The Perspectival Basis of Fluid-S Case-Marking in Northern Pomo*

Amy Rose Deal and Catherine O’Connor

Harvard University and Boston University

1. Introduction

Northern Pomo is a language in which the subjects of intransitive clauses do not behave uniformly with respect to case-marking. The subject of sentence (1) is the nominative pronoun man ‘she’. The subject of (2), on the other hand, is the accusative pronoun ma:dal ‘her’.1

(1) man k’otama
    3SF.NOM swim
    ‘She swims/swam.’

(2) ma:dal mikitʰi
    3SF.ACC faint
    ‘She faints/fainted.’

Patterns like those in (1)-(2) in various languages have come to prominence as part of a broader phenomenon of Differential Subject Marking. Dixon (1979) identified two forms of Differential Subject Marking effects found cross-linguistically. In some languages – Dixon lists Mandan, Guaraní and Hidatsa – subject marking depends entirely on the choice of verb. This is what he calls the ‘Split S’ pattern. In other languages – he lists Batsbi and Eastern Pomo – the choice of subject marking is variable with individual verbs, and different ways of marking the subject have consequences for sentence meaning. This pattern Dixon calls ‘Fluid S’.

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The Split S and Fluid S languages discussed by Dixon are generally organized along the same lines. One way of marking the intransitive subject is used in sentences that ascribe volitionality or agentivity to the referent of the subject (in a Fluid S system) or for verbs naming kinds of events generally carried out volitionally or agentively (in a Split S system). This marking is identical with the marking found on subjects of transitive clauses. Thus in a Split S system, a verb like run, which describes an action, marks its subject in the same way as the subject of a transitive clause. The other way of marking the intransitive subject is used in sentences that ascribe no or limited volitionality or agentivity to the referent of the subject (in a Fluid S system) or for verbs naming kinds of events generally carried out non-agentively (in a Split S system). This marking matches that found with the object of a transitive clause. In a Split S system, a verb like fall thus typically marks its subject in the way that a transitive clause marks its object.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receives case associated with subject of transitive</th>
<th>Receives case associated with object of transitive</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent subject (Fluid S)</td>
<td>Patient subject (Fluid S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject of verb assoc. with agency (Split S)</td>
<td>Subject of verb assoc. with patienthood (Split S)</td>
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These well-known sorts of patterns lead us to expect that a complete account of differential subject marking in the intransitive clause might be given under the rubric of theta-theory or a theory of argument structure. In differential marking systems, one case is used for nominals denoting agents, regardless of transitivity; another case is used for nominals denoting patients.

In this paper we want to discuss a kind of Fluid S case marking that poses a challenge for this characterization, and suggest some additional semantic dimensions to which differential subject marking can be sensitive. The case marking alternation we will be concerned with is seen in Northern Pomo with verbs of internal physical experience, including those translated as:

\[
\text{hiccup, blush, fall, urinate, sneeze, be hot, be cold, vomit, cough, be sick, be tired...}
\]

It also extends to some transitive and intransitive predicates of mental or emotional experience, including those translated as:

\[
\text{forget, desire, feel (good, bad etc.), think...}
\]

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1 Abbreviations in Northern Pomo glosses are as follows: ACC accusative, COMP complementizer, DEM demonstrative, EVID evidential, LOG logophor, MEV multiple event marker, NOM nominative, OBL oblique, P postposition, PERF perfective, SMLF semelfactive, 3SF 3rd person singular feminine (and similarly for other person-number-gender combinations).
We contend that differences in case-marking for the subjects of these verbs reflect not thematic role but relationship to the point of view center or contextual judge. The analysis we give builds on relationships between case-marking, logophoricity and evidentiality noted with these verbs by O’Connor (1992). We first review the evidence that case-marking alternations with these verbs are not thematically driven. We then work to make precise the hypothesis that case marking with these verbs depends on the point of view encoded by a context.

2. Northern Pomo Case-marking: Background

Northern Pomo is an SOV, dependent-marking language with three morphological case categories. In a transitive clause, the subject is typically marked nominative and the object, accusative; oblique arguments are marked with a special oblique case.

