental. I refer the reader to some related studies reported in Cooley (2013) and Scholten and Aguilar-Guevara (2010).

This difference between weak definites and bare singulars will show relevance in Section 1.4, where the meanings of the sentences in which they occur are studied.

1.3 A kind-reference account of weak definites and its possible extension to bare singulars

This section provides a brief summary of Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts's (2011, 2013) semantic theory of weak definites of how it accounts for their properties. After that, it discusses an alternative to extend this account to bare singulars. For a more detailed explanation about these two matters, the reader should consult the original papers and Aguilar-Guevara (2014).

1.3.1 Summary of the proposal

The authors propose that weak definites refer to atomic kinds, as the following example shows:

$$(29) \quad [[\textit{the newspaper}]] = \iota x_k [\textit{Newspaper}(x_k)] \\ = \mathbf{N}$$

These kinds combine with object-level predicates by means of the following lexical rule.

$$(30) \quad \textit{Kind Lifting Rule}$$

If V is a transitive verb (or verb-preposition combination) with an internal argument Arg and V has the meaning $\lambda x_i \lambda e [V(e) \wedge Arg(e) = x_i]$, then V also has the meaning $\lambda x_k \lambda e [V(e) \wedge R(Arg(e), x_k) \wedge U(e, x_k)]$.

As it can be seen, the KLR has a triple function. First, it lifts object-level predicates to kind-level predicates. Second, it indicates that the kinds combining with lifted predicates are instantiated via the realization relation R . Third (and crucial for the argumentation of this paper) it incorporates the relation U into the denotation of the lifted predicates, which indicates that the described events are part of the stereotypical usages (SUs) of the kinds, that is to say, of the most typical circumstances under which objects exemplifying the kinds are used.

Thus, for example, if V is *to read* and it has the meaning in (31a), then it also has the meaning in (31b):

$$(31) \quad \text{a. } [[\textit{read}]] = \lambda x_i \lambda e [\textit{Read}(e) \wedge Arg(e) = x_i] \\ \text{b. } [[\textit{read}]] = \lambda x_k \lambda e [\textit{Read}(e) \wedge R(\textit{Th}(e), x_k) \wedge U(e, x_k)]$$

The KLR constitutes a mechanism of generation of predicates which in principle can apply to any verb yielding a function that can take any atomic kind. However, the rule only operates if two circumstances co-occur. The first one is that the predicate in question combines with a kind associated with SUs, as it happens with the newspaper kind. The second condition is that the sets of events corresponding to those SUs and the sets of events corresponding to the predicate intersect, as it happens in *reading the newspaper*, but not in *burning the newspaper*, where the definite does not have a weak reading. This double requirement is captured by the following condition:

- (32) *Condition of applicability of the KLR*
 A verb (or verb-preposition combination) V with the meaning $\lambda x_i \lambda e [V(e) \wedge Arg(e) = x_i]$ can also get the meaning $\lambda x_k \lambda e [V(e) \wedge R(Arg(e), x_k) \wedge U(e, x_k)]$ and then combine with a DP referring to an atomic kind \mathbf{K} iff $\lambda e V(e) \cap \lambda e U(e, \mathbf{K}) \neq \emptyset$.

According to the present proposal, a weak definite sentence like (33a) has the logical form in (33b):

- (33) a. Alice read the newspaper.
 b. $\exists e [Read(e) \wedge Ag(e) = alice \wedge R(Th(e), \mathbf{N}) \wedge U(e, \mathbf{N})]$

(33b) states that the sentence is true if and only if there was an event of reading, and the agent of that event is Lola, the theme of that event instantiates the newspaper kind, and the event is part of the SUs of the newspaper kind.

1.3.2 Properties accounted for by the proposal

The analysis summarized above accounts for the properties of weak definites listed before, as the following summary shows. First of all, the assumption that these nominals are both ordinary definites, but referring to kinds, explains the lack of the uniqueness presupposition at the level of ordinary individuals, despite the presence of the definite article. Given that uniqueness applies at the level of kinds and given that, as it is explained in the original papers, instantiations of kinds can be entities or sums, sentences with weak definites are felicitous in contexts where more than one entity satisfies their descriptive content (4). The kind-referring nature of weak definites also explains the resemblance between weak and generic definites (11), assuming that this last type of definites denote kinds. Also, this kind-referring nature explains why only modifiers yielding subtypes of individuals are compatible with weak readings (9). The logical form attributed to sentences with weak definites, which does not involve existential quantification over individuals, is consistent with the incapacity of weak definites and bare singulars to establish discourse referents (12). In this type of logical form, the thematic role is instantiated for each event (by

an individual that can be identical or different for each event) and that explains why there is sloppy identity in sentences with VP-ellipsis (5). Narrow scope is due to the same reason, because the event quantifier has narrow scope with respect to scope bearing operators (6). The fact that weak readings of definites are due to the application of the KLR accounts for the fact that weak definites typically occur as objects and not as subjects (10) because this rule affects internal arguments which typically correspond to objects and not to subjects. The presence of the *U* predicate that the KLR incorporates into the lifted predicates, which relates SUs to kinds, accounts for the lexical restrictions of weak definites: only certain nouns that support stereotypical usage patterns trigger weak readings (7); only verbs and verb-preposition combinations associated with these patterns support weak readings (8). Finally, the presence of this *U* predicate also accounts for the enriched meaning of the sentences (13) and, crucially for the purposes of the rest of this paper, it predicts that this content is truth-conditional, as it will be explained in Section 1.4.

1.3.3 Extension of the proposal to bare singulars

The similarities between bare singulars and weak definites as well as their crosslinguistic complementary distribution suggest that both types of phrases should receive the same semantic analysis. Thus, extending the present account of weak definites to bare singulars becomes relevant. This possibility has already been entertained by Le Bruyn, de Swart, and Zwarts (2011). However, a number of questions need to be solved as part of this extension.

The most evident question is how to deal with the fact that bare singulars do not have a definite determiner. An obvious way to account for this difference is by postulating that bare singulars are DPs with a covert definite article. Although I believe that this approach has some virtues, one of them being simplicity, there is another alternative that I would like to propose here, although the details of its implementation will be left for future research.