(3) [ miʔ ⁴⁴ tuh ] mo:w ma-dahad-el k’a:
you.OBL P 3SG.M.NOM POSS-wife-ACC left
‘He left his wife because of/for you.’

Several diagnostics distinguish the subject of (3) from the direct object and the benefactive nominal. The subject alone can control into subordinate clauses, be controlled in subordinate clauses, and serve as an antecedent for a clause-internal reflexive (see O’Connor 1992 ch 6).

Among intransitive verbs, there are several distinct subtypes of case-marking behavior to be discerned. One subclass of intransitives displays the Split S pattern discussed by Dixon. Just as in the cases he discusses, the split with these verbs divides typically agentive intransitive verbs (unergatives), e.g. walk, swim, from verbs where the subject typically denotes a non-agentive undergoer, e.g. bleed, faint (unaccusatives). Subjects of the former verbs categorically mark nominative case, and subjects of the latter verbs categorically mark accusative case.

(4) **Unergative: nominative subject**

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{man} & \text{k’otama} \\
3\text{SF.NOM} & \text{swim} \\
\text{‘She swims/swam.’}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{man} & \text{wa:de} \\
3\text{SF.NOM} & \text{walk} \\
\text{‘She walks/walked.’}
\end{array}
\]

(5) **Unaccusative: accusative subject**

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{ma:dal} & \text{mikitʰi} \\
3\text{SF.ACC} & \text{faint} \\
\text{‘She faints/fainted.’}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{ma:dal} & \text{balaybanema} \\
3\text{SF.ACC} & \text{bleed} \\
\text{‘She bleeds/bled.’}
\end{array}
\]

Unergatives in this class include thaʔ ‘play’ and wan ‘walk’; unaccusatives in this class include xamalc’ikok ‘feel upset’, miboh ‘be bloated’. Subjects of both types of verbs pass the subjecthood diagnostics noted above (O’Connor 1992).
Another subclass of intransitives displays the thematic-role related Fluid S pattern also discussed by Dixon. With these verbs, the referents of subjects marked with the nominative case must be agents, whereas the referents of subjects marked with the accusative case must be undergoers or patients. (All subjects again pass the subjecthood diagnostics noted above.)

(6a) man c'eday-či 3SF.NOM slide-SMLF 'She slides/slid [on purpose].'
(6b) ma:dal c'eday-či 3SF.ACC slide-SMLF 'She slips/slipped [by accident].'

3. Fluid-S beyond thematic role

Verbs of internal experience also show a Fluid S pattern, as we see in (8) and (9).

(8a) ťo: ditʰale 1S.ACC be.sick 'I am/was sick.'
(8b) mo:w ditʰale 3SM.NOM be.sick 'He is/was sick.'

(9a) ťo: yaṭ-ṭa 1S.ACC vomit-MEV 'I vomited'
(9b) mo:w yaṭ-ṭa 3SM.NOM vomit-MEV 'He vomited.'

Verbs of this class have in common that their subject denotes an experiencer of an internal mental or physical process. These examples differ from (6) and (7): Northern Pomo speakers resist construing these verbs in ways that allow for a wider range of roles for the subject. The choice of a nominative subject in (9b) in no way suggests that the referent of the subject is an agent of forced vomiting (e.g. a bulimic). Similarly, the nominative subject of (8b) is not construed as denoting an agent of intentional sickness. At the same time, once again, the deciding factor for case-marking is not a subject/non-subject alternation; all subjects of these verbs pass O'Connor's (1992) subjecthood diagnostics.

The absence of thematic-role related differences between nominative and accusative subjects with internal experience verbs stands in stark contrast to the pattern we see with verbs like c'eday-či ‘slip/slide’ (6) and pʰitik ‘belch’ (7). This contrast goes along with an additional, more subtle difference between the two verb classes. With c'eday-či ‘slip/slide’ and pʰitik ‘belch’, the choice of case is determined by the thematic
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role of the subject and is independent of subject person. With internal experience verbs like ditʰale ‘be sick’ (8) and yat-ᵗᵃ ‘vomit’ (9), on the other hand, the case forms given by speakers in decontextualized sentence elicitations depend on the person of the subject. The examples in (8) and (9) reflect the preferences seen in this context: first person subjects are marked with accusative case (a examples), whereas third person subjects are marked with nominative case (b examples). The marking of second person subjects was more variable; speakers felt that either case form was acceptable.

(10a) miṱo ditʰale
    2SG.ACC  be.sick
    ‘You are/were sick.’

This pattern is especially subtle given that the person split for 1ˢᵗ and 3ʳᵈ persons with verbs of internal experience does not reflect a grammatical requirement. It is a preference only. In the same elicitation sessions, speakers accepted nominative 1ˢᵗ person subjects and accusative 3ʳᵈ person subjects with internal experience verbs, as seen in the following minimal pairs.

(11a) ṭo:  mul  šiʔučiʔ-ye
    1S.ACC  DEM  forget-PERF
    ‘I forgot that.’

(12a) maːdal  tʻacʻama
    3SG.F.ACC  blush
    ‘She blushed’

What is the status of speakers’ flexible person-linked preferences? What truly determines the choice of case-marking for the subjects of these verbs? O’Connor (1992) observes that contextual factors play a significant role. The contextual factors that make 1ˢᵗ person nominative subjects (e.g. (11b)) and 3ʳᵈ person accusative subjects (e.g. (12a)) acceptable with these verbs are linked to point of view. In particular, these verbs allow accusative subjects only when the referent of the subject is the center of point of view.²

This hypothesis calls for a tight link between case-marking and perspective, which we take to be an essentially pragmatic affair. A sentence uttered from a particular point of view is uttered in a context which is specified in a particular way. We can think of the point of view from which an utterance is made as a feature of the context in a Kaplanian sense (Kaplan 1989). Just as we rely on a context to fix the reference of indexicals such as I, here and now, we also rely on a context to pick out a particular individual corresponding to the traditional notion of SELF, center of point of view, or point of view holder. Lasersohn (2005) has dubbed the parameter of context responsible for this specification the judge.

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² Here and throughout, we limit our attention to referential nominals. A fuller account allowing for quantification must be postponed to a later occasion.
On this understanding, we can state the hypothesis from O’Connor 1992 in the following way.

(13)  
**Perspectival Case-Marking Hypothesis**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Subj-ACC } V_{\text{internal experience}} &\text{ is felicitous in context } c \text{ iff } \left[[\text{Subj}]\right]^c = \text{Judge}(c) \\
\text{Subj-NOM } V_{\text{internal experience}} &\text{ imposes no constraint on context.}
\end{align*}
\]

If the perspectival hypothesis is correct, the meaning difference in accusative-nominative pairs like (11) and (12) lies in requirements placed on the context. In (11), the subject is a first-person pronoun, denoting the speaker. The accusative version in (11a) is appropriate only in a context where the speaker is also the contextual judge. Lasersohn (2005) calls a context of this type *autocentric*.

The nominative version in (11b) does *not* require that the speaker be the judge. It does not place a restriction on point of view.

In (12), the subject is a 3rd person pronoun, which is presupposed not to denote the speaker.\(^3\) The nominative version in (12b) places no restriction on the context; it is possible where the speaker is the judge (an autocentric context). In order for the accusative version in (12a) to be appropriate, however, the contextual judge must be the referent of the third-person subject pronoun *ma:dal*. The context cannot be autocentric, then. It must be what Lasersohn calls *exocentric*; (12a) is felicitous in context \(c\) just in case \(\text{Speaker}(c) \neq \text{Judge}(c)\).\(^4\)

If accusative marking is subject to the condition in (13), we start to have a sense of why speakers should choose accusative for 1st person subjects but nominative for 3rd person subjects in “out of the blue” sentence elicitation. Without a rich context establishing another individual as a plausible judge, speakers default to contexts where the speaker is the judge; where the condition on accusative case is met, speakers tend to choose the accusative case.

In the following sections, we present evidence for (13) from the interaction of case-marking patterns with logophoric and evidential marking, and discuss the ability of the hypothesis to cast light on the particular ways in which Northern Pomo speakers translate sentences with accusative subjects of internal experience verbs.

### 4. Logophoricity

Logophoric forms\(^5\) are specialized pronouns which canonically occur in the complements of verbs of speech or thought. The Northern Pomo logophoric paradigm forms part of the

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\(^3\) See the discussion of person features in Heim (2008).