The proposal is to treat bare singulars nominals as DPs experiencing a syntactic movement of the noun heading the NPs inside the DPs to the determiner phrase domain. Interestingly, this possibility has been considered (e.g. Longobardi, 1994; Longobardi, 2001) for another domain in which there is alternation between the presence and the absence of the definite article both within (35) and across (34) languages, namely, the domain of proper names:

- (34) a. **Valeria** llegó a la fiesta sin su novio. (Spanish)
 b. **La Valeria** llegó a la fiesta sin su novio. (Spanish)
 ‘(The) Valeria came to the party without her boyfriend.’
- (35) a. Fui a **la India**. (Spanish)

- b. Ik ging naar **India**. (Dutch)
'I went to India.'

In the light of this similarity, the question that arises is what if a syntax and semantics of proper names of atomic kinds would also be assumed for weak definites and bare singulars, as Zribi-Hertz and Jean-Louis (2012) have already suggested?

One piece of evidence that makes this idea attractive is the existence of some uses of proper names in languages like English (36) or Spanish (37) which have an interpretation similar to that of weak definites and bare singulars (and in Spanish the bare-definite alternation is also possible with this type of phrases). In these cases it seems clear that the names are indeed naming a kind rather than an individual:

- (36) a. My neighbor went to **Walmart** on Black Friday and I did too.
(My neighbor and I could have gone to different Walmarts)
b. Lola works at **McDonald's** and Alice does too.
(Lola and Alice could be working at different McDonalds)
- (37) a. Fui a **Walmart** el sábado y fue espantoso.
b. Fui **al Walmart** el sábado y fue espantoso.
'I went to Walmart on Saturday and it was awful.'

A refinement of Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts's theory in terms of names of kinds is worth pursuing because it has the potential to provide a straightforward explanation to the alternation between bare singulars and weak definites and to nicely link it to an analogous phenomenon in the domain of proper names. In addition, the idea is valuable because it would contribute to the study of different strategies to name kinds in natural language, which seems to still be a barely explored research area.³

Having said that, it is also important to acknowledge the potential difficulties that such a refinement would encounter. For example, an anonymous reviewer has remarked that giving bare singulars and weak definites a proper-name treatment is unjustified since whereas for proper names to use or not the determiner is in general optional within the languages allowing the alternance, the choice between bare singulars or weak definites is a matter of complementary distribution. I agree that this is something to

³Works like Jespersen (1927), Carlson (1977), Dayal (2004), Krifka (2004), and Borik and Espinal (2012) have suggested that generic definites (like in *the dodo is extinct*) could be considered to be names of kinds. The context of this idea was the observed difference between generic definites and another kind-level phrase in English, that is, bare plurals. Each type of phrase has different semantic properties and distribution. For example, generic definites occur less commonly than bare plurals (like in *dodos are extinct*). To account for this, the idea that these authors entertain is that, whereas bare plurals make reference to all the members of a kind, generic definites rather refer to the kind itself.

consider. However, as Sánchez-Sánchez and Aguilar-Guevara ([submitted](#)) argue, the complementary distribution that bare singulars and weak definites exhibit is also happening for proper nouns with and without definite article that name objects other than persons, such as names of places, colors, days, etc. (see van Langendonck, [2008](#), for an extensive classification of proper names).

1.4 Assessing the nature of the content of sentences with weak definites and bare singulars

The following examples illustrate one more time the literal and enriched meaning conveyed by sentences with weak definites and bare singulars:

- (38) Lola went to the supermarket.
 LM = Lola went to a supermarket.
 EM = Lola went to do grocery shopping.
- (39) Theo went to church.
 LM = Theo went to a church.
 EM = Theo went to attend Mass.

A question that arises is what the semantic and pragmatic nature of LMs and EMs is. From an intuitive viewpoint, it would seem obvious that LMs reflect truth-conditional content whereas EMs do not do so. The fact that it is not possible to associate EMs directly with any of the constituents of the sentences (e.g. nothing in (38) explicitly commits to grocery shopping) rather suggests that these inferences might be conversationally implicated.

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the analysis of weak definites presented in Section 1.3, both LMs and EMs appear to be entailments. Recall that, according to this approach, the logical form of a sentence like *Lola went to the supermarket* would be as follows:

$$(40) \quad \exists e[Go\text{-}to(e) \wedge Ag(e) = lola \wedge R(Loc(e), \mathbf{S}) \wedge U(e, \mathbf{S})]$$

This logical form states that Lola is the agent involved in an event of going to a location exemplified by the supermarket kind, and that event is part of the stereotypical usages associated with that kind. The first part of this statement – that Lola is the agent involved in an event of going to a location exemplified by the supermarket kind – clearly corresponds to the LM of the sentence, namely, that Lola went to a supermarket. The second part of the statement – that the event is part of the stereotypical usages associated with the supermarket kind – corresponds to the EM, that Lola went to do grocery shopping, considering that in our daily life the stereotypical way of using supermarkets involves doing grocery shopping. In other words, the

proposed presence of the relation U in the logical form of the sentences is compatible with their corresponding EMs being truth-conditional.

Thus, whereas the empirical viewpoint and the discussed analysis of weak definites coincide in treating LMs as truth-conditional content, they conflict with each other in the way they approach to EMs: the empirical viewpoint considers EMs to be non-truth-conditional and the theory predicts that, given the inclusion of the U relation in the logical form of the sentences, are truth-conditional.

In order to corroborate the coincidence between the empirical approach and the discussed theory of weak definites with respect to LMs, and the controversy regarding EMs, this section addresses the semantic and pragmatic nature of LMs and EMs. To do so, it will be examined, among other things, whether or not LMs and EMs display four properties, namely, reinforceability, defeasibility, at-issueness, and projectivity, which the literature have proven to be useful in the characterisation of different types of inferences (see Abbott, 2000; Beaver and Geurts, 2010; Gazdar, 1979; Grice, 1975; Heim, 1992; Horn, 1996; Horn, 1984; Horn, 2002; Karttunen and Peters, 1979; Levinson, 2000; Potts, 2004; Potts, 2005; Potts, 2007a; Potts, 2007b; Roberts, 1996; Roberts, 2006; Roberts, Simons, Beaver, and Tonhauser, 2009; Simons, 2001; Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts, 2011; Stalnaker, 1974; Tonhauser, 2011; Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts, and Simons, 2013, among many others). By examining these properties, the behaviour of LMs and EMs will be compared to that of regular entailments (Es) and conversational implicatures (ConIs).

1.4.1 The nature of literal meanings

The first matter to discuss here is whether LMs display reinforceability. A content conveyed by the utterance of a sentence is said to be reinforceable if the content can be stated explicitly without causing redundancy. As the following examples show, LMs do not seem to display this property:

(41) #Marta went to the store and went to a store in the neighborhood.

(42) #Marta went to church and went to a church in the neighborhood.

The second property to discuss is defeasibility, which is the capacity of inferences to be subject to cancellation or suspension without causing their triggering sentence to be incoherent. Cancellation happens when the speaker uttering the sentence explicitly commits herself to the falsity of the proposition corresponding to the content. Suspension is when the speaker simply does not commit to the truth or falsity of the proposition. As the following example shows, LMs are not defeasible:

(43) a. #Marta went to the store but I am not sure that she went to a store. (Suspension)

- b. #Marta went to the store but she didn't go to a store. (Cancellation)
- (44) a. #Marta went to church but I am not sure that she went to a church. (Suspension)
- b. #Marta went to church but she didn't go to a church. (Cancellation)

Notice, however, that sentence (44b) would not sound so odd if it described, for example, a situation in which Lola attended Mass in the garden of a house instead of in a church because the church in which the mass should have taken place was burned down. In general, defeating the literal meaning of some bare singular and weak definite sentences in this way is not impossible. This issue will be addressed at the beginning of section 1.4.2.

The third property to discuss here is at-issueness. There is not a unique and simple definition of what at-issue content is (works like Abbott, 2000; Potts, 2005; Roberts, 1996; Roberts, Simons, Beaver, and Tonhauser, 2009; Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts, 2011, illustrate the diversity of definitions). The way Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2011) define it is in terms of the concept of Question Under Discussion (QUD), which, according to Roberts (1996), corresponds to the current discourse topic in a conversation: an implicit question which utterances constituting conversational moves attempt to resolve. Several tests have been proposed to identify whether or not a content is at-issue (see Tonhauser, 2011, for a complete battery). One of them is precisely to assess the inferences' capacity to answer a question in a dialogue. As the following examples show, LMs display that capacity:

- (45) A: Where are you going?
B: I am going to the supermarket.
- (46) A: Where are you?
B: I am in bed.

Another at-issueness test, very commonly used, inquires whether an inference is susceptible to direct denial. The idea is that, if a proposition p can resist a dissent followed by an utterance conveying a proposition q , which is alternative to p , then p can be considered at-issue content. LMs are susceptible to direct negation:

- (47) A: Marta called the doctor yesterday.
B: That's false! She called a friend not a doctor.
- (48) A: Lula went to church yesterday.
B: That's false! She went to a Buddhist temple.

Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2011) have proposed that at-issueness is relevant for determining another property, namely, projectivity, which is the last one to discuss here. A content conveyed by the utterance of a sentence is said to be projective if it holds even when the trigger of the content occurs under the scope of sentential operators such as negation, antecedent of conditional or modals. Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2011) have proposed that projection is inversely correlated with at-issueness; in particular, they hypothesize that only contents which are not at-issue have the potential to project, because sentential operators only affect those propositions that are part of the utterances' main point, i.e., what addresses the QUD. As the following examples show, LMs are not projective inferences:

- (49) a. Marta went to the store.
LM = Marta went to a store.
- b. Marta didn't go to the store. (Negation)
LM does not survive.
- c. If Marta went to the store this morning, I won't go tomorrow.
(Antecedent of conditional)
LM does not survive.
- d. Maybe Marta went to the store. (Epistemic modal)
LM does not survive.
- (50) a. Marta went to church.
LM = Marta went to a church.
- b. Marta didn't go to church. (Negation)
LM does not survive.
- c. If Marta went to church this morning, I will go tomorrow. (Antecedent of conditional)
LM does not survive.
- d. Maybe Marta went to church. (Epistemic modal)
LM does not survive.

In conclusion, LMs are non-reinforceable, non-defeasible, at-issue and non-projective meanings. As such, they behave as regular entailments (51), which are also non-reinforceable (52), non-defeasible (53), at-issue (54), and non-projective (55) inferences:

- (51) Lula loves Marta and John.
E = Lula loves Marta
- (52) # Lula loves Marta and John. In fact, Lula loves Marta.
- (53) a. # Lula loves Marta and John but he doesn't love Marta. (Cancellation)

b. # Lula loves Marta and John and maybe he loves Marta. (Suspension)

(54) A: Lula loves Marta and John.
B: That's false! Lula only loves John.

- (55) a. Lula loves Marta .
E = Lula loves someone.
b. Lula doesn't love Marta (Negation)
E does not survive
c. If Lula loves Marta, he will suffer (Antecedent of a conditional)
E does not survive
d. Maybe Lula loves Marta (Epistemic modal)
E does not survive

Before concluding this section I would like to remark that, although it was expected that LMs behave as regular entailments, it was far from trivial to submit LMs to a whole battery of tests to determine it. One reason why this was important is to dismiss the possibility that LMs behave as non-regular entailments, such as Horn's (2002) assertorically inert entailments (AIEs). AIEs, although part of the main proposition conveyed by a sentence, are somehow outside the scope of what the sentence is really about. An example of AIE is the meaning of sentences with the approximative adverb *almost*, illustrated in (56). According to Sevi (1998), the meaning of these sentences comprises both a *proximal* proposition of the type 'x came close to P', and a *polar* one of the type 'x did not P'. The polar proposition is an AIE:

- (56) Gore almost won the election.
Proximal component = Gore came close to winning.
Polar component (AIE) = Gore did not win.

AIEs are similar to regular entailments in that they are non-reinforceable (57), and non-defeasible (58) meanings:

- (57) #Gore almost won the election but he didn't win it.
(58) a. #Gore almost won the election and maybe he won. (Suspension)
b. #Gore almost won the election but he won. (Cancellation)

However, AIEs differ from regular entailments in that they are not susceptible to direct negation (59), which suggests that they are not at-issue meanings.

- (59) A: Gore almost won the election.
B: That is not true! #He won.

Correlatively, AIEs seem to be able to project (60):

- (60) a. Gore almost won the election.
 AIE = Gore did not win.
- b. It is not the case that Gore almost won the election. (Negation)
 AIE survives
- c. If Gore almost won the election, he might faint when he finds out. (Antecedent of a conditional)
 AIE survives
- d. Maybe Gore almost won the election. (Epistemic modal)
 AIE survives

The possibility that LMs had something in common with AIEs was suggested to me to account for the fact that, although LMs are entailed by the sentences, they do not seem to be what the sentences are really about. In the end, when saying that Lu is in jail, what we really want to express is that she is imprisoned and not that she is located in a jail. Nevertheless, the tests have shown that, at least so far, LMs behave like regular at-issue entailments.