\(^4\) Some differences of formalization aside, this matches Doron’s (1991) characterization of free indirect discourse.

\(^5\) In O’Connor 1992, these were called Non-Clause Bounded Reflexives (NCBRs), following a convention established by Maling (1984).
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independent pronominal paradigm shown in Table 1. The paradigm in (14) situates an additional logophoric form among the pronominal prefixes that indicate the person of the possessor of a kinship stem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case category</th>
<th>1st sg</th>
<th>1st pl</th>
<th>2nd sg</th>
<th>2nd pl</th>
<th>3 sg (masc.)</th>
<th>3 pl</th>
<th>Log sg</th>
<th>Log pl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominative</td>
<td>?a:</td>
<td>ya</td>
<td>ma</td>
<td>ma:</td>
<td>mo:w</td>
<td>pʰow</td>
<td>ţiyi</td>
<td>ţiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accusative</td>
<td>ţo:</td>
<td>yal</td>
<td>miːtɔ</td>
<td>maːl</td>
<td>moːwal</td>
<td>pʰowal</td>
<td>ţiːti</td>
<td>ţiyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblique</td>
<td>ţoʔ kʰe</td>
<td>yaʔ</td>
<td>miʔ</td>
<td>maʔ</td>
<td>moːwaʔ</td>
<td>pʰowːaʔ</td>
<td>ţiʔ</td>
<td>ţiyaʔ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Case paradigms for some independent pronouns

(14)  ‘my daughter’  ?aːmi-pʰane  ‘his/her/their daughter’  ba- pʰane
‘your daughter’  mi-pʰane  ‘Logophor’s daughter’  ma- pʰane

Three factors determine the distribution of logophors in Northern Pomo. First, just as Clements (1975) seminally reported for logophoric pronouns in Ewe, Northern Pomo logophoric forms “distinguish reference to the individual whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are reported or reflected in a given linguistic context” (1975:141). We can adopt this analysis into our system by treating logophoric pronouns as indexicals which refer, relative to a particular context, to the judge. Example (15) provides our first example of a Northern Pomo logophoric pronoun in use.

(15)  [ʔami-phanel ţiːti | kʰaː-nam] moːw maxoːy-e
1POSS-daughter.ACC LOG.NOM leave-DET 3SM.NOM regret-PAST
He, regretted that he left my daughter.

The logophoric form in (15) occurs in the classic habitat of such creatures – the complement of a speech or attitude verb. We assume, following the general picture put forward by Schlenker (1999, 2003) and Anand and Nevins (2004), that the affinity of logophoric pronouns for such environments is connected with context shifting. The context relevant for the interpretation of the complement of a speech or attitude verb may differ from the overall (“matrix”) context at least in the value of the judge parameter. To be conservative, we assume that in Northern Pomo, such pairs of contexts differ at most in the value of the judge parameter. The context relevant for the interpretation of the complement may be exocentric (encoding ‘3rd person point of view’) while the matrix context is autocentric (encoding ‘1st person point of view’).

The connection of logophoric forms to exocentric contexts relates to the person specification of logophors, the second factor determining their distribution. Logophoric

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6 Person indexicals do not shift in (non-quoted) speech and attitude reports in Northern Pomo, as we see for a first person indexical in (15). While this is the classic behavior of person indexicals, it is not universal; see Rice (1986), Anand and Nevins (2004) and Deal (2009) for examples of shifty person indexicals in Slave, Zazaki and Nez Perce.
pronouns belong to the third person in Northern Pomo. They are used in contexts of speech and thought reporting only for individuals other than the speaker or hearer.

\[(16a) \ [ \ (\text{ʔa:}) \ / *\text{ʔiyi} \ ] \sim\text{a}:\text{miti} \ ] \text{hm} \ ?\text{a:} \ hi

\[1\text{S.NOM} / *\text{LOG.NOM} \ \text{sleep.lie} \ \text{COMP} \ 1\text{S.NOM} \ \text{say}\]