1.4.2 The nature of enriched meanings

Before the meaning properties of EMs are examined, it is important to mention three other facts about EMs, which will gain relevance throughout the discussion. The first one is that EMs and LMs are related in such a way that EMs typically implicate LMs. For example, in the example *Lu is in jail*, the EM that Lu is to serve a sentence usually requires the LM that is Lu in fact situated in a jail to be true in order for it to be true as well. Similarly, the EM of the sentence *Lola called the doctor*, that Lola called to ask for medical assistance, typically implicate the LM that she called a doctor. Having said that it is important to acknowledge that, according to the consulted informants, using weak definite and specially bare singular sentences to describe situations in which the literal meaning is not true, is not completely impossible. For example, one could say that Lu is in jail if she is under house arrest.

The second fact is that an EM typically involves the characteristic purpose of use of the object designated by the weak definite or bare singular in question. Nouns heading weak definites and bare singulars are functional nouns, i.e., nouns designating objects with a purpose of use (with a *telic role* in terms of Pustejovsky's (1995) Generative Lexicon Theory). They designate musical instruments (61), communication devices (62), means of transport (63), establishments (64), home spaces (65), machines (66), professions (67), and natural places associated with particular functions (68):

- (61) a. Romeo played **the oboe**.

- b. Jimi Hendrix played **guitar** upside down and backwards.
- (62) a. When was the last time you listened to **the radio**?
 b. Children who consistently spend more than 4 hours per day watching **TV** are more likely to be overweight.
- (63) a. Martha waited for **the bus** 20 minutes before the stop time.
 b. It's ok, we caught **the train** anyway.
- (64) a. Martha thinks that I have money in **the bank**.
 b. Charlie was in **the hospital** from Monday to Thursday.
- (65) a. I ran to **the bathroom** and made it just in time.
 b. What we do in the lead up to going to **bed** directly impacts how we're able to function the following day.
- (66) a. I ran on **the treadmill** today instead of just working out on **the elliptical**.
 b. Did you hand wash the dishes before using **the dishwasher**?
- (67) a. My wife called **the doctor** today.
 b. Daddy, next time bring **the plumber**!
- (68) a. Luisa's boyfriend proposed to her while they were biking in **the mountains**.
 b. I want to sleep on **the beach** before I die a boring death.

EMs always allude to these purposes of use. For example, the EM of *Lola went to the store* is that Lola went to buy some groceries, and, in fact, the purpose of stores is to sell groceries; similarly, the EM of *Lu is in jail* is that she is imprisoned, and the purpose of jails is to keep prisoners. Hence, it is possible to say that EMs are grounded in the lexical semantics of the nouns.

Related to this, the third fact about EMs that is important to mention here is the implication of the way they are paraphrased, which is as tenseless purpose clauses rather than as full sentences with conjugated verbs. For example, the paraphrase of the EM of the sentence *Lola looked in the mirror* is *to see her reflection* and not *Lola saw her reflection*. The aim of opting for the subordinate clause is to capture that a weak definite (or bare singular) sentence conveys that a subject does something (corresponding to the literal meaning) with a purpose (corresponding to the enriched meaning). This purpose might be achieved or not but that is irrelevant to the felicitous use of the sentence. This irrelevance is reflected on the fact that examples as the following ones are possible:

- (69) *Context*: Lola became a vampire mysteriously and she does not know it yet. However, she has already noticed a series of changes on her body and, as she is worried, she decides to go to the doctor. When the doctor asks her what seems to be the problem she replies:

Sentence: Something is wrong with me, doctor. For instance, yesterday I looked in the mirror, and I couldn't see my reflection.

- (70) *Context:* Lola walked to her school this morning to take her usual classes but on her way she met a classmate who told her that the school was closed because the teachers are on strike. When she returns home, twenty minutes later, her mother asks her where she has gone and why she returned so quickly. Lola replies:

Sentence: I went to school but the teachers are on strike.

If instead of only conveying the intention of a subject of achieving a purpose, weak definite and bare singular sentences would also convey that the purpose indeed takes place, in which case a full sentence would be a more appropriate paraphrase of EMs, then the sentence in (69) under the weak reading of the definite, and the sentence in (70) would both be infelicitous.

Now the properties of enriched meanings will be examined. The first one again is reinforceability. As the following sentences show, EMs can be stated explicitly without causing redundancy:

- (71) a. I went to the supermarket to do some grocery shopping.
b. Jason went to the hospital to get some medical services.
- (72) a. Lu is in jail to serve a sentence.
b. Theo went to church to attend Mass.

In contrast, EMs are not defeasible. Therefore, as the examples below show, adding a continuation that cancels or suspends EMs causes weak definites to be interpreted as specific ones (73) and bare singulars to be unacceptable (74):

- (73) a. Lola went to the supermarket, but maybe she didn't go to do grocery shopping but to attend a demonstration against violence. (#weak) (Suspension)
b. Lola went to the supermarket, but not to do grocery shopping but to attend a demonstration against violence. (#weak) (Cancellation)
- (74) a. #Lola went to church but maybe she didn't go to attend Mass but to pick up a friend. (Suspension)
b. #Lola went to church but not to attend Mass but to pick up a friend. (Cancellation)

It is important to remark that, in these examples, the continuations not only include clauses explicitly contradicting the EMs. Crucially, the clauses also state that the reason why the agent interacts with the object designated by

the weak definite or bare singular in question is not typical for that object. Thus, for example, sentence (73) not only explicitly cancels that Lola went to do grocery shopping but that she went to do something typical of a supermarket. This important detail will be explained later, in Subsection ??.

There is another indirect way to show that EMs are not defeasible. As explained before, an EM typically involves the characteristic purpose of the object designated by the weak definite or bare singular of the sentence conveying the EM. Crucially, using the sentence in a context in which the purpose of the object is somehow not available creates oddity. Consider the following context and sentence:

- (75) *Context:* Ana and Bert are exploring the attic of their grandmother's house. Suddenly, Bert finds a box full of old newspapers. He takes one of them and starts reading it. Ana sees this and asks Bert what he is doing. Bert replies:

Sentence: I am reading the newspaper.

In this context, the sentence, under the weak reading, sounds odd unless it is taken as a joke. Admittedly, the effect is rather subtle and can easily disappear as the weak definite can always be reinterpreted as a specific definite. But now consider what would happen with a bare singular sentence. Consider example (76). In the context of that example, Ana's answer also sounds incoherent unless it is assumed that she is joking:

- (76) *Context:* Ana and Bert are exploring a ghost town in Mexico. Suddenly, Ana discovers that a few feet from where they are standing there is a ruined church and starts walking towards it. Bert sees this and asks Ana what she is doing. Ana answers:

Sentence: I am going to church.

What examples (75)-(76) have in common is that the purposes of use associated with the objects designated by *the newspaper* and *church* are blocked. An old newspaper cannot fulfill its function, that is to say, to inform about the daily news. Similarly, a ruined church is not a place where somebody can go to attend Mass or to pray. If the objects' main purpose of use is blocked, then the EMs associated with the sentences (i.e. that Bert is attempting to get informed about the daily news, in the newspaper case, and that Ana is going to pray or to attend Mass, in the church case) are also canceled. The consequence of this cancellation is that these sentences sound incoherent. This shows that EMs are not defeasible meanings.

It is now time to evaluate whether or not EMs are at-issue contents. As the following examples show, in principle, these inferences are at-issue and therefore able to address the QUD:

- (77) A: Why don't you want me to go to get some groceries tomorrow?

B: Because I am going to the supermarket right now.
 LM = B is going to a supermarket right now.
 EM = B is going to get groceries right now.

However, applying the deniability test to EMs shows a difficulty. Recall the typical implicational relationship between EMs and LMs showed at the beginning of this subsection. The fact that in general EMs can only be true if the corresponding LMs are true as well creates a difficulty to apply the deniability test. When we deny a weak definite or a bare singular sentence, the proposition we deny in the first instance is the LM and this automatically defeats the EM. Therefore, we must somehow make sure that the denial only targets the EMs. One way to do so is by adding a continuation to the denial which ensures that the LM still holds and supports the denial of the EM at the same time, as shown in examples (78)-(79). If we accept that the following examples are felicitous, then they corroborate that EMs are, in fact, at-issue:

- (78) A: Lola went to the supermarket.
 B: That's not true. She walked to the Wal-Mart around the corner but only to pick up a friend.
- (79) A: Lu is in jail.
 B: That's not true. It's true that right now she is living in the State Prison but she is living there because she is doing an internship and not because she is serving time.

The final matter to discuss in this subsection is the reaction of EMs to the projectivity test. Due to the same reason the original negation test fails to validly show whether EMs are at-issue meanings, the projection test is problematic. As examples b-d in (80) and (81) show, embedding under the scope of sentential operators inevitably suspends the truth of the propositions corresponding to the LMs, and this suspends the truth of the propositions corresponding to EMs because EMs depend on LMs. Thus, although the projection test shows that EMs do not hold under the scope of operators, we cannot say that this happens for the right reasons, i.e. because the operators affect the EMs as it is expected given their at-issue nature:

- (80) a. Marta went to the supermarket.
 LM= Marta went to a supermarket.
 EM = Marta went to do grocery shopping.
- b. Marta didn't go to the supermarket. (Negation)
 Neither LM nor EM survives.
- c. If Marta went to the supermarket this morning, Laura won't go tomorrow. (Antecedent of conditional)
 Neither LM nor EM survives.

- d. Maybe Marta went to the supermarket. (Epistemic modal)
Neither LM nor EM survives.
- (81) a. Marta went to church this morning.
LM = Marta went to a church
EM = Marta went to attend Mass.
- b. Marta didn't go to church this morning. (Negation)
Neither LM nor EM survives.
- c. If Marta went to church this morning, she is probably tired now.
(Antecedent of conditional)
Neither LM nor EM survives.
- d. Maybe Marta went to church this morning. (Epistemic modal)
Neither LM nor EM survives.

Although it is not easy to draw conclusions from the application of the projection test, it is reasonable to believe that EMs are non-projective. If EMs were projective, then we would encounter contradictions in (80b)-(80c) and in (81b)-(81c), or redundancies in (81d) and in (81d). For example, sentence (80b) would mean that Marta did not go to a supermarket and she went to do grocery shopping; sentence (80c) would mean that Marta went do grocery shopping and, if she went to a supermarket, Laura won't go tomorrow; and sentence (80d) would mean that Marta went to do grocery shopping and she maybe went to a supermarket. As neither contradiction nor redundancies are the case in these sentences, it is possible to adventure that their EMs do not project.⁴

In conclusion, EMs are reinforceable, non-defeasible, at-issue, and (arguably) non-projective meanings. Let us now see the implications of this behavior. If it was not because EMs are reinforceable, we could say that they are entailments. However, as we know, reinforceability is a characteristic property of conversational implicatures (cf., Grice, 1975; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000).

To account for this conflict, I propose to treat EMs as being partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated, the latter due to the intervention of Grice's conversational maxim of relevance. The idea would be that, in a sentence like *Lola went to the supermarket*, what is truth-conditional,

⁴The weakness in this argument is that one could counter this possibility assuming that EMs do project, but this projection gets suppressed in case it leads to anomalies. This happens with presuppositions like those associated with possessives (e.g. *John's children are ill* presupposes that John has children). These presuppositions project (e.g. *Maybe John's children are ill* still presupposes that John has children) unless there is a contradiction (e.g. in *Maybe John's children do exist!* the presupposition that John has children is contradictory and therefore gets suppressed). As can be seen, this is parallel to what happens in sentences (80b)-(80d) and (81b)-(81d). Although it is a possibility to treat EMs as projective meanings that get suppressed if oddity is generated, it seems that it is better to treat them as non-projective meanings.

along with Lola going to a supermarket, is that Lola went there for a purpose stereotypical of supermarkets. On the other hand, what is conversationally derived is that Lola went there to do grocery shopping, which is, among all the exemplifications of the stereotypical purposes of supermarkets, the most stereotypical according to our world knowledge. In other words, the proposal is that stereotypicality plays twice a role in the interpretation of weak definite and bare singular sentences, once as an E (e.g. the reason to go to a supermarket is a stereotypical one), and once as a ConI (e.g. the exemplification of the stereotypical purpose of supermarkets that is the most stereotypical is to do grocery shopping).