\text{I said that I slept.}\]

\[(16b) \ [ \ (\text{ma}) \ / *\text{ʔiyi} \ ] \sim\text{a}:\text{miti} \ ] \text{hm} \ ma \ hi

\[2\text{S.NOM} / *\text{LOG.NOM} \ \text{sleep.lie} \ \text{COMP} \ 2\text{S.NOM} \ \text{say}\]

\text{You said that you slept.}\]

\[(16c)^7 \ [ \ \text{ʔiyi} \ / *\text{man} \ ] \sim\text{a}:\text{miti} \ ] \text{hm} \ \text{man} \ hi

\[\text{LOG.NOM} / *\text{3SF.NOM} \ \text{sleep.lie} \ \text{COMP} \ 3\text{S.NOM} \ \text{say}\]

\text{She said that she slept.}\]

This paradigm suggests that logophoric forms, like ordinary third-person pronominals, are presupposed not to denote the speaker or addressee. Therefore, if we are correct in hypothesizing that they must refer to the judge, \textit{they may only do so in a context that is exocentric}. The contextual values for \textit{speaker} and \textit{judge} must be distinct. Verbs of speech and attitude may trigger an exocentric context, as in (15-16), but exocentric contexts can also play a role independent of such predicates, as shown in (17). Here, the matrix subject is a non-logophoric form, but in the adverbial clause (headed by adverbial complementizer \textit{da} ‘while’), a coreferential logophoric form is used.

\[(17) \ [\ \text{ʔiyi} \ xale=\text{yw} \ č\text{ima}=\text{da}] \ \text{man} \ \text{k}^\text{h}\text{ebe:de-n}

\[\text{LOG.SG.NOM} \ \text{tree}=\text{under} \ \text{sit}=\text{ADV} \ 3\text{SF.NOM} \ \text{sing-PROG}\]

\text{"She is singing while she's sitting under a tree."}\]

Since it does not seem plausible that \textit{da} ‘while’ triggers a shift to an exocentric context, we assume that both clauses in a sentence like (17) are interpreted with respect to the same, exocentric context. Why, then, should only the embedded subject appear in a logophoric form? This example illustrates the third important factor determining the distribution of logophors in Northern Pomo. Logophoric forms in this language require linguistic antecedents. In (17), elicited without a larger context, the non-logophoric matrix subject \textit{man} ‘she’ and the logophoric embedded subject \textit{ʔiyi} are co-referential; the former antecedes the latter. If logophor \textit{ʔiyi} denotes the contextual judge, so too does non-logophoric pronoun \textit{man} ‘she’. The fact that only the embedded subject takes a logophoric form reflects a familiar type of antecedence condition.

Statement (18) summarizes the three conditions to which logophors are subject.

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^7 Use of the non-logophoric pronoun in the embedded clause in (16c) is grammatical when the intended interpretation is disjoint reference between the matrix and embedded subject.
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(18) A logophoric form Λ denoting α is appropriate in context c iff
   a. α is the judge in c  \textit{(perspectival condition)}
   b. α is not the speaker or addressee in c  \textit{(person condition)}
   c. Λ has a linguistic antecedent  \textit{(antecedence condition)}

This analysis leads us to a prediction about logophors and their antecedents, where the two are interpreted with respect to the same context. We expect that logophors and their same-context antecedents will receive accusative case as subjects of internal experience verbs as a matter of course. Accusative-marked internal experience subjects must denote the judge; so too must logophors, and any nominals co-referential with them in the same context. This expectation is borne out.

Example (19) shows the baseline case. In this sentence, which lacks a speech or attitude verb, the absence of logophoric pronouns is consistent with an autocentric context. Accordingly, the 3rd person subject of internal experience verb yat-ṭa ‘vomit’ is marked in the nominative.

\begin{verbatim}
(19) [ ba-pʰane mow:al pʰaşil=kan ] mow yat-ṭa
    3S.Poss- daughter.NOM 3SM.ACC poison=ADV 3SM.NOM vomit-MEV
    ‘Because his daughter poisoned him he vomited.’
\end{verbatim}

In example (20), in contrast, the adverbial clause contains a logophor whose same-context antecedent is the subject of an internal experience verb. The matrix subject must therefore denote the judge, the condition in (13) is met, and accusative case is chosen.

\begin{verbatim}
(20) [ ma-pʰane tiṭi pʰaşil=kan ] mow:al yat-ṭa
    LOG.Poss- daughter.NOM LOG.ACC poison=ADV 3SM.ACC vomit-MEV
    ‘Because his daughter poisoned him he vomited.’
\end{verbatim}

It appears to be the case that 3rd person subjects of internal experience verbs that are logophoric or co-referential with logophors in the same context favor the accusative case to the same degree that 1st person subjects of internal experience verbs do in ordinary conversational contexts (i.e. contexts respecting the autocentric default). In traditional narrative texts, in which the main character may be distinguished as the judge through the use of logophoric forms, internal experience verb subjects picking out the main character will typically appear in the accusative. Example (21), excerpted from a traditional Coyote story, illustrates this trend.\footnote{This example is taken from O’Connor’s unpublished data based on fieldwork with Mrs. Edna Campbell Guerrero.}

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(21) Context: Coyote has just come upon a group of young women bathing in a river, and is striken by lust.

nan čalil ... dileeeey ūti da:
and just aallllll LOG.ACC want
‘and he just wanted them ALL!’

In this example, the logophoric form ūti, referring to Coyote, appears as the subject of an internal experience verb. The logophor denotes the judge; the accusative case, available only to judge-denoting subjects, is accordingly chosen.

Example (21) also illustrates a verb-linked difference which tracks point of view, accusative case and logophoricity. The verb da: ‘want’ appearing in (21) contrasts with a longer form, daʔade ‘want’, along perspectival lines. In (autocentric) elicitation contexts, the accusative subject case and the short stem form da: (as seen in 22a) are limited to 1st person subjects, while 3rd person subjects receive nominative case and the longer form of the stem, daʔade.

A natural analysis of this contrast in verb shape would be to impose a condition on the short-stem form da:, a condition parallel to that imposed on accusative case with internal experience verbs in general (13). The short-stem form is appropriate only if the subject denotes the judge. In (22a), uttered in an autocentric context, the first person pronoun meets this condition. In (21), uttered in an exocentric context, the logophor ūti (its own appropriateness conditions being met) likewise passes the test.

5. Co-occurrence Restrictions with Evidentials

Contexts that license logophoric pronouns provide an opportunity to test our hypothesis (13) in light of their necessarily exocentric character. In this section we examine the case-marking of internal experience verb subjects in a context that must be autocentric. As expected, accusative case-marking for 3rd person subjects of internal experience verbs is disallowed in such a context. The crucial examples come from sentences with evidential suffixes.

In possessing a set of verbal evidentials, Northern Pomo is like the other Pomo languages (McLendon 2003). The evidentials appear as suffixes on the verb stem, occupying the slot where tense/aspect morphemes would appear. They occur only in declaratives. Like the Quechua evidentials investigated by Faller (2002), they seemingly do not contribute to the main assertion; their contribution to meaning may not be

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9 These ‘want’ verbs are representative of a small number of transitive internal experience verbs which obey the subject case marking condition in (13). Note that regardless of the case of the subject, the object appears in the accusative case in (22).
questioned or negated (see O’Connor 1992). Evidential sentences presuppose or conventionally implicate that the speaker/judge has evidence of the appropriate type regarding the main assertion.

(23a) -nhe  sensory evidence, non-visual

mul tiyiš miše-nhe hayu bakoka-nhe
DEM ugly smell-EVID dog bark -EVID
‘That smells bad!’
‘A dog is barking.’

(23b) -na  inferential evidence (based on visual or other sensory evidence)

pʰatay ma na na
weak 2S.NOM be EVID
‘You must be weak.’ (Said on seeing someone fail to lift something.)

(23c) -do  gossip or hearsay evidence

mo:w ma:dal kʰamat don do
3SM.NOM 3SF.ACC angry make -EVID
‘He made her angry (I heard tell)’

We should elaborate at once on the crucially indexical component of these evidentials’ meanings. Evidential suffixes in Northern Pomo appear only in contexts that are autocentric. The values for speaker and judge provided by the context must not be distinct. Therefore, whenever an evidential is appropriate, evidence of the appropriate type must be available to the speaker and, trivially, to the judge.