To clarify the proposal it is useful to revisit what has been said about the theory of weak definites that was discussed in Section 1.3 and see how the proposal is actually grounded in it. According to the theory, a sentence like *Lola went to the supermarket* has the denotation represented by the logical form store in (40), repeated) in (82), which corresponds to a non-empty set of events in which Lola, the agent, moved to a location exemplifying the supermarket kind S , and those events constitute stereotypical usages of S , as the U relation indicates:

$$(82) \quad \exists e[\text{Go-to}(e) \wedge \text{Agent}(e) = \text{lola} \wedge R(\text{Loc}(e), \mathbf{S}) \wedge U(e, \mathbf{S})]$$

As mentioned before, the presence of the relation U in the logical form of the sentences is compatible with EMs being truth-conditional. However, to be more precise, this compatibility is only partial. The logical form in (82) states that Lola is involved in an event that is a stereotypical usage event of the supermarket kind. However, the logical form does not specify that the event involves grocery shopping. This part of the interpretation is a stereotypical exemplification of the stereotypical purpose of supermarkets, which is derived by means of a pragmatic reasoning supported by a stereotype constructed by our linguistic community as from our world knowledge. In other words, the analysis of weak definite sentences previously presented is actually more compatible with EMs being partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated than with EMs being only entailed.

The mixed nature of EMs explains their meaning properties as follows. The aspect of the EMs that is entailed is that an event takes place with a purpose stereotypical of the type of object designated by the weak definite or bare singular in question; in the case of *going to the supermarket*, the event of going to a realization of the supermarket kind. As such, this meaning part is at-issue, non-projective, and non-defeasible content. On the other hand, the aspect of EMs that is conversationally implicated is the exemplification of the stereotypical purpose associated with the type of object in question; in the case of *going to the supermarket*, the exemplification of the stereotypical purpose associated with supermarkets is to do grocery shopping. Therefore, this meaning part is reinforceable. The following reasoning illustrates,

again with the case of *going to the supermarket*, how the ConI would be derived:

- (83) A: Why don't you want me to go to get some groceries tomorrow?
 B: Because I am going to the supermarket right now.
B's Reasoning:
- i. A is following the conversational maxim of relevance.
 - ii. His remark would not be relevant unless the fact that he is going to the supermarket right now is relevant to why he doesn't want me to go to get some groceries tomorrow.
 - iii. That he is going to the supermarket right now means that he is about to engage in an event of going to a location exemplified by the supermarket kind, and that event is part of the stereotypical usages associated with that kind.
 - iv. The most stereotypical usage associated with the supermarket kind is to buy groceries, so A is probably doing so.
 - v. A assumes I will reason in this way, and has not said anything to stop me from doing so.
 - vi. In conclusion, the stereotypical event associated with the supermarket kind in which A is about to engage is buying groceries.
- ConI = The stereotypical event associated with the supermarket kind in which A is about to engage is buying groceries.

Before concluding, it is important to provide a precision about the way defeasibility on EMs was tested in 1.4.1, which needed to wait until now. Recall that in order to test this property, the examples used were like *Lola went to the supermarket, but not to do grocery shopping but to pick up a friend*. In this example, the sentence *Lola went to the supermarket* is followed by a continuation comprising two parts. The first part, *but not to do grocery shopping*, contradicts explicitly the inference that Lola went to do grocery shopping. The second part, *but to pick up a friend*, specifies the reason why Lola went to a supermarket. To pick up a friend is an atypical reason why people go to supermarkets. Without the second part, the continuation would only cancel the most stereotypical exemplification of the stereotypical purpose of supermarkets, namely, to do grocery shopping. As this part is conversationally implicated, according to the proposal, cancellation does not cause the weak definite *the supermarket* to lose its weak reading. Precisely what the atypical reason does, apart from reinforcing the cancellation of the implicature that Lola went to do grocery shopping, is to cancel the entailment that Lola went to the supermarket for stereotypical purposes of supermarkets (going to pick up a friend is not one of them). Defeating the entailment does cause the weak definite to become a regular, specific definite.

Related to this issue, now it is also possible to see why the sentence *I am going to the supermarket* is compatible with a situation in which the speaker

is going to a supermarket to buy groceries but also with a situation in which the speaker is going to return some beer bottles and get some money back. In contrast, the sentence, under the weak reading of the definite *the supermarket* is incompatible with a situation in which the speaker is going to a supermarket to pick up a friend. The explanation is that only in the first two situations a supermarket is being used in a stereotypical way and therefore the pragmatic reasoning giving rise to the corresponding ConIs can take place, as (83) above and (84) below show respectively. In contrast, the last situation does not exemplify the stereotype and that contradicts the truth-conditional part of the EM, which is precisely that Lola went to fulfill a stereotypical purpose of supermarkets.

(84) A: Why don't you want me to go and return these beer bottles tomorrow?

B: Because I am going to the supermarket right now.

B's Reasoning:

- i. A is following the conversational maxim of relevance.
 - ii. His remark would not be relevant unless the fact that he is going to the supermarket right now is relevant to why he doesn't want me to go and return these beer bottles tomorrow.
 - iii. That he is going to the supermarket right now means that he is about to engage in an event of going to a location exemplified by the supermarket kind, and that event is part of the stereotypical usages associated with that kind.
 - iv. A stereotypical usage associated with the supermarket kind nowadays is to return bottles for recycling, so A is probably planning to do so.
 - v. A assumes I will reason in this way, and has not said anything to stop me from doing so.
 - vi. In conclusion, the stereotypical event associated with the supermarket kind in which A will engage is returning beer bottles.
- ConI = The stereotypical event associated with the supermarket kind in which A will engage is returning beer bottles.

In sum, the proposal is to treat EMs as being partly entailed, which is captured by the presence of the stereotypical usage relation *U* in the logical form of the sentences, and partly conversationally implicated, which exemplifies these stereotypical usages. This proposal explains the mixed behavior of EMs.

1.5 Conclusions

This paper has discussed the semantic and pragmatic nature of LMs and EMs. To do so, it was assessed whether or not these inferences display re-

inforceability, defeasibility, and at-issueness. The main conclusion about LMs is that they are non-reinforceable, non-defeasible, at-issue and non-projective meanings. As such, LMs can be considered regular truth-conditional content. In contrast, the main conclusion regarding EMs is that they are reinforceable, non-defeasible, at-issue, and (arguably) non-projective meanings. Given this behavior, they cannot be straightforwardly reduced to one single type of meaning. Therefore, it has been proposed to analyze EMs as being partly truth-conditional and partly conversational implicature. This treatment can explain their mixed behavior and, furthermore, is compatible with Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts's analysis of weak definites and its possible extension to bare singulars.