Northern Pomo evidentials may be embedded only in direct quotation, where both speaker and judge parameters are shifted from their matrix values.

(24) mu:l tiyiš miše-nhe hin mo:w hi
DEM ugly smell-EVID COMP 3SM.NOM say
‘“That smells bad!” he said.’ (‘You’re quoting what he said.’)

In contexts with distinct values for speaker and judge, evidentials may not be used. They cannot, therefore, be used in a sentence like (25), where the logophor tiyi ‘she’ in the adverbial clause refers to a judge presupposed not to be the speaker.

(25) *tiyi xale =yow čima=da man kʰebe:de-nhe
LOG.SG.NOM tree =under sit=ADV 3SF.NOM sing-EVID
"She is singing while she's sitting under a tree (I have sensory evidence)."

The conditions on evidential sentences are summarized in (26).
An evidential sentence $\phi$-E is appropriate in context c iff
a. Speaker(c) = Judge(c)
b. The speaker/judge has evidence of the appropriate type regarding $\phi$.

If evidentials require autocentric contexts, we predict that their availability in internal experience clauses with accusative subjects will depend on the person of the subject. Our hypothesis (13) leads us to expect that accusative case will appear on internal experience verbs’ subjects only when the subject denotes the judge. Evidentials appear only when the judge is the speaker. Therefore, we expect evidentials to co-occur with accusative subjects of internal experience verbs only when the subject denotes the speaker. While we do not have available a complete paradigm in this respect, the evidence that has been gathered in this area is consonant with our prediction. Third-person accusative-marked internal experience subjects are incompatible with evidentials:

(27a) ma:dal šiʔučiʔ
(27b) *ma:dal šiʔučiʔ -do
3SF.ACC forgot 3SF.ACC forgot -EVID
'She forgot!' 'She forgot! (they say)'

Sentence (27b) can be ‘saved’ by changing the accusative of the subject to a nominative. The clause with nominative subject is consistent with an autocentric context, which allows the evidential to be felicitous.

(27c) ma:n šiʔučiʔ -do
3SF.NOM forgot -EVID
'She forgot (they say)'

In the domain of evidentials, once again, third-person accusative subjects of internal experience verbs pattern with logophoric forms. They require an exocentric context. In Northern Pomo, the presence of an evidential rules this out.

6. **Expressive translation**

Matthewson (2004) emphasizes the importance of speaker comments and translations as clues to subtle semantic distinctions. When Northern Pomo speakers were asked to translate or paraphrase Northern Pomo sentences with verbs of internal experience into English, they often rendered sentences with accusative subjects differently from those with nominative subjects. Particularly when the subject was 3rd person, sentences with accusative subjects, but not those with nominative subjects, were rendered into English with expressive voice quality, facial expression and occasionally other expressive elements, including emotives like “Awww” or “Ohhh!”.

(28a) mo:wal ditʰale
3SM.ACC be.sick
'Ohhh, he’s siiick!'

(28b) mo:w ditʰale
3SM.NOM be.sick
‘He’s sick.’

[ ‘You’re telling someone that he is sick.’]
We suspect that speakers used expressive translations as a way of illustrating the kinds of contexts where 3rd person accusative subjects of internal experience verbs are felicitous. Expressive language is known to show what Potts (2007) calls perspective dependence. In Potts’ characterization, an expressive uttered in context c conveys the heightened emotional state of Judge(c). In a case like (28a), given that (a) the emotive interjection and expressive intonation indicate a heightened emotional state for the judge and that (b) the sentence describes an experience that leads to heightened emotional states, a plausible assumption is that the intended judge is the referent of the subject pronoun, the experiencer of the sickness. The kind of context that most naturally makes the speaker’s expressive English translation felicitous is an exocentric one—precisely the kind of context that supports the choice of accusative case for the Northern Pomo subject.

Our perspective on the data in (28) and (29) thus rests crucially on a methodological hypothesis about the task of translation. We hypothesize that speakers’ translations can aim to capture not only semantic but also pragmatic aspects of linguistic meaning. In the case at hand, differences between the two languages complicate this task. Northern Pomo sentences (28a) and (29a) require exocentric contexts (given their third person subjects, plus the condition in (13)), but they impose no requirement that any individual be in a heightened emotional state. The English expressive material used in the translations suggests the same type of context (given what could be inferred about the identity of the judge, along the lines just sketched), but by slightly different means.

Supporting this interpretation, we notice a contrast in expressive translations between sentences with 1st and 3rd person subjects. Sentences with 1st person accusative subjects could be translated expressively, but speakers did not feel that expressive translations were necessary. We take this to reflect the autocentric default, which also leads to a person-based split in case-marking in elicitation (see section 3). Since speakers by default use the speaker as the value of the judge parameter, they did not feel constrained to produce English translations which are informative as to the judge parameter’s value.

On the other hand, contrasts in expressive translation become informative again if we consider the ways that sentences with 1st person nominative subjects are translated. A speaker who uses an internal experience verb with a 1st person nominative subject conspicuously fails to require that the speaker be the judge of the relevant context. This may be because the speaker is clearly not the judge, e.g. in a logophoric context. Alternatively, it may be because the speaker does not want to be interpreted as making an expressive claim from her own perspective. Indeed, reports of internal experience with 1st person nominative subjects seem to lack the potential for expressiveness seen with 1st person accusative subjects, as the pairs below demonstrate.
Speakers suggest contexts for these nominative examples that avoid expressiveness. They are portrayed as simple reports devoid of emotional content. They choose expressive translations, by contrast, for the parallel examples with accusative subjects.

7. Conclusions

While the most familiar of differential subject marking systems are organized along roughly thematic lines, subject marking in Northern Pomo is a complex affair involving not only distinctions based on the lexical meaning of verbs but also distinctions connected with the contextual determination of perspective. Building on the work of O’Connor (1992), we have proposed a particular treatment of the perspectival meaning of case-marking on subjects of internal experience verbs. Accusative case-marking on the subjects of these verbs imposes the requirement that the subject of the internal experience verb denote, informally, the individual whose point of view is being represented, or more formally, the (Lasersohnian) judge of the (Kaplanian) context.

The requirement imposed when the subject is accusative leads to interactions with person marking, logophoricity and evidentiality. Contexts by default are what Lasersohn calls autocentric; the speaker and the judge are the same. First person pronouns, therefore, which denote the speaker, make excellent accusative subjects for internal experience verbs. These pronouns pick out the judge in an autocentric context; the condition on accusative case is met. Third person pronouns, which are presupposed not to denote the speaker, are not used with accusative case when they serve as subjects of internal experience verbs in contexts respecting the autocentric default.

Logophoric contexts provide the opposite view of this perspective-linked pattern. In view of the distribution of logophoric pronouns in Northern Pomo, we have proposed that logophors in this language (and perhaps more broadly) are indexicals which refer to the judge, relative to a context, but which are presupposed not to denote the speaker or addressee. Logophors thus live on contexts which are exocentric in Lasersohn’s terms. The speaker and the judge are distinct. In contexts where logophors are licensed, third-
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person pronouns picking out the judge are used with the accusative case as subjects of internal experience verbs.

Evidential contexts are of interest, by contrast, for their rigid autocentricity. If a verbal evidential is used in a context, the speaker and the judge of that context must be the same. Therefore, logophoric forms cannot be used, and the accusative case may be used for subjects of internal experience verbs only when they are 1st person. Third-person subjects of internal experience verbs are forbidden from carrying the accusative case in evidential sentences.

The empirical picture behind these generalizations and hypotheses speaks to the starring role of perspective in the grammar of Northern Pomo. Perspectival contrasts sit at the heart of the logophoric system, the evidential system, and the system of marking subject case. Advances in the formal treatment of perspective thus offer crucial tools for the analysis of this under-studied language. The language in turn offers a rich set of data demonstrating the variety of ways in which perspectival meanings may be expressed in natural languages.

References


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Amy Rose Deal  
318 Boylston Hall  
Department of Linguistics  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
ardeal@fas.harvard.edu

Catherine O’Connor  
2 Sherborn St.  
Program in Applied Linguistics  
Boston University  
Boston, MA 02215  
mco@bu.edu