Acknowledgements

This research was sponsored by the Program UNAM-DGAPA-PAPIIT (project IA401116 "Definitud regular y defectiva en la lengua natural"). I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, the volume editors as well as Henriette de Swart, Bert Le Bruyn, Rick Nouwen, Julia Pozas Loyo, Violeta Vazquez-Rojas, Joost Zwarts, and audiences of the Leiden Utrecht Semantics Happenings, Seminario de Semántica y Sintaxis del Centro de Estudios Lingüísticos y Literarios de El Colegio de Mexico and Seminario de Filosofía del Lenguaje del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM, because their valuable comments played a significant role in the writing of the final version of this paper. Of course, the usual disclaimers apply.

References

- Abbott, B. (2000). "Presuppositions as nonassertions". In: *Journal of pragmatics* 32.10, pp. 1419–1437.
- Aguilar-Guevara, A. and M. Schulpen (2014). "Modified weak definites". In: *Weak Referentiality*. Ed. by A. Aguilar-Guevara, B. Le Bruyn, and J. Zwarts. *Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today* 219. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Aguilar-Guevara, A. and J. Zwarts (2013). "Weak definites refer to kinds". In: *Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes* 42. Ed. by Claire Beyssade and Roberta. Pires de Oliveira, pp. 33–60.
- Aguilar-Guevara, Ana (2014). *Weak definites: Semantics, lexicon and pragmatics*. Dissertation Series 360. Utrecht: LOT.
- Aguilar-Guevara, Ana and Joost Zwarts (2011). "Weak Definites and Reference to Kinds". In: *Proceedings of SALT 20*. Ed. by Nan Li and David Lutz, pp. 179–196.
- Bach, Kent (1994). "Conversational implicature". In: *Mind & Language* 9.2, pp. 124–162.

- Bach, Kent (2006). "The top 10 misconceptions about implicature". In: *Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean studies in pragmatics and semantics in honor of Laurence R. Horn*. Ed. by Betty J. Birner and G.L. Ward. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 21–30.
- Baldwin, Timothy et al. (2006). "In search of a systematic treatment of determinerless PPs". In: *Syntax and Semantics of Prepositions*. Ed. by Patrick Saint-Dizier. Vol. 29. Text, Speech and Language Technology. Springer, pp. 163–179.
- Beaver, David and Bart Geurts (2010). "Presupposition". In: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. CSLI.
- Beysade, Claire (2014). "Back to uniqueness presupposition". In: *Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes* 42. Ed. by Claire Beysade and Roberta. Pires de Oliveira.
- Borik, O. and M.T. Espinal (2012). "On definite kinds". In: *Recherches Linguistiques de Vincennes* 41, pp. 123–146.
- Carlson, Greg, Natalie Klein, Whitney Gegg-Harrison, and Michael Tanenhaus (2014). "Weak Definites as a Form of Definiteness: Experimental Investigations". In: *Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes* 42. Ed. by Claire Beysade and Roberta. Pires de Oliveira.
- Carlson, Greg, Rachel Sussman, Natalie Klein, and Michael Tanenhaus (2006). "Weak definite noun phrases". In: *Proceedings of NELS 36*. Ed. by Christopher Davis, Amy Rose Deal, and Youri Zabbal, pp. 179–196.
- Carlson, Gregory. (1977). "Reference to kinds in English". PhD thesis. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
- Carlson, Gregory. and Rachel Sussman (2005). "Seemingly indefinite definites". In: *Linguistic evidence: Empirical, theoretical, and computational perspectives*. Ed. by Stephan Kepser and Marga Reis. Vol. 85. Studies in Generative Grammar. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 71–85.
- Carston, Robyn (2004). "Truth-Conditional Content and Conversational Implicature". In: *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction*. Ed. by Claudia Bianchi. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 65–100.
- Cooley, C. A. (2013). "An empirical investigation of the use and meaning of weak definites". MA thesis. Northwestern University.
- Corblin, Francis (2014). "Weak definites as bound relational definites". In: *Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes* 42. Ed. by Claire Beysade and Roberta. Pires de Oliveira.
- Davis, Wayne A (1998). *Implicature: Intention, convention, and principle in the failure of Gricean theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dayal, Veneeta (2004). "Number marking and (in)definiteness in kind terms". In: *Linguistics and Philosophy* 27.4, pp. 393–450.
- De Swart, Henriette (2013). *Constructions with and without articles*. Talk presented at the workshop 'The Syntax and Semantics of Pseudo-Incorporation' of the 35th Annual Conference of the German Linguistic Society, University of Potsdam.

- Donazzan, Marta (2014). "Familiarity constraints on weak definite DPs". In: *Recherches linguistiques de Vincennes* 42. Ed. by Claire Beyssade and Roberta. Pires de Oliveira.
- Gazdar, G. (1979). *Pragmatics: Implicature, presupposition, and logical form*. New York: Academic Press.
- Grice, H.P. (1975). "Logic and conversation". In: *Syntax and semantics* 3, pp. 41–58.
- Heim, I. (1992). "Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs". In: *Journal of semantics* 9.3, pp. 183–221.
- Horn, L. R. (1996). "Presupposition and implicature". In: *The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory*. Blackwell, pp. 299–319.
- Horn, L.R. (1984). "Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature". In: *Meaning, form, and use in context* 42, pp. 11–42.
- Horn, L.R. (2002). "Assertoric inertia and NPI licensing". In: *Proceedings of CLS* 38, pp. 55–82.
- Jespersen, Otto (1927). *A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles, Part III, Syntax*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
- Karttunen, L. and S. Peters (1979). "Conventional implicature". In: *Syntax and semantics* 11, pp. 1–56.
- Karttunen, Lauri (1975). "Conversational Implicature in Montague Grammar". In: *Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*, pp. 266–278.
- Klein, Natalie (2011). "Convention and Cognition: Weak Definite Noun Phrases". PhD thesis. University of Rochester.
- Klein, N.M., W.M. Gegg-Harrison, G.N. Carlson, and M.K. Tanenhaus (2009). "Special but not unique: Weak definite noun phrases". In: *Semantics and pragmatics, from experiment to theory*. Ed. by U. Sauerland and K. Yatsushiro. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 264–175.
- Klein, N.M., W.M. Gegg-Harrison, G.N. Carlson, and M.K. Tanenhaus (2013). "Experimental investigations of weak definite and weak indefinite noun phrases". In: *Cognition* 128, pp. 187–213.
- Krifka, Manfred (2004). "Bare NPs: Kind-referring, indefinites, both, or neither?" In: *EMPIRICAL*, pp. 111–132.
- Kuguel, Inés and Carolina Oggiani (2016). "La interpretación de sintagmas preposicionales escuetos introducidos por la preposición en". In: *Cuadernos de Lingüística de El Colegio de México* 3.2, pp. 5–34.
- Le Bruyn, B., H. de Swart, and J. Zwarts (2011). *Mass-count distinctions in bare PPs*. Ms. Utrecht University.
- Levinson, S.C. (2000). *Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature*. Cambridge: The MIT Press. ISBN: 0262122189.
- Longobardi, Giuseppe (1994). "Reference and Proper Names: A Theory of N-Movement in Syntax and Logical Form". In: *Linguistic inquiry*, pp. 609–665.

- Longobardi, Giuseppe (2001). "How Comparative is Semantics? A Unified Parametric Theory of Bare Nouns and Proper Names". In: *Natural Language Semantics* 9.4, pp. 335–369.
- Lucas, Christopher (2011). "Form-function mismatches in (formally) definite English noun phrases: Towards a diachronic account". In: *The Noun Phrase in Romance and Germanic: Structure, Variation and Change*. Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 159–174.
- McCawley, J. (1978). "Conversational implicature and the lexicon". In: *Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics*. Ed. by P Cole. New York: Academic Press, pp. 245–59.
- Oggiani, Carolina (2013). "La semántica de los nombres singulares escuetos: sus propiedades referenciales". In: *Signo y Señal* 23, pp. 239–255.
- Pires de Oliveira, Roberta. (2013). "Weak (in)definiteness and referentiality". In: *Revista da ABRALIN* 12.1. Ed. by Roberta. Pires de Oliveira, pp. 1–37.
- Potts, C. (2004). "Conventional implicatures, a distinguished class of meanings". In: *The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Interfaces*. Ed. by Gillian Ramchand and Reiss Charles. Oxford University Press, pp. 187–198.
- Potts, C. (2005). *The logic of conventional implicatures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 0199273839.
- Potts, C. (2007a). "Into the Conventional-Implicature Dimension". In: *Philosophy compass* 2.4, pp. 665–679. ISSN: 1747-9991.
- Potts, C. (2007b). "The expressive dimension". In: *Theoretical linguistics* 33.2, pp. 165–198.
- Pustejovsky, James (1995). *The generative lexicon*. Cambridge: The MIT press.
- Roberts, C. (1996). "Information structure in discourse: Towards an integrated formal theory of pragmatics". In: *Working Papers in Linguistics—Ohio State University Department of Linguistics*, pp. 91–136.
- Roberts, C. (2006). *Only, presupposition and implicature*. Ms. The Ohio State University.
- Roberts, Craig, Mandy Simons, David Beaver, and J. Tonhauser (2009). "Presupposition, conventional implicature, and beyond: A unified account of projection". In: *Proceedings of the ESSLLI workshop 'New Directions in the Theory of Presupposition'*.
- Sadock, Jerrold M (1978). "On testing for conversational implicature". In: *Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics*. Ed. by P Cole. Vol. 9. New York: Academic Press, pp. 281–297.
- Sánchez-Sánchez, Aarón Pablo and Ana Aguilar-Guevara (submitted). "Alternancia entre presencia y ausencia de artículo en frases definidas del español". In: *Cuadernos de Lingüística de El Colegio de México*.
- Scholten, Jolien and Ana Aguilar-Guevara (2010). "Assessing the discourse referential properties of weak definite NPs". In: *Linguistics in the Nether-*

- lands. Ed. by Jacqueline van Kampen and Rick Nouwen. Vol. 27. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 115–128.
- Schwarz, Florian (2014). “How weak and how definite are Weak Definites? (To appear)”. In: *Weak Referentiality*. Ed. by A. Aguilar-Guevara, Bert Le Bruyn, and J. Zwarts. *Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today* 219. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Sevi, A. (1998). “A Semantics for ‘almost’ and ‘barely’”. PhD thesis. Tel-Aviv University.
- Simons, M. (2001). “On the conversational basis of some presuppositions”. In: *Proceedings of SALT 11*. Ed. by Rachel Hastings, Brendan Jackson, and Zsofia Zvolenszky, pp. 431–448.
- Simons, M., J. Tonhauser, D. Beaver, and C. Roberts (2011). “What projects and why”. In: *Proceedings of SALT 20*. Ed. by Nan Li and David Lutz, pp. 309–327.
- Stalnaker, R. (1974). “Pragmatic presuppositions”. In: *Semantics and philosophy*. Ed. by Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger. New York: New York University Press, pp. 197–213.
- Stvan, Laurel S. (1998). “The semantics and pragmatics of bare singular noun phrases”. PhD thesis. Northwestern University.
- Stvan, Laurel Smith (2007). “The functional range of bare singular count nouns in English”. In: *Nominal Determination: Typology, Context Constraints, and Historical Emergence*. Ed. by Elisabeth Stark, Elisabeth Leiss, and Werner Abraham. Vol. 89. *Studies in Language Companion Series*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 171–187.
- Stvan, L.S. (2009). “Semantic incorporation as an account for some bare singular count noun uses in English”. In: *Lingua* 119.2, pp. 314–333.
- Tonhauser, J. (2011). “Diagnosing (not-)at-issue content”. In: *Proceedings of SULA 6*, pp. 239–254.
- Tonhauser, J., D. Beaver, C. Roberts, and M. Simons (2013). “Towards a taxonomy of projective content”. In: *Language* 89.1, pp. 66–109.
- Van Langendonck, Willy (2008). *Theory and typology of proper names*. Mouton de Gruyter.
- Williams, Adina (2018). “A Morpho-Semantic Account of Weak Definites and Bare Singulars in English”. In: *Definiteness Across Languages*. Ed. by Ana Aguilar-Guevara, Julia Pozas-Loyo, and Violeta Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado. *Studies on Linguistic Diversity Series*. Language Science Press.
- Zribi-Hertz, Anne and Loïc Jean-Louis (2012). *From noun to name: ‘weak definite’ markers in Modern Martinique*. Talk presented at UMR SFL, Université Paris-8/CNRS.
- Zwarts, Joost (2014). “Functional frames in the interpretation of weak nominals. (To appear)”. In: *Weak Referentiality*. Ed. by A. Aguilar-Guevara, Bert Le Bruyn, and J. Zwarts. *Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today* 219. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